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Powerful semiotic signs like the Great Wall of China and the Berlin Wall served 
significant communicative functions. The modern culture of nation state wall building 
continues despite the fact that the security fences are obsolete. Wall advocates argue 
that security fences deter undocumented immigrants from trying to cross the border 
illegally. The walls also function to stop terrorism or other criminal threats. This paper 
applies semiotic and hermeneutic methods to examine and compare the communication 
functions of South African apartheid with the U.S. Mexico border wall. Structuration 
Theory (ST),and Dissociation and Dimensional Accrual (DAD) are applied to discuss 
the consequences to communication from such barriers.  
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Communication functions of South Africa Apartheid and the U.S. Mexico Security 
Fence 
 Throughout time, humans have created enormous physical structures such as 
walls, dams, buildings, and cultural artifacts for a variety of reasons. Some of these may 
include showing ingenuity, creativity, and skill of an individual or group. Nations have 
used these structures to show off new technologies, gain political advantage over rival 
nations, or attempt to control the mobility of peoples. Other structures illustrate the need 
to overcome and control nature. All of these structures are signs and/or messages that 
gain cultural meaning through social interaction. Without such interaction, they would 
be nothing more than concrete, steel, dirt, and stone. The presence of these walls says 
something about the individuals, communities, or nations that built them.  
Historically humans have built all kinds of walls that came in many shapes and 
sizes, using everything from stones and mud to metal, wood, and concrete. Walls serve 
a variety of purposes including providing safety from the elements, providing security 
from attacking enemies, separating people from communities or serving as an 
ideologically or symbolically powerful symbol. Beyond the physical structures 
themselves, walls communicate social and cultural meanings. Walls define a friend, a 
criminal, an illegal alien, or a terrorist. They can potentially have political, social, 
economic, and other meanings depending on the context in which people build them, 
and the other circumstances surrounding them. They help define our identities, cultures, 
nations, and the world.  
Some of the most iconic, symbolic, walls are the Great Wall of China and the 
Berlin Wall. Rojas (2010) described how the Great Wall has manifested the “power, 
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unity, and longevity” (p. 2) of China throughout history. The Great Wall was further 
described as, “A defensive barricade spanning China’s northern frontier and linking 
contemporary China back to its first unified dynasty, the Wall symbolizes the nation’s 
geographic integrity and historical continuity” (p. 2-3). Regardless of historical debates, 
Rojas (2010) concluded that the Great Wall remains an iconic symbol for China and the 
world. The Berlin Wall is another easily recognized symbolic icon. The physical wall 
divided the city, but the ideological Berlin Wall was a symbol of the Cold War that 
divided the world between two superpowers through much of the 20
th
 century.  
Globalization is pushing nations closer together than ever before. Brown (2010), 
Jones (2012), and Nevins (2012) argue that this closeness increases the number of 
conflicts along borders forcing nations to build massive “security” walls to protect 
themselves from threats. For a short time after the Berlin Wall fell, there was hope that 
nations could create a new era of cooperation and communication (Alvarez, 2012; 
Donnan & Wilson, 1999; Houtum, 2012; Jones, 2012; Obama, 2013; Smith-Sivertsen, 
2012). Instead, Jones (2012) indicates that from 2000-2011, countries built or heavily 
renovated at least 25 major border barriers. Wall building has been ongoing since the 
U.S. won the war with Mexico in 1848. The Secure Fence Act in 2006 called for a 
border extending across the entire U.S. Mexico (USMX) border. The Mexican 
government contemplated building a wall on the southern border between Chiapas and 
Guatemala, all while complaining that the USMX fence was unnecessary (Valladares, 
2010). Brown (2010), Nevins (2002, 2006, 2012), Romero (2008), and Rojas (2010) 
highlight that major fences were constructed between Israel and Palestine, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, India and Pakistan, 
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India and Bangladesh, Morocco and Spain, and China and North Korea. Egypt built a 
controversial separation wall along the Gaza Strip (Fleishman & Hassan, 2009; Rojas, 
2010). Malaysia and Thailand have a security agreement to build a fence line in an 
attempt to reduce human, drug, and firearms smuggling (Electronic Fence, 2013). The 
list of barriers continues growing at a steady pace.  
Wall building defines what it means to be a citizen, a legal immigrant, an alien, 
an undocumented immigrant, a terrorist, a criminal, and so forth. In the U.S., we could 
ask, what does it mean to be an immigrant? This is similar to the Berlin Wall. What did 
it mean to be a citizen or a stranger in a divided Berlin? In intercultural communication 
terms, walls help determine individual and collective cultural identities. It is important 
to study walls, as they are a reflection of how people see their fears, ambitions, and 
themselves. The security fence debate across North and Central America is comparable 
to the historical experience of apartheid in South Africa (Coplan, 2010; Nevins, 2002, 
2006, 2012; Spencer, 2009). This dissertation presents the case that apartheid in South 
Africa and the walls on the USMX border serve a variety of communication functions 
to many audiences. South African apartheid and the USMX Security Fence are 
examples of communication failures and extreme sovereignty. 
 
Two Justifications for the Dissertation 
1. The U.S. Wall is a National Security Issue 
Security walls and particularly the USMX border fence are the center point of 
scholarship, media and political attention, and social significance. The first reason to 
study the USMX security fence in a communication context is that it is a major national 
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security issue. Scholars across the social sciences explain that the fence is symbolic of 
post 9/11 nationalist fears such as the fear of “the other” (undocumented immigrants, 
terrorists, drug criminals, and other perceived threats) (Alvarez, 2012; Brown, 2010; 
Brunet-Jailly, 2012; Chavez 2012; Dunn, 2009; Garcia, 2011; Gulasekaram, 2012; 
Jones, 2012; Luke, 2013; Maril, 2011a, 2011b; Nevins, 2012). As an analyst in national 
security issues at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and as member of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community (USIC or IC)
1
, I am highly interested in comprehending the 
communicative functions of border walls.  
After the terrorist attacks on the New York City World Trade Center Twin 
Towers and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001 (9/11), it became 
necessary for the USIC to re-organize counterterrorism efforts that included reforming 
border protection (9/11 Commission, 2004; Kean & Hamilton, 2014; Nevins, 2002; 
Romero, 2008; Brunet-Jailly, 2007). A difficult conundrum was that most of the 48 
terrorists who conducted attacks on the homeland between 1993 and 2001 entered the 
U.S. legally (Camarota, 2002; 9/11 Commission, 2004). The Patriot Act created the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003 consolidating 17 agencies to increase 
information sharing and other kinds of cooperation with the Intelligence Community. 
DHS merged the Immigration Naturalization Service (INS) and the U.S. Border Patrol 
into three units: Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), and Citizenship and Immigration Services. The FBI is the primary 
                                                 
1
 I take personal responsibility for all expressions, views, opinions, analysis, 
and/or conclusions found throughout this dissertation. I am not speaking on 
behalf of the FBI, the Department of Justice (DOJ), or any agency or military 
portion of the U.S. government. The FBI does a security prepublication check 
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agency that investigates terrorism acts and cooperates with immigration agencies to 
investigate other federal crimes.  
The Intelligence Community considers border security to be an important 
national security concern due to the significant number of people crossing the border 
every year. On September 17, 2014, President Obama informed Congress that the U.S. 
is still under a national emergency caused by terrorist acts that occurred in September 
2001 (Message to Congress, 2014). President Obama (2010, 2011, 2013, 2014) outlined 
that border enforcement was a priority to protect the American people from terrorism 
and other threats. The most significant threat identified in intelligence hearings with 
Congress in 2011 and 2012 was Hezbollah and Iranian resources developing an attack 
plan in an allied country in the western hemisphere, and then conducting the attack on 
the American homeland (Clapper, 2012; Levitt, 2012). In 2012, Border Patrol Chief 
Fisher stated, “The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against our Nation defined U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection’s national security mission: nothing less than preventing 
terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States” (CBP, 2012, p. 6). The 
2014 mission statements for the FBI and the DHS indicate that a top priority continues 
to be preventing future terrorist attacks by securing the border and regulating/enforcing 
immigration laws (Core Missions, 2014; ‘What We Investigate, 2014). Politicians and 
intelligence agencies are not the only parties that have a strong interest in immigration 
as it relates to terrorism national security issues. Many scholars across the social 
sciences disciplines note that a national security culture has been resilient over the last 
thirteen years and continues to manifest itself in American culture (Alvarez, 2012; 
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Brown, 2010; Brunet-Jailly, 2012; Chavez 2012; Dunn, 2009; Garcia, 2011; 
Gulasekaram, 2012; Jones, 2012; Luke, 2013; Maril, 2011a, 2011b; Nevins, 2012). 
Immigration is a ubiquitous social, political, and U.S. national security issue. 
There must be a discussion about immigration policies in order to better comprehend 
the communicative functions of walls. According to the 9/11 Commission (2004), the 
terrorist attackers used a variety of legal immigration policies and illegal means to 
travel, plan and create a safe haven for themselves prior to carrying out their attacks. 
The Commission (2004) also noted that millions of people cross U.S. borders every 
year, and more than 500,000 people do so illegally. The U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) 
reported that from 1999-2006, they apprehended just over one million people per year 
along the Southwest border (Apprehension Statistics, 2013). From 2007-2013 the 
apprehension rate reduced to around 500,000 people per year (Apprehension Statistics, 
2013).  
After 9/11, politicians and media groups argue that the Southern border is 
unsecure as evidenced by the fact that thousands of undocumented immigrants and 
criminals continue to cross. In order to ensure the security of the Southwest borders, in 
2006, President George W. Bush and Congress (including then Senator Barak Obama) 
passed the Secure Fence Act of 2006. The law provides the DHS with the statutory 
authority and almost unlimited resources to increase border security with smarter 
technologies and a vast infrastructure of physical fencing in California, Arizona, New 
Mexico, and Texas (Nevins, 2006; Romero, 2008; Secure Fence Act, 2006). 
Immigration was a major election issue in the 2008 and 2012 President Elections 
(Carter, Ellis, Hossain & McLean, 2008; Cisneros, 2014; Maril, 2011a). In 2012, 
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President Obama won 71% of the Latino vote, with a promise that immigration reform 
would be part of his legislative agenda (Brown, Sherman, & Raju, 2012). The Boston 
Bombing in April 2013 also raised questions about loopholes, keeping immigration at 
the forefront of national security concerns. In 2013 and 2014, both political parties 
engaged in the rhetoric of immigration reform in numerous settings. 
Immigration is not the only national security concern resulting from the 9/11 
attacks. The Department of Transportation (DOT) noted in 2012 that 224 million people 
crossed the Canada or Mexico border by train, bus, personal vehicle, or by walking 
across an international bridge. Eleven million trucks crossed a border with over seven 
million loaded containers, and almost 40,000 trains crossed with about two million 
loaded containers (Transportation Statistics, 2012). In the new security culture, the U.S., 
Mexico, and Canada had to re-imagine how they could function together in immigration 
policies, economics, and national security concerns (Brunet-Jailly, 2012; Meyers, 2003; 
Romero, 2008). Meyers (2003) noted that in December 2001 and March 2002 Canada 
and Mexico signed new “smart border” agreements with the U.S. to sustain the 
precedents of NAFTA while protecting each nation’s borders. Furthermore, Brunet-
Jailly (2012) indicated that Canada passed a similar form of the American Patriot Act in 
2004 to increase border enforcement with a specific emphasis on stopping terrorists and 
increasing intelligence sharing with foreign partners. As long as the post 9/11 national 
security culture of xenophobia exists, the border fence and immigration will continue to 





2. Contribute to the Field of Communication Studies  
 In 1985, the President of the World Communication Association Dr. Jeffrey 
Auer speaking at the International Communication Convention in a keynote address 
stated: 
Ironically, it has been the nuclear achievements of our scientists, made at the 
behest of our militarists that have created a potential barrier which may in the 
long run force us to relate instead of annihilate....The essential means of relating 
is communicating....Communication is the critical instrument for working on the 
walls, tearing them down, stone by stone, pulling out each brick of prejudice, 
chauvinism, isolationism, and cultural elitism....We can each contribute by 
understanding, and applying, and teaching human communication. Working on 
the walls that separate us from our fellow men and women is....the great cause of 
our time. And each of us....must in our own way devote some part of our life and 
life's work to that cause, for it is the cause of developing understanding and 
securing peace among the peoples of the world. (p. 80) 
  
Communication scholars have started to participate more in borderlands research, but 
there are still many opportunities to help influence both disciplines. Borderland is a key 
term introduced by Asiwaju (1983) in African border studies. Anzaldúa (1987) used the 
term to describe the USMX border, “Es una herida abierta where the Third World 
grates against the first and bleeds. And before a scab forms it hemorrhages again, the 
lifeblood of two worlds merging to form a third country – a border culture” (p. 3). 
Asiwaju (1983) and Anzaldúa (1987) argue that borderlands research encompasses both 
sides of physical borders, and expands the concept in a sociological sense to include 
anywhere people of different cultures, races, and classes overlap. Asiwaju (1983) and 
Anzaldúa (1987) encourage scholars to deal with the paradox of borders in that they 
keep certain people out while at the same time force others to stay inside a particular 
area. Communication research could provide have a positive impact on how politicians 
and people view the borderlands.  
9 
 
 Communication research on the borderlands is scattered across the discipline. 
Research areas included speeches calling for more attention to walls (Auer, 1985; 
Chavez & Salmon, 2010; Rodriguez, 2008); the Berlin Wall (Bruner, 1989; Passey, 
1973; Rowland 2006); territory/proxemics (Hall, 1966); architecture (Jackson, 2006); 
TV, film, and globalization issues (Chan & McIntyre, 2002; Gitlin, 2002; Kramer, 
2003; Miller, 2002; Lee 2002), media framing (Martinez 2004, Carroll 2006, Rodriguez 
Escobar 2010); the Israel/Palestine Wall (Bars and Renterghen, 2004); dissemination of 
health information through community networks (Ford, Crabtree, & Hubbell, 2009); 
balancing human rights with conservation principles (Shellabarger, Peterson, Sills, & 
Cubbage, 2012); vigilantism, surveillance, and security (DeChaine, 2009; Hasian and 
McHendry, 2012); and rhetorical analysis of citizenship, identity politics and social 
movements (Cisneros, 2012, 2014; Flores, 2003; DeChaine, 2009, 2012; Klipp, 2011). 
None of the communication scholarship currently available has examined the physical 
fence as a communication artifact. This study offers a unique step in the direction of 
examining walls as a semiotic artifact with essential communication functions. 
 I propose to study walls as the primary unit of analysis by employing two 
theoretical perspectives, Structuration Theory (ST), and Dissociation and Dimensional 
Accrual (DAD), to answer questions about the semiotic nature of walls. Organizational 
communication scholars McPhee, Poole, and Iverson (2014) abbreviated Giddens 
(1980, 1993) Structuration Theory as ST (p. 75). McPhee et al. acknowledge that ST 
has been slow to develop in communication research; scholars have applied it almost 
exclusively to the organizational communication context. Banks & Riley (1993) argue 
that ST has received limited attention in communication research that is surprising 
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given the richness of communication concepts within the theory. Banks and Riley 
(1993) suggest one reason for its lack of use is that, “structuration requires a careful 
introduction for the uninitiated, since a number of key concepts have unconventional 
meanings” (, p. 169) including the Hermeneutic Circle, Phenomenology, and Semiotics.  
One common theme in organizational communication literature meta-reviews 
was that ST has potential to explain communication phenomenon, but communication 
scholars rarely apply the theory in their research (Heracleous, 2013; McPhee, Pool, & 
Iverson, 2014). Olufowote (2003) argues that there is no framework for “reviewing and 
evaluating communication scholarship informed by structuration” (p. 4). Heracleous 
(2013) only found six communication studies conducted from 1997 to 2013 that 
employed ST as a main theoretical framework to analyze data or interpret results. 
Finally, McPhee, et al. (2014) highlights the various ways ST is applied in the 
organizational communication context, but ST is still limited in other communication 
scholarship. I am employing ST in my study because it has the potential to identify 
agents and their motives for building walls in South Africa and along the U.S. Mexico 
Border. People tend to see walls as physical rather than ideological. The ideological 
aspect of walling is often implied rather than visible. ST can also help me discover 
larger social structures that helped make physical and ideological fence building 
possible. McPhee, et al. (2014) explained that early versions of ST denied the 
possibility that collective organizations or groups had agency but later backed off from 
this uncompromising view.  
Dissociation and Dimensional Accrual or “DAD” as Kramer (1997, 2013) 
abbreviated it, began developing in 1993 but has limited use in communication 
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scholarship. Callahan (2004) suggested that scholars avoid using DAD theory possibly 
due to its perceived philosophical complexities in theory and method. DAD’s basis is in 
hermeneutics, and the theory is not interested in one particular outcome or desire, but 
rather tries to provide a space for as many perspectives as possible. This allows scholars 
to acquire a holistic view of the phenomenon under study. Some examples include how 
Kim (2002) applies DAD theory to criticize the modern culture of technology that 
heavily influences human communication. Jafri (2003) examines the cultural practice of 
honor killings in Pakistan through the lens of the magic, mythic, and perspectival 
dimensions that DAD describes. Igiel (2014) and Thornton (2008, 2009) analyze how 
national symbols are interpreted through the various viewpoints that DAD theory 
discusses. Applying DAD could identify cultural motivations or other explanations for 
why people communicated with apartheid discrimination and/or the USMX walls. 
Furthermore, assessing and strengthening DAD theory could provide a new contribution 
to communication scholarship. 
 This dissertation consists of the following parts: Chapter 2 is a literature review. 
Chapter 3 describes ST and DAD theory and presents research questions. Chapter 4 
explains the method including the use of semiotics, hermeneutics, and phenomenology 
to analyze the apartheid and the security fence. Chapters 5 and 6 are comprehensive 
investigations of apartheid and the USMX Security Fence. The investigation in each 
chapter develops a semiotic historical context for the artifact, and analyzes numerous 
binary oppositions found therein. I also apply the theories to answer the research 
questions. Chapter 7 concludes my arguments with a comparison of the two artifacts 
and recommendations for future research. Throughout this dissertation process in 
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analyzing these two subjects, I expect to find eidetic meanings of walls from historical 
and current sources. 
 
Chapter Two: Literature Review 
The literature review is comprised of scholarship that concludes international 
borders and border walls are part of a regional identity and culture. The research further 
concludes that walls symbolically represent the modern nation state geopolitical 
ideology where the interests of the sovereign take precedent over local or international 
concerns. This dissertation will analyze walls that communicate intercultural, 
international messages. In the literature review, I make five arguments that justify the 
salient, timely need for this project.  
First, communication scholarship has been limited in borderlands studies, 
despite several calls to pay more attention to this subject. Second, throughout the social 
sciences, scholars recognize borders and boundaries are shifting all across the globe. 
They, like communication scholars, are calling for more research to account for the 
social and cultural consequences of new border landscapes. Third, Borderlands scholars 
(Alvarez, 1995; Anzaldúa, 1987; Asiwaju, 1989, 1993; Brunet-Jailly & Dupeyron, 
2007; Baud & van Schendal, 1997; Coplan, 2010; Donnan & Wilson 1999; Martinez, 
1989; Newman & Paasi, 1998; Sibler, 1995; Strassoldo, 1989) recognize the diversity 
of definitions and perspectives about borders. They call for cross comparisons both 
between local regions within countries and between international borders (Asiwaju, 
1989, 1993; Coplan, 2010; Nevins, 2006, 2012; Spencer, 2009). Fourth, local border 
communities are challenging the geopolitical power or policies of the nation sate 
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(Brunet-Jailly & Dupeyron, 2007; Pickles, 1992; O’Tuathail, 1996, O’Tuathail & 
Agnew, 1992; Toal & Agnew, 2003). Finally, the physical structures of the border 
fences change landscapes by the way nation states build fences. In modern media, 
pictures of the fences are messages creating a semantic landscape that we need to 
examine because they have consequences for individual and group identities, and local, 
regional, national, and international policies.    
 
Communication Research 
 Communication research in borderlands has been somewhat limited and 
scattered across many areas in the discipline. Research areas include speeches calling 
for more attention to walls (Auer, 1985; Chavez & Salmon, 2010; Rodriguez, 2008); the 
Berlin Wall (Bruner, 1989; Passey, 1973; Rowland 2006); territory/proxemics (Hall, 
1966); architecture (Jackson, 2006); TV, film, and globalization issues (Chan & 
McIntyre, 2002; Gitlin, 2002; Kramer, 2003; Miller, 2002; Lee 2002), media framing 
(Martinez 2004, Carroll 2006, Rodriguez Escobar 2010); the Israel/Palestine Wall (Bars 
and Renterghen, 2004); dissemination of health information through community 
networks (Ford, Crabtree, & Hubbell, 2009); balancing human rights with conservation 
principles (Shellabarger et al. 2012); vigilantism, surveillance, and security (DeChaine, 
2009; Hasian and McHendry, 2012); and rhetorical analysis of citizenship, identity 
politics and social movements (Cisneros, 2012, 2014; Flores, 2003; DeChaine, 2009, 
2012; Klipp, 2011). Some of the authors mention there is a fence, but none of the 
communication scholarship currently available has extensively examined the physical 
fence as an influential communication artifact. This study offers unique communication 
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research by examining the communication functions of the walls of South African 
Apartheid and the USMX border fence.  
  There is a unique opportunity to for new communication scholars to expand our 
research into Borderland Studies due to the rapidly increasing number of fences and 
barriers countries or groups built in recent years. Communication continues to play a 
central role in the creation, destruction, and recreation of borders (Chan & McIntyre, 
2002; Cisneros, 2014; DeChaine, 2009, 2012). Security fences by their nature are a 
communication artifact serving two purposes. First, they are a literal message to limit 
and/or stop the physical movement of people. Second, they are a highly symbolic 
message regarding powers between nation-states (Donnan & Wilson, 1999). Walls 
characterize intergroup relations. Communication scholars should contribute to the 
growing body of interdisciplinary literature that exemplifies many dynamic messages at 
the borderlands. The following review of communication literature first discusses how 
humans use architecture to communicate about themselves. Next, the review discusses 
communication and the Berlin Wall through the 1990’s. Finally, the review discusses 
the new security culture that flourished after the terrorist attacks in September 2001. 
 
Architecture and Communication 
 One of the essential ways humans communicate is through their architecture. 
Scholars in semiotics (Noth, 1985/1990; Saussure, 1972/1983), anthropology, (Hall, 
1966; Levi-Strauss, 1963; Rapoport, 2011), intercultural communication (Gebser, 
1949/1985; Kramer, 1997 & 2013; Jackson, 2006), sociology (Gutman, 2011) and non-
verbal communication (Knapp & Hall, 2002; Poyatos, 2002; Richmond & McCroskey, 
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2004) document how architecture is a part of any message environment. Hall (1966) 
stated that studying the way humans construct, divide, and otherwise use and define 
space can "reveal hidden cultural frames that determine the structure of a given peoples 
perceptual world" (Hall, 1966, p. 163-164). Furthermore, Hall (1966) explains that we 
have “different sensory worlds” (p. 2) and selectively screen information, so that two 
people may experience the “same” space, but never in the same way. This is certainly 
the case when experiencing the USMX border wall. Citizens, immigrants, business 
people, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers, coyotes (nickname for human 
smugglers), drug smugglers, and tourists may be in the same space viewing the fence, 
but they have vastly different horizons on what the fence means. Since the security 
fence is a piece of architecture with communication implications, there are some 
questions to consider in researching it. Who is building the wall and why? How does the 
location of the fence architecture affect cultural and social life? 
Unfortunately, Jackson (2006) criticized communication scholars for neglecting 
to study architecture as part of message context stating:  
Architecture’s presence or absence shapes and affects human interaction. 
Architecture is part of what is perceived in a situation. It is absorbed and 
interpreted and consequently affects communication….As an important part of 
the environment, architecture plays a role in the conditions of communication 
which take place around, against, near, or inside the build form. Architecture is 
perceived trough the senses – visual, auditory, touch, small, and kinesthetic. 
Architecture is everywhere people live. (p. 34) 
 
Jackson (2006) was particularly critical on non-verbal communication textbooks 
(Knapp & Hall, 2002; Richmond & McCroskey, 2004) since non-verbal scholars 
claimed that physical context was important, but provided very little guidance on 
architecture, which is a main non-verbal characteristic of a message. Jackson also 
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criticized rhetorical scholars explaining, “traditionally, rhetoricians focus on analysis 
and criticism of speeches and language based texts….Because architecture provides 
physical context for communication interaction, the need to understand its role is a 
crucial part of any rhetorical analysis, yet it is rarely mentioned” (p. 36). In the review 
of communication literature, there were two rhetorical pieces analyzing the Berlin Wall. 
Bruner (1989) analyzed the symbolism of the Wall. Rowland (2006) analyzed President 
Reagan’s speech in Berlin but failed to provide an adequate context that included the 
architectural or historical context that surrounded the event.  
Recently, Latino communication scholars have ignored the architecture of walls 
that play a large role in the chronic borderland problems. The scholars do acknowledge 
that the U.S. government continues to militarize borders because of the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks, but ignore further analysis of how the border architecture 
influences their studies. For example, DeChaine (2009) analyzed the rhetoric of 
alienation tactics of the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps (MCDC) based in Arizona. 
The original purpose of the MCDC was to start building a privately owned border 
fence, but DeChaine (2009) chose not to discuss this important goal in the rhetorical 
analysis. Moreover, Cisneros (2014) analyzes the rhetoric of citizenship mostly for 
undocumented immigrants already in the states but does not include how the border 
wall architecture influences that discussion.  
 
The Berlin Wall and Pre 9/11 Communication Research 
 Borderlands research was generally limited prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall 
(Stoddard, 1989). Therefore, it was not surprising to find that communication 
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scholarship was even more limited in the same area prior to 9/11. I conducted searches 
for borders and walls scholarship in academic journal databases including 
Communication and Mass Media Complete, Communication Abstracts, ABI/Inform, 
the EBSCO Collection, and JSTORE. I conducted additional queries on the National 
Communication Association website that houses 11 prominent communication journals. 
Search terms included words and phrases such as “communication scholar” 
“communication”, “borderlands”, “rhetoric”, “fence”, “wall”, “border”, “security”, 
“U.S. Mexico Border”, “Mexico”, and other project relevant combinations. These 
searches revealed four journal articles: a speech from the President of the World 
Communication Association (Auer, 1985), and three articles related to the Berlin Wall 
(Bruner, 1989; Passey, 1973; Rowland 2006). I found additional research in books from 
the fields of international, mass media, and intercultural communication studies (Chan 
& McIntyre, 2002; Gitlin, 2002; Kramer, 2003; Lee 2002; Miller, 2002).  
 Auer (1985) gave a speech about walls and their consequences for 
communication professionals. Auer discussed historic environmental barriers, and some 
famous historic walls including great mountain ranges, deserts, oceans, rivers, outer 
space, the Great Wall of China, and Hadrian’s Wall. Auer (1985) then highlighted three 
wall barriers built along borders since 1945 including the North Korea/South Korea 
Demilitarized Zone, the Gaza Strip, and the Berlin Wall. Auer went on to suggest that 
these barriers and others like them were symbolic of silence and selfishness that 
permeated the world in 1985. Auer (1985) then compared these physical walls with 
metaphorical barriers faced by intercultural communication scholars. The goal 
according to Auer was to fight against cultural and political barriers that scholars faced 
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throughout the world. Auer then proceeded to discuss how communication associations 
could be successful. Even though Auer (1985) had a theme on walls and even spoke 
about specific physical barriers, the speech was not an analytical research product.  
Bruner (1989) suggests that the Berlin Wall was a political and rhetorical tool 
used by politicians for various symbolic reasons from 1961-1990. Bruner chose to 
analyze the first week of the wall in 1961, President Kennedy’s speech in 1963, 
President Reagan’s speech in 1987 and media coverage and comments by General 
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. There was very little historic context provided 
throughout the article. The only justification Bruner provided for choosing these events 
was that more information was available on them at the time of writing. In addition, 
Bruner did not identify scholarly rhetorical criticism methods used to analyze the 
events. Rather, Bruner insisted that analyzing the wall was a continuing dialectic 
process thus assuming a rhetorical model was unnecessary. I derived three conclusions 
from Bruner’s (1989) analysis. First, the wall was dynamic with changing meaning over 
time. Second, there are many contexts to consider when studying the symbolism of the 
Berlin Wall. It is not enough to discuss some brief history and then move to analysis. 
Third, people on both sides of the Wall had differing narratives and perspectives 
Specific messages included that humans suffered, espionage and political treachery 
were very active regardless of the Wall’s existence. For the West, the Wall was a 
symbol of failure to communicate. For the East, the wall was a symbol of solidarity for 
the collective cause of maintaining the Communist ideology. Bruner’s article was very 
limited in the help in could provide future researches for analyzing the Berlin Wall or 
other modern wall barriers. 
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Similar to Bruner, Passey (1973) did not identify a particular theory or rhetorical 
criticism used to analyze the speech of West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt in 1961 just 
prior to the beginning of construction. Passey (1973) analyzed the audience and the 
international effects of Brants speech in a very general, broad way. Again, this was a 
criticism of a speech, where the Berlin Wall was little more than a historic backdrop, 
not the artifact central to the criticism even though it was because of the Wall that 
Brandt had to give the speech. Passey (1973) concludes that scholars could record 
individual responses to the speech, but in order to discuss international consequences, 
scholars would need to conduct much more research.  
 Rowland (2006) analyzed President Reagan's 1987 Speech at the Brandenburg 
Gate where he used the famous phrase, "tear down this wall". The criticism is about the 
character and persona of President Reagan, his writing staff, and his policies. The only 
reason the Berlin Wall is in the speech is that President Reagan chose to speak there. 
While there is repeated use of the line and the concept of tearing down the wall, there is 
no analysis on how the Berlin Wall functioned as a rhetorical tool, and there is no 
historical context provided for President Reagan’s speech.  
 After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990, some scholars, political leaders, and the 
media expected wall building to decline (Alvarez, 2012; Donnan & Wilson, 1999; 
Houtum, 2012; Jones, 2012; Obama, 2013; Smith-Sivertsen, 2012). Instead, Jones 
(2012) indicated that from 2000-2011, countries built or heavily renovated at least 25 
major wall barriers. In the U.S., the Secure Fence Act in 2006 called for a border 
extending across the entire Southern U.S. border. In 2010, the Mexican government 
contemplated building a wall on the southern border between Chiapas and Guatemala 
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(Valladares, 2010). Other countries currently involved in wall building include Israel, 
Palestine, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Morocco, Spain, China, North Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and Egypt 
(Brown 2010; Electronic Fence, 2013; Fleishman & Hassan, 2009; Nevins, 2002 & 
2006; Romero, 2008).  
Intercultural, international, and mass media communication scholars recognize 
that globalization affects communication across borders (Chan & McIntyre, 2002; 
Gitlin, 2002; Kramer, 2003; Lee 2002; Miller, 2002). For example, in Africa, there are 
between 47-53 countries with an innumerable host of ethnic groups, national 
governments, or quasi-national groups competing, often violently, for limited resources 
across the continent (Asiwaju, 1989 & 1993; Bonchuk, 2013; Donnan & Wilson, 1999). 
Chan and McIntyre (2002) ask how boundaries, increasingly rising out of globalization, 
affect nation states, cultures, and identities. Through communication, humans create 
their identity and culture, so it is imperative that communication scholars investigate 
these concerns. Gitlin (2002) criticizes the Hollywood film and TV industry for 
exporting American culture to other countries resulting in the destruction of their own 
cultures. Kramer (2003) argues that “global cities” are rapidly increasing their 
populations, depleting natural resources, and creating a monoculture that destroys 
indigenous languages and cultures. Miller (2002) examines the consequences of 
globalization and sovereignty on the film industry. Lee (2002) analyzes the theory of 
acculturation recognizing that even when you cross a border, your culture continues 
with you. We adopt new values and add them to what we already have. Although Chan 
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& McIntyre (2002) encourage communication research, the effects of wall building on 
communication is largely still absent in the literature.  
 Chan & McIntyre (2002) explain that one of the complexities of dealing with 
this subject is that "boundaries can be tangible, visible, spatial, and physical as in the 
case of territorial borders, or intangible, invisible, temporal and virtual, as in the case of 
social categorization and symbolic representation" ( p. xv). In the case of South Africa, 
the apartheid ideology was intangible but colonial leaders and later political leaders 
used laws to make the walls of racism visible for almost three centuries. The USMX 
border fence has both visible, tangible, purposes as well as intangible consequences. 
With every fence scholars study, there are going to be multifaceted perspectives to 
review on each side of the fence. 
 Chan and McIntyre (2002) propose examining narratives through discourse 
analysis to comprehend how boundaries affect identity. Discourse is a part of power 
structures so the discourse about boundaries is a sociopolitical act worth examining. 
Their research focuses on how even in a globalizing world, the discourse of national 
identity is still a relevant discussion. Other interdisciplinary research (Gulasekaram, 
2012; Jones, 2012; Nevins, 2002) demonstrates that the discourse of nationalism is 
critical for garnering support to build and maintain the USMX security fence. Wall 
building continues despite all criticism against it.     
 
Communication Research after the September 2001 Terrorist Attacks  
The 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington D.C. created a 
fundamental change in how governments, the public, and borderlands scholars 
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comprehend border security (Brown, 2010; Brunet-Jailly & Dupeyron, 2007; Dunn, 
2009; Gulasekaram, 2012; Jones, 2012; Maril, 2011a, 2011b; Nevins, 2006; Romero, 
2008). I conducted searches for communication research from 2000-2014 that accounts 
for the new national security culture. I used the same search terms, databases, books, 
and other resources that I used in the previous inquiry prior to 2000. Search terms 
included “communication scholar”, “communication”, “borderlands”, “rhetoric”, 
“fence”, “wall”, “border”, “security”, “U.S. Mexico Border”, “Mexico”, and other 
project relevant combinations. Communication scholarship is still limited, rarely 
accounting for the security culture or wall building, and its influences on 
communication.  
Rodriguez (2008) called for a greater focus on border research in the National 
Communication Association's (NCA) Newsletter, Communications Currents. Rodriguez 
(2008) asked a timely question:  
What is the value of devices.... that limit and even end communication between 
different peoples--especially in our....multicultural world where our distances 
and spaces are collapsing and pushing us to reckon with all manner of 
diversity?.... what is ultimately the usefulness of walls and fences in an 
increasingly plural, global, and multicultural world? (p. 1) 
 
Despite the 2008 call, communication research is limited. Mass Communication 
scholars concentrated on the USMX wall, and the Israel security wall by developing 
alternative perspectives from the Palestinian and Mexican viewpoints (Bars & 
Renterghen, 2004; Carroll, 2006; Martinez, 2004; McGreal, 2004, 2011; Rodriguez 
Escobar 2010). Health Communication scholars research how community networks 
disseminate medical information to immigrants (Ford, Crabtree, & Hubbell, 2009). 
Environmental Communication research is interested in balancing human rights with 
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conservation efforts (Shellabarger, Peterson, Sills, & Cubbage, 2012). Rhetorical 
studies and Latino Communication scholars emphasize that the government should 
recognize that many undocumented immigrants are citizens. These scholars study 
various forms of citizenship, the national identity, and immigration social movements 
(Cisneros, 2012, 2014; Flores, 2003; DeChaine, 2009, 2012; Klipp, 2011). Other 
communication research analyzes the overzealous role of some U.S. citizens who act as 
vigilante police at the border. These groups, often referred to as militia groups, do not 
believe the U.S. government is doing enough to stop illegal immigrants or other 
criminals from entering the U.S. illegally (DeChaine, 2009; Hasian and McHendry, 
2012). At the Association for Borderland Studies 2011 Quebec conference entitled, 
"Fences, Walls, and Borders State of Insecurity", there were only three presentations by 
communication scholars in journalism, and a fourth presentation about communication 
technology crossing/ignoring borders. There were 71 presenters at the conference, so 
the fact that only four presenters even touched on walls is significant. Finally, Chavez 
and Salmon (2010) draw attention to the fact that areas such as international and 
intercultural communication have much to offer when discussing border 
communication, especially when it comes to increasing border technology. 
Communication scholarship is still noticeably absent from the borderlands research. 
This dissertation contributes to the academic fields of Communication and Borderland 
studies.  
The Israel Security Fence is not of primary concern in this project but a large 
body of interdisciplinary literature makes comparisons between the Israeli and USMX 
walls. Bars and Renterghen (2004) describe the dichotomy between what Israel defines 
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as a security fence, and Palestine argues is an apartheid wall. It is a glaring example of 
how border walls create a binary opposition with diverging perspectives on either side. 
Israel unilaterally built the fence in 2002 to protect its people from Palestinian suicide 
bombings that occurred from 1993-2004 (Bars & Renterghen, 2004; Yom & Saleh, 
2004). On the Palestine side, the wall literally divides villages and families. Bars and 
Renterghen (2004) explain that the village of Kaffin in the West Bank separates farmers 
from their olive groves and fields. McGreal (2003) describes one family experience:  
From the backyard, Khadija Bdarat can point out the roof of her children’s 
school a few hundred metres up the hill in the Palestinian village of Ras. The 
problem is how to get there. In the way stands Israel’s ‘security fence’, which 
runs across the back of the Bdarats’ home, cutting it off from the village. When 
the motion detectors are switched on and the latest section of the fence is 
declared operational on Friday, the house will fall inside a ‘closed military 
zone’. After that, the Bdarats’ adult children will need a permit to visit their 
parents, and at night the family will be under curfew and not allowed to use the 
only road from the house. (p. 10) 
 
This experience is the norm across the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the U.S., there are 
cities, families, businesses, and friends along the USMX border that face similar issues 
(McGreal, 2011). However, due to the much longer history, conflict, and limited 
geography in the Israel/Palestine region, broad comparisons of the two walls are 
difficult to assess. 
 
Journalism Literature 
Journalism scholars (Martinez, 2004; Carroll, 2006) share opinion pieces 
regarding the history of violence at the USMX border fence. Martinez (2004) explains 
that in 1848 the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo designated the Rio Grande as the 
boundary between the U.S. and Mexico. Prior to the September 2001 terrorist attacks, 
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people moved across both sides of the border without problems. In the new security 
culture, the Border Patrol clamped down on immigration because "presumably, Al-
Qaida was about to smuggle dirty bombs across the Rio Grande" (Martinez, 2004, p. 
49). Martinez (2004) argues that U.S. citizens are the problem since they do not see the 
wall from the side of the developing nation of Mexico. U.S. citizens are tourists that like 
to visit the border to get a quality view of the "other", but then return to their safe homes 
to be separate from it. Conversely, Martinez (2004) states, "from the migrant point of 
view, borders are permeable rather than solid, moving rather than fixed; politically 
expedient rather than morally imperative" (p. 50). According to Martinez, American 
citizens rely on the "Great Wall of America" to protect the country from terrorists or 
perceived threats such as undocumented immigrants. Martinez (2004) concludes that 
the border fence is an obvious failure that contributes to human deaths since people 
have to find other places to cross such as dangerous geographical terrain or travel with 
Coyotes often at a higher price. Even while complaining about the U.S. border, 
Valladares (2010) explains that the Mexican government is considering building their 
own security wall along the border with Guatemala. The Mexican government argues 
that the Southern wall is necessary to stop the rising violence from gangs, increasing 
narcotics smuggling, and migrants from several countries in Central and South America 
who want to reach the U.S. by crossing through Mexico (Valladares, 2010).  
Carroll (2006) is a journalist writing stories of immigrants who die on the 
border. Carroll explains that writing these stories can be difficult for several reasons. 
The stories require great cooperation from Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
Agents, and the Mexican government and/or people. Readers sometimes consider the 
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stories overly sympathetic to immigrants who break the law to get into the states. The 
numbers of undocumented immigrant deaths was not fully recorded by the CBP until 
1998-1999 fiscal years so the true number of deaths is likely much higher than reported 
(Carroll, 2006; No More Deaths, 2014). Carroll (2006) concludes that with the rising 
interest in immigration and border control throughout the late 1990s, it has become 
easier to share the economic story driving the massive migration movement. There is no 
further context or references to wall building in the article.  
The U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) statistics (USBP Profile, 2013) revealed that in 
2013, 445 people died in the nine Southwest Sectors that span from California to Texas. 
Alternatively, there were NO deaths recorded along the Coastal Sector (Miami, New 
Orleans, Ramey) or the Northern Sectors (eight sections that include the entire 
Canadian border). According to the Unitarian Universalist Church of Tucson Ministry 
“No More Deaths – No Mas Muertes” (No More Deaths, 2014), there were 2666 deaths 
in Arizona from 2000 to 2013. No More Deaths Ministry explains that an estimated 
5000 to 6000 people died crossing the USMX border over the same 13-year period 
depending on which private or public agency is recording the statistics. No More Deaths 
Ministry (2014) highlights a major problem in collecting, analyzing, and publicizing an 
accurate number of people who have died:  
When large numbers of people are dying in remote wilderness conditions, the 
number of bodies recovered gives an indication, but only an indication, of the 
true loss of life. No one knows how many are not found. Moreover, many that 
are found are not identified. A complete list of people who have died while 
crossing the border does not exist. (¶ 5) 
 
No More Deaths Ministry has the same problem as other organizations and academics 
who are trying to conduct borderlands research. Undocumented immigrants who cross 
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the border are unable or unwilling to share their experiences due to fear of reprisal from 
the U.S. law enforcement agencies or their own governments. If returned to their 
country of origin, immigrants could face any number of dire consequences (Coleman, 
2008; Coplan, 2010; Ettinger, 2009; Garcia, 2011; Ruben Garcia, personal 
communication, November 9, 2013; Graham, 1991; Jones, 2012; Maril, 2011a; 
Martinez, 1989; Massey, 1981; North, 1987; Petition for Mexican Nationals, 2014; 
USMX IRB, 2010; Rivera-Batiz, 2000). 
 
Environmental and Health Communication 
 Scholars in health and environmental communication studies also recognize that 
collecting data can be a precarious process due to similar fears with their 
“marginalized” target population. Ford, Crabtree, and Hubbell (2009) analyze how 
friends use communication networks to disseminate important health messages to 
communities. Although the research team worked in border cities, they did not make 
any connections to the security fence, and the target population was limited to only 
people on the U.S. side of the border. There was no exploration about expanding the 
study to the Mexican side of the border. Ford et al. (2009) found that community 
networks are essential when disseminating health information to the marginalized 
borderland peoples. However, before the researchers could gather information, they had 
to work with the target communities for several years before receiving the trust of the 
people.  
 Environmental communication scholars Shellabarger et al. (2012) discuss 
conservation efforts, protecting human rights and perceived law enforcement abuses 
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across the borderlands. Shellabarger et al. (2012) note that communication scholarship 
related to borderlands issues is still rare as recently as 2012. The research efforts did not 
discuss fence building, but rather community interactions with ecological concerns. 
Shellabarger et al. (2012) indicate that environmental degradation is increasing since 
security fences force immigrants to cross the border in more dangerous geographical 
locations. This has also upset the relationship some cultures such as the O’odham have 
with their environment. Shellabarger et al. (2012) also suggested that the government 
appears to care more about the national security narrative than local opinions from 
community members and leaders.  
 
Latino Communication Scholarship 
The Latino communication scholar’s body of research is primarily concerned 
with events that take place after people are already living in the U.S. My research 
differs in the fact that it is dealing with communication functions of the physical fence 
line at the USMX border. Latino scholars discuss the rhetoric of citizenship, 
immigration reform, racism, feminism, and nationalism discourse (Cisneros, 2011, 
2012, 2014; Holling & Calafell, 2011; DeChaine, 2012). A handful of Latino 
communication scholars also examine vigilante groups who patrol the borderlands in 
lieu of government agents that have failed to protect the U.S. (DeChaine, 2009; Hasian 
and McHendry, 2012).  
 DeChaine (2012), Cisneros (2011, 2012, 2014), and Holling and Calafell (2011) 
examine immigrant involvement in civic engagement practices regardless of whether 
they are formally recognized by other citizens or the U.S. government. Cisneros (2014) 
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briefly acknowledges that physical borders and the laws create the status that 
distinguishes aliens from citizens. However, regardless of their status, Cisneros’s (2011) 
research finds that many ‘aliens’ are highly patriotic because they consider themselves 
citizens already no matter how the government branded them. Cisnero argues that the 
discourse of citizenship matters more than how a nation legally and institutionally 
defines what a citizen should be. Cisnerso (2011) theorizes: 
Civic belonging is [conceptualized]…. in individual and group performances of 
citizenship. Individuals enact citizenship [by]….consuming information, 
displaying the flag, engaging in public discussions, participating in public 
ceremonies, demonstrating, and even voting….Viewing citizenship as 
performance entails shifting focus from the [institutional] category of 
citizen….to the individual and situated articulation of citizenship. (p. 30). 
 
Cisneros (2014) further confirms that language and actions communicate citizenship 
well beyond how laws or institutions define it. The argument focuses on figurative and 
rhetorical borders of people living around the U.S. while choosing to exclude a 
discussion of the critical influences that the 9/11 terrorist attacks have on citizenship 
discourse. Similarly, Holling and Calafell (2011) offer a collection of essays examining 
rhetoric of Latino communities, but do not discuss the influential effects of wall 
building. Holling and Calafell (2011) explain, “Latin@ vernacular discourse’ refers to 
Latin@’s self-produced texts and performances that interact with and against the 
prevailing discourses about and/or concerning Latin@s” (p. xvii). Like other 
communication research, Latino scholars are not researching wall building. Rather, they 
emphasize studying the rhetorical practices of people. Although there is some overlap 
particularly in alienation discourse, Latino communication research rarely examines 




Rhetoric of Border Vigilante Groups 
A few communication scholars examine extremist vigilante groups who patrol 
the borderlands in lieu of government agents who fail to protect the U.S. border 
(DeChaine, 2009; Hasian and McHendry, 2012). DeChaine (2009), and Hasian and 
McHendry (2012) explore the rhetoric of two popular vigilante groups: The Minutemen 
Project in California led by Jim Gilchrist; and the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps 
(MCDC) formed by Chris Simcox. According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) 
(2005), the two projects joined forces in Arizona in 2005 to bring attention to the issue 
of illegal immigration. Over 1000 volunteers came to Arizona including several White 
Supremacist groups like the neo-Nazi National Alliance. The ADL (2005) notes that, 
“Before the project began, National Alliance fliers, describing illegal immigration as an 
"invasion" that will cause white people to be "a minority within the next 50 years," were 
circulated in several communities along the Arizona border” (¶ 6). The ADL (2006) 
describe that the 2005 movement mainly focused on people of Hispanic descent but 
emphasized that all illegal immigrants are criminals. The ADL (2006) states: “More 
than 400 anti-immigration activists gathered at the event to hear speakers describe 
illegal immigrants as "the enemy within" and "illegal barbarians," while suggesting that 
America was "at war" with illegal immigrants and urging people to "take America 
back” (p. 14). The ADL (2006) further describes how several anti-immigration groups 
racially profiled Latino or Hispanic people, and how the vigilante rhetoric became 
increasingly confrontational and violent.  
Hasian & McHendry (2012) explain that this rhetoric brought attention to the 
illegal immigration issue and the vigilante groups. For example, by the end of 2005, the 
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Minuteman Project was mentioned in at least 1700 national media stories, praised by 
some congressional leaders, and was highlighted in several popular prime time 
television shows including Law and Order, and The West Wing. At its peak, the 
Minuteman Civil Defense Corps (MCDC) claimed to have more than 350,000 private 
American Citizens helping build a private fence in Arizona (DeChaine, 2009). 
DeChaine (2009) argues that the MCDC built a wall because  "[Walls] perform both 
division and containment functions, differentiating the self from others, one culture 
from another, desirable elements from undesirable ones, and, often enough, "us" from 
"them" (p. 44-45). Brown (2011) explains that the MCDC membership numbers are 
vastly inflated, noting that there are 40,000 members in 76 chapters. Beirich (2014), 
with the Southern Poverty Law Center reports that there are 173 anti-immigrant 
chapters scattered across the country, including several White Supremacist and other 
extremist groups.  
 
Communication Research Summary 
In the review of communication literature, first, I discussed the influence of 
architecture on a message. Second, I examined rhetorical criticism research about the 
Berlin Wall and noted a lack of research on the subject of international wall building. 
Finally, I argued that communication scholars made limited contributions to 
borderlands research from 2001-2014. Few studies, including those in the Latino 
communication scholarship emphasize wall building or the new security culture that 




Social Science Research 
  In other fields, scholars recognized the importance of borderlands research, 
particularly after the fall of the Berlin Wall (Brunet-Jailly & Dupeyron, 2007). In the 
1980’s, Asiwaju (1983) pioneered comparative borders research in Africa and Europe. 
Anzaldúa’s (1987) graphic description of the USMX border was a rallying cry for 
scholars to pay more attention to consequences of the borderlands, border fence culture. 
In the 1990’s, the collapse of the Soviet Empire led to the rise of 20 sovereign states 
with many new borders and questions of national identity (Brubaker, 1994). Other 
notable events also caused major geopolitical shifts that created new countries with new 
borders (Newman & Paasi, 1998; O’Tuathail, 1996). Some of these events included 
include the dissolution of Yugoslavia; the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans; the first Gulf 
War in the Middle East; the formation of the European Union (EU); and the creation of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Donnan & Wilson, 1999; 
Newman & Paasi, 1998). By the end of the 1990’s, Donnan and Wilson (1999) 
explained that there were 185 United Nations members and 313 shared borders. Joining 
world organizations did not stop countries from building new walls to keep neighbors 
our or to keep their own citizens in. Beyond the communication studies, four areas of 
the social science research are most relevant to this dissertation. First, I examine the 
history, current state, and limitations of Borderlands research. Second, I review 
definitions used by various academic disciplines that conduct Borderlands research. 
Third, I present geopolitical concepts that have an important symbolic role in 
developing and sustaining state border walls. Fourth, I examine the relationship 




History, Development, and Limitations of Borderlands Research 
 Borderlands research is still a relatively new academic field internationally, not 
taking off until after the fall of the Berlin Wall (Brunet-Jailly & Dupeyron, 2007). 
Previously, borders research fell into other categories such as history (Baud & van 
Schendal, 1997; Sibler, 1994), geography (Martinez, 1989; Newman & Paasi, 1998; 
O’Tuathail, 1996, O’Tuathail & Agnew, 1992), anthropology (Alvarez, 1995; Donnan 
& Wilson, 1999), sociology (Coplan, 2010; Stoddard, 1989), international relations 
(Brubaker, 1994) and comparative international studies (Asiwaju, 1989, 1993; 
Strassoldo, 1989). Social science scholars in these fields recognized the deficiency, and 
began to focus more directly on the borders themselves as a social and cultural actor, 
rather than a traditional object of state power. They called for more scholarship in this 
area to include theory, empirical and/or qualitative methods, and international, cross 
comparative research. 
 Stoddard (1989), the first president of The Association for Borderlands Studies 
(ABS), briefly described this history of the field. Borderlands research originated in the 
1920’s when the fields of agriculture, sociology, and anthropology came together to 
discuss the USMX border (Martinez, 1989). Stoddard (1989) described that during the 
Great Depression, scholars conducted some research in border towns, but the borders 
themselves were not a major variable affecting the research. From the 1940's through 
the 1970's borderlands research became more practically oriented rather than historic or 
theoretical. Scholars introduced an international model identifying the border as a 
transnational geopolitical problem that federal governments should work out. Stoddard 
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(1989) explained that the border was a dysfunctional barrier to the US and Mexico due 
to immense movement or "leakage" from both sides.  
In 1954, Michigan State University brought together scholars from several 
disciplines and combined their borders research into a single report on border activities, 
which started to legitimize scientific research on borders (Stoddard, 1989). After 
Stoddard updated the work from the Michigan State study, the ABS formed, issuing the 
first journal in 1986. The geopolitical international border model was too ideologically 
rigid so scholars abandoned it in the 1970’s for what Stoddard (1989) suggested was a 
more functional view of the border that has become the central concept in borderlands 
studies. A functional model was more capable in accounting for social variables such as 
cultural relationships, local conditions, and the dynamic movement constantly 
happening in the borderlands (Asiwaju, 1989, 1993; Brunet-Jailly, 2007; Baud & van 
Schendal, 1997; Donnan & Wilson, 1999; Newman & Paasi, 1998; & Stoddard, 1989).  
 
Borderlands Research Development in Africa and Europe 
 Scholars in African nations and throughout Europe became part of the 
Association of Borderland Studies (ABS) movement, recognizing their border problems 
were similar to the USMX border issues (Stoddard, 1989). O’Tuathail (1996) argued 
that social science scholars conducted borders research using an outdated geopolitical, 
ideological definition. Asiwaju (1989, 1993) explained that this static demarcation 
resulted in one-sided, internal, nationalistic analysis and policy. Major-General Magoro 
of Nigeria (1985) explained that African borders had unique problems due to how they 
were artificially 'carved up' by European imperialist powers. Magoro argued that this 
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colonialist history caused innumerous border conflicts due to rivaling ethnic groups and 
economic tensions between competing African nations. Asiwaju (1993) pointed out that 
most of the legal instruments used to carve out territories by colonizing European 
powers continued to have legal force even into the 1990’s.  
 Instead of static outdated ideological frameworks, Asiwaju (1989, 1993) urged 
scholars to embrace a functional view of borderlands research. Whether viewing from a 
national or a local functional perspective, Asiwaju argued that researchers could discuss 
social networks, cultural circumstances, socioeconomics, government controlled areas, 
and many types of immigration policies. Borderlands scholars started describing 
borders more as buffer zones than firm demarcations because the was no way to 
delineate a boundary line between most nations and ethnic cultures (Asiwaju, 1989; 
Anzaldúa, 1987; Donnan & Wilson, 1999; Newman and Paasi, 1998). Asiwaju noted 
that the USMX border was a model for conducting cross comparison research. Coplan 
(2010), Nevins (2002, 2006, 2012) and Spencer (2009) expanded on Asiwaju's efforts 
by comparing the USMX border to the South Africa and Lesotho borders, and 
apartheid, illustrating that such research was not only possible, but necessary to better 
understand how borders function on a sociocultural level.  
 In reviewing the state of borders research throughout Europe, Strassoldo (1989) 
noted the similar problems found by Asiwaju and Stoddard. If borders were part of 
research at all, the focus was traditionally regional interpretive, descriptive research 
with no cross comparisons to other European nations or elsewhere. Strassoldo (1989) 
explained that the European border studies research faced similar concerns as African 
nations including ethnic divides and large socioeconomic gaps. This was especially true 
36 
 
when one country is richer/poorer than the other countries with which it shares borders, 
cultural differences, and environmental degradation. Strassoldo (1989) also explained 
that federal entities had geopolitical motives in conducting research. This motive made 
the research biased or unusable. Moreover, European nations claimed to display 
openness in their borders but all political power still resided in central governments. 
Interestingly, Luxemburg, Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands signed the 
Schengen Framework in 1985 that allowed for open borders between those countries, 
but the Schengen agreement was not actually implemented until 1995 due to the fall of 
the Berlin Wall as well as many internal government bureaucratic problems (Boer, 
2011).  
 
Challenges & Limits in Borderlands Research 
 Borderlands research has grown despite some academic, government, and legal 
hurdles that burden the discipline. These are particularly relevant to this dissertation 
topic since they required me to alter my research plan in two proposals and the final 
product. The problems severely limited my ability to use some qualitative research 
methods including interviewing and ethnography. Overcoming academic, government, 
and legal barriers to find and utilize the best information sources will open up paths for 
new research. Communication will play a vital role in overcoming institutional 
challenges that face Borderlands Studies scholars. The following section summarizes 
some of the barriers Borderlands scholars must overcome: 
 First, collecting accurate information through direct interviews and ethnography 
is difficult for a variety of reasons. For this dissertation, the Institutional Research 
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Board (IRB) at the University of Oklahoma highlighted multiple concerns about 
collecting information (Universit of Oklahoma IRB, personal communication, February 
10, 2010). First, they argued that government officials could be at risk of losing their 
jobs or facing sanctions for sharing their opinions without formal permission from their 
agencies. Second, the IRB argued that interviewing undocumented immigrants who 
were in the U.S. illegally could result in their deportation or other consequences. Third, 
the IRB was concerned that law enforcement officials could subpoena my collected 
information to use against undocumented immigrants. Other scholars conducting similar 
Borderlands research have had mixed results in the kinds of information they collected, 
and what other IRB’s allowed  scholars to do, so institutional constraints are not a new 
phenomenon (Coleman, 2008; Coplan, 2010; Ettinger, 2009; Ford, Crabtree, & Hubbell, 
2009; Graham, 1991; USMX IRB, 2010; Martinez, 1989; Maril, 2011; Massey, 1981; 
No More Deaths, 2014; North, 1987; Rivera-Batiz, 2000). 
 The U.S. Mexico Border Health Commission in 2009 and 2010 found other 
concerns when dealing with their respective IRB’s. The commission conducted a survey 
about IRB’s to faculty members, practitioners, and staff members of medical 
institutions who conducted borderlands research. Interviewees concluded that finding 
Mexican university IRB’s was more difficult than working with their U.S. counterparts. 
Furthermore, interviews suggested that IRB’s informed consent policies were not 
culturally sensitive. In some cultures, signing a document where people distrust their 
governments or another institution could be problematic. The survey interviewees 
suggested that a voice recording of consent to participate might actually make people 
feel more comfortable than signing a written consent form. The survey concluded that 
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fixing some of the transnational IRB issues could lead to more productive, safe, social 
research (USMX IRB, 2010).   
Borderlands scholars found a second constraint to effective research. They note 
that obtaining institutional access (governments, private corporations, university 
administrations, etc.) or government funding was very difficult. Sometimes the 
interdisciplinary nature of the work required the approval of two states (Donnan & 
Wilson, 1999; Martinez, 1989). Donnan and Wilson (1999) pointed out that the national 
security concerns of governments are a normal part of the research process. In some 
cases, private corporations or universities are very restrictive in their regulations of 
social science projects they perceived as not being beneficial to their public image 
(Maril, 2011a, 2011b; University of Oklahoma IRB, personal communication, February 
10, 2010).  In some cases, Donnan and Wilson (1999) found that walls are such a 
normal part of society that some institutions do not consider them an artifact worthy of 
academic study. ST (Giddens, 1984; 1993) criticizes this kind of ignorance arguing that 
these type of entrenched social roles should be at the center of our social science 
research. This was especially true when considering the act of ignoring border walls 
means ignoring a very real, visible, sometimes violent, symbol of state power and social 
control. 
 Dr. Maril (2011b), an expert with 17 years’ experience in borderlands research, 
shared his concerns regarding institutional access. In 1999, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) patrol agents were taking classes with Dr. Maril. The 
agents invited Maril to visit the border on an intimate basis. INS administrative 
concerns blocked Maril from obtaining approval for the work at that time (Maril, 
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2011b). It took five years for Maril to obtain the necessary permissions to work with the 
INS agents, or, the newly named Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents after 
September 2001. In 2004, Maril (2011b) finally conducted interviews, was a participant 
observer, and started collecting data for ethnographic descriptions. Maril (2011b) 
worked with CBP for two years which gave him access to exclusive, unique, 
government documents going back to the 1990’s. Maril could not recall another social 
scientist obtaining access to so many institutional materials. Prior to 9/11, several 
scholars recorded there were no concerns when they met regularly with government 
officials or immigrants (Dunn, 2009; Hagan & Baker, 1993; Heyman, 2000; Nevins, 
2002).  
Furthermore, Maril explained that in the post 9/11 period, in order to obtain 
government documents related to the USMX border and related projects, a scholar must 
obtain information through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Even with FOIA 
requests, Maril (2011b) noted that the government was more secretive about documents 
and finances related to the Security Fence between 2004 and 2011 than they were prior 
to the 9/11 attacks. In some cases, agencies may deny requests based on national 
security or privacy concerns. Alternatively, private for profit corporations have no 
obligation to share any information with the public, and would not provide information 
that could damage their profits. Maril (2011) explained that Boeing would not release 
any information about the costs of the security fence they built for the Department of 
Homeland Security.  
A third challenge to conducting borderlands research is that many of the 
available studies treat both sides border issues fairly. This could be due to the scope of a 
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project in focusing exclusively on one side of a border (Coplan, 2010). Further 
inequities occur with the lack of language capacity, knowledge of one or both nations 
under examination, or geographical limitations (Martinez, 1989). Martinez (1989) states 
that parochialism and ethnocentrism taint research when only one side of the border 
receives representation.  
 A fourth challenge in borderlands research is that scholars find it difficult to 
procure primary source materials. Along the USMX border, Martinez (1989) argues that 
there is an awkward power relationship between the U.S. "First World" nation next to 
Mexico, a "Third World" nation. Along the USMX border, Martinez (1989) argues that 
the U.S. side has plenty of academic rigor with the ability to find scholarly research and 
primary sources. On the Mexican side, Martinez notes that there is a lack of support for 
academic research at the border, but some better sources may be found in Mexico City 
where more funding for universities is available. In cross border comparisons between 
South Africa and Lesotho, Coplan (2010) explains that Lesotho has more immediate 
economic concerns to face and likely does not have resources to put towards academic 
rigor that South Africa does.  
  A fifth challenge facing borderlands research is that mapping data is often 
inaccurate, and if requested, does not have a uniform, comparable format for analysis. 
Typically, two nations at the border do not cooperate/coordinate in collecting and 
making demographic, topographical, or geographical data generally available due to 
many more immediate social concerns (Maril, 2011a, 2011b; Martinez, 1989).  
 A sixth difficult for borderlands scholars is a lack of cross comparison data 
between U.S. and Mexico cities, and an even larger gap in the comparative data 
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between other international borders. Although there have been calls for more of this 
type of research, it is an ongoing effort (Asiwaju, 1989; Coplan, 2010; Martinez, 1989). 
Despite interdisciplinary cooperation on scholarship across the international 
community, Borderlands Studies face a lack of support in critical areas. Due to the six 
difficulties facing borderlands research, it is becoming increasingly difficult to collect 
the best possible ethnographic data or conduct interviews for the most accurate, quality 
data. Although these difficulties exist, somewhat limiting the data collection in this type 
of dissertation, they also open up new possible avenues for future research. 
 
Definitions in Borderlands Research 
   Many definitions and characteristics of ‘border’, ‘boundary’, ‘borderlands’, and 
'frontier' open up a broad list of research options and interpretations including a path for 
communication scholarship. The borderlands body of literature indicates that they are 
highly dynamic, demographically diverse, sociocultural areas. (Astor, 2009; Alvarez, 
1995; Anzaldúa, 1987; Asiwaju, 1989, 1993; Baud & van Schendal, 1997; Brunet-
Jailly, 2012; Brunet-Jailly & Dupeyron, 2007; Cisneros, 2014; Coplan, 2010; Darder, 
2004; DeChaine, 2012; DeGenova, 2002, 2004; Donnan & Wilson 1999; Dunn, 2009; 
Holling & Calafell, 2011; Nevins, 2002; Newman & Paasi, 1998; Ono, 2012; Romero, 
2008; Rosas 2006a, 2006b, 2007; Sanchez, 2011; Sibler, 1995; Spencer, 2009) 
Borderlands are made up of local, national, and global networks that compete for 
limited resources and conflicting needs. International and national laws have ever-
expanding definitions for what constitutes a border. Borders are not only physical 
manifestations of communication and/or power, but they are also used increasingly as 
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metaphors for other social issues, which further expand their definitions. This 
dissertation will limit the focus of walls to the case study of South Africa apartheid and 
the USMX border security fence. 
In the history literature, Baud and van Schendal (1997) explain that one 
complexity of these words comes from the etymology and resulting dissimilar 
connotations of the word 'frontier' in English, French, and Spanish. Another problem of 
interpretation arises when there are conceptual differences between government policy 
makers and local cultures. Baud and van Schendal (1997) explain that in history 
literature, the word boundary is used in political and diplomatic contexts to identify a 
dividing line between peoples; border is used when discussing psychological issues and 
regional emphasis; and frontier is preferred to discuss ungoverned regions of territory. 
The reality is that there are huge overlaps between these three terms.  
 In geography, Newman and Paasi (1998) explain that, 
"geographers....understand boundaries as expressions or manifestations of the 
territoriality of states....because geographic processes of socialization have taught us to 
acknowledge the state system within which we live - a spatial system which is 
characterized by more or less exclusive boundaries" (p. 187). Newman and Paasi 
emphasized that geography and landscape research focus on how nation states 
communicate within and across geopolitical boundaries. They recognize that borders 
are much more than a physical location. Rather, borders are highly social, dynamic, 
culturally diverse domains. The changing definition of borders in geography generated 
new research in geopolitics, cultural geography, and landscape studies. 
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 From an anthropological perspective, Donnan and Wilson (1999) argue that 
scholars should be most concerned with how nation states or individuals use borders 
symbolically to create and maintain their identities. The borderlands provide an 
example where local and nation state identities clash. Donnan and Wilson (1999) clarify 
that developments in the borderlands are one way to "demonstrate the importance of 
culture in the mapping out of the progress of nations and states in the modern and 
postmodern worlds" (p. 13). Borderlands peoples constantly re-negotiate identities 
between living in local, national, and international cultures, so scholars should focus 
research efforts there. Finally, Donnan and Wilson (1999) conclude that interpretive 
methods are preferable so scholars can develop the historical and cultural construction 
of nations.  
 According to Alvarez (1995), the US-Mexico border is the icon and model for 
this kind of identity, culture, and community research, but more specifically, it is a 
useful model for conducting research on marginalized peoples for two reasons. First, it 
is the best example of a nation state using politics to regulate and constrict people where 
there should be a natural flow between two nations. Second, Alvarez contends that 
nowhere else in the world do we find a border with a more glaring example of the 
inequality between "First World" and "Third World" nations on so many levels. Alvarez 
(1995) further describes why the US-Mexico border is a unique model for research by 
stating:  
The complexity and problems inherent in such a paradox go beyond everyday 
nation-state negotiations. This paradox reaches into the most local of contexts 
and affects the everyday life of border folk.... The massive exchange of 
commodities, both human and material, dramatically affects life and 
behavior....as does the continuous shifting and reconfiguration of people, 
ethnicity, sexual orientation and identity, and economic hierarchy and 
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subordination....Given the differing political economies and a history of 
conquest and domination, the Mexican-US border is the best example of how 
nation-states negotiate, marginalize, and influence people's ever-shifting local 
behavior....Indians, fronterizos, nortehos, Chicanos, Chicanas, Mexican 
Americans, Mexican(o)s, Anglos, Tejanos, gringos *and agringados, Texans, 
green carders, pachucos, cholos, commuters, and others represent distinct 
historical backgrounds and cultural behaviors. (p. 451) 
 
Interdisciplinary critical scholars prefer a more vivid definition of the 
borderlands. The Chicano Studies critical scholar Anzaldúa (1987) offers a critical way 
to theorize life in the borderlands. In her youth, Anzaldúa was a woman of color trapped 
between the Mexican and U.S. racist, sexist borderlands culture. In order to take back 
her voice, Anzaldúa became a powerful writer and scholar. Anzaldúa (1987) explains, 
“I will no longer be made to feel ashamed of existing. I will have my voice: Indian, 
Spanish, White. I will have my serpent’s tongue-my woman’s voice, my sexual voice, 
my poet’s voice. I will overcome the tradition of silence” (p. 59). As part of her voice, 
Anzaldúa (1987) outlins her definition of the borderlands:  
A borderland is a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional 
residue of an unnatural boundary. It is in a constant state of transition. The 
prohibited and forbidden are its inhabitants. Los atravesados live here: the 
squint-eyed, the perverse, the queer, the troublesome, the mongrel, the mulato, 
the half-breed, the half dead; in short those who cross over, pass over, or go 
through the confines of the “normal.” Gringos in the U.S. Southwest consider 
the inhabitants of the borderlands transgressors, aliens – whether they possess 
documents or not, whether they are Chicanos, Indians or Blacks. Do not enter, 
trespassers will be raped, maimed, strangled, gassed, shot. The only “legitimate” 
inhabitants are those in power, the whites and those who align themselves with 
whites. Tensions grip the inhabitants of the borderlands like a virus. 
Ambivalence and unrest reside there and death is no stranger. (p. 3-4) 
 
Anzaldúa (1987) further describes that borderlands are physical, psychological, sexual, 
and spiritual. Moreover, borderlands exist wherever cultures, races, and classes occupy 
the same space. Other interdisciplinary critical scholars use Anzaldúa’s definition to 
criticize U.S. immigration policy and provide a voice for millions of undocumented 
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immigrants and legal permanent residents who live in the U.S. (Anzaldúa, 1987; 
Cisneros, 2014; DeChaine, 2012; Holling & Calafell, 2011; Nevins, 2002; Rosas, 
2006a, 2006b, 2007; Spencer, 2009).  
 
Geopolitics and Borderlands Research 
 Nation states utilize borders as geopolitical tools for many reasons. 
Governments use borders as a means of security as well as an economic tool to control 
the flow of people and goods between countries (Donnan & Wilson, 1999; Patrick, 
2007; Brunet-Jailly & Dupeyron, 2007).  Borders exclude people (Adamson, 2006; 
Andreas, 2003; Brown, 2010; Bruner, 1989; Dunn, 2009; Heyman, 2004; Jones, 2012; 
Nevins 2002, 2012; Spencer, 2009). Borders represent nationalistic propaganda (Brown, 
2010; Donnan & Wilson, 1999; Gulasekaram, 2012; Pickles, 1992). Borders are an 
identity marker limiting where sovereignty and citizenship begin/end (Donnan & 
Wilson, 1999). Borders create a dichotomy between “us” and “them”; between the 
welcome, and "the other" (Anzaldúa, 1987; Bars and Renterghen, 2004; Jones, 2012; 
Nevins, 2012; O’Tuathail & Agnew, 1992; Spencer, 2009).  
 Governments have used several geopolitical justifications to build security 
fences across international borders. Bars and Renterghen (2004) explain that the state of 
Israel justified wall building to stop terrorist suicide bombings. Malaysia and Thailand 
agreed to build a fence line to reduce human, drug, and firearms smuggling (Electronic 
Fence, 2013). Both India and the U.S. justified building fences to stop terrorists from 
illegally entering their countries (Jones, 2012). Generally, the U.S. government cites 
terrorism as the primary geopolitical justification for wall building in the Southwest. 
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However, throughout the literature review, others argue that true purpose is to curtail 
the stem of illegal immigration. Furthermore, scholars argue that security fences are far 
more damaging to millions of people compared to their minimal law enforcement or 
national security success. People from other countries see a better life in the U.S. so 
they want to move here. The U.S. built walls to send a message to the governments and 
people of Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Ecuador, El Salvador, and elsewhere that their 
people should not attempt to cross the U.S. border. The message is DO NOT ENTER; 
trying to do so illegally results in dire consequences. Security walls and fences are 
profound geopolitical symbols that “determine who and what is granted legitimate 
territorial access” (Andreas, 2003, p.78.). In order to analyze security walls, it is 
essential to discuss some scholarly literature dealing with basic geopolitical principles. 
It is important to point out that geopolitics scholars rely mostly on historical analysis to 
conduct their work. They rarely discuss theory or outline their methods of research. 
This historical type analysis is semiotic and hermeneutic in nature, whether they 
acknowledge that or not. My dissertation using similar methods can strengthen the 
geopolitical literature base by explicitly identifying how I conduct my analysis. 
 
Four Principles of Geopolitics 
 The principles of geography are not self-evident truths. Rather, they are 
powerful socially constructed tools of communication used by elites for centuries to 
define and enforce particular identities on communities and nations (O’Tuathail, 1996; 
Pickles, 1992). Walls, gates, and fences are the physical manifestation of that 
communication. O’Tuathail (1998) outlines several historical events that fundamentally 
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changed the way geopolitics function. Some of these were economic globalization, 
wider availability of media to a global audience through better telecommunication 
technologies like the Internet, and an increasing number of international state and non-
state actors. Brown (2010) contends that borders are becoming increasingly relative; 
there is a greater need than ever to listen to the interpretation of local people rather than 
force an artificial state centric definition on them. Many walls and fences built along 
borders around the world today have serious geopolitical implications that opposing 
sides vigorously debate, often to the point of violence (Brown, 2010; Fleishman & 
Hassan, 2009; Jones, 2012; Nevins, 2002, 2006, & 2012; Romero, 2008; Valladares, 
2010). Furthermore, regardless of which nations or peoples are directly involved in the 
wall building, there are third parties interested in the consequences of the projects that 
affect them as well. All of the discourse about walls communicates information about 
the people who built them, and their relationships with others. 
 O’Tuathail (1996, 1998), and O’Tuathail and Agnew (1992) identify four 
principles redefining geopolitics to fit in what they called a postmodern academic 
culture. First, anyone who works with foreign policy deals with geopolitics. Foreign 
policy decisions do not exist in a vacuum. O’Tuathail (1996) explains, “In critically 
investigating the textuality of geopolitics, we are engaging not only geopolitical texts, 
but also the historical, geographical, technological, and social contexts within which 
these texts arise and gain social meaning and persuasive force” (p. 73). Certainly, there 
are political foreign policies made by governments, but due to increasing 
communication technologies and other freedoms, there are many other voices than the 
government who are participating in the geopolitical process (Dittmer, 2010; Dittmer & 
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Dodds, 2008; O’Tuathail, 1998). Cultural values and beliefs are becoming a more 
critical component in trying to comprehend why governments and nations run by people 
make a particular geopolitical decision over another. Ignoring popular geopolitical 
cultural values and beliefs when evaluating decisions often leads to misunderstandings 
with devastating consequences (Dittmer, 2010; Toal & Agnew, 2003). 
 Second, O’Tuathail (1996) explains that there are two groups involved in 
geopolitical reasoning. The first group includes all practitioners involved with the many 
aspects of geography. The second group are critics who question the spacializing 
practices of the practitioners (Moisio & Paasi, 2013; Toal, 2000). In academic circles, 
this includes scholars from several fields previously identified in this literature review. 
Later in the dissertation, I highlight individuals and groups who reject how the first 
group tries dictates the rules for how people should think about geopolitical policies. 
O’Tuathail’s (1996) third principle of geopolitical reasoning suggests that local 
geopolitical events have larger global consequences that we must consider on a holistic 
scale. Although the terrorist attacks on 9/11 happened in the U.S., the consequences of 
those attacks had ripple effects that fundamentally altered the meaning of national 
security for most countries across the world. Conflicts in 2014 in several regions of the 
world continue to illustrate that regional events have a global influence. For example, 
the Syrian Civil War and the crisis with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 
moved beyond the borders of Syria into Iraq and elsewhere. This movement caused 
several governments to form a global coalition to fight the spread of ISIL. In the 
ongoing Ukraine/Russia conflict, Malyasia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down killing 289 
innocent people who had nothing to do with the fight on the ground (Fisher, 2014). A 
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body of borderlands scholarship argues that due to integrated relationships, nation states 
must recognize how decisions affect each other (Adamson, 2006; Alvarez, 1995; 
Asiwaju, 1989; Brunet-Jailly, 2012; Coplan, 2010; Donnan & Wilson 1999; Dunn, 
2009; Holling & Calafell, 2011; Nevins, 2002; Newman & Paasi, 1998; Ono, 2012; 
Romero, 2008; Rosas 2006a, 2006b, 2007; Sanchez, 2011; Spencer, 2009).   
The influx of young immigrants to the U.S. starting in October 2013 
demonstrates how clearly the actions or inactions of countries have a profound effect on 
each other. According to Foreman (2014), Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
apprehended more than 60,000 undocumented children since the wave started which is 
drastic when only about 8000 children came across in prior years. Dinan (2014) 
reported that the government expects to apprehend another 30,000 by the end of 2014 
and over 140,000 children in 2015. Dinan also points out that these estimates do not 
include the thousands of people who the CBP does not catch. The reason for the huge 
increase is that more and more families and children are applying for refugee status due 
to escalating threats of violence and death in their home countries of Guatemala, 
Honduras, and El Salvador (Agular, 2014; Dinan, 2014; Foreman, 2014). According to 
Paterson (2014), the violence appears to be so bad that the activist group, 
Mesoamerican Migrant Movement (MMM) asked the U.N. to declare a refugee crisis. 
Antonio Guterres, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, explained that the U.S. 
border situation is not unique. Guterres states that globally there are more than 50 
million displaced refugees. Guterres explains, “We are seeing a growing number of 
minors on all routes. We see them in the Mediterranean routes, through Mexico to the 
U.S., we see them everywhere” (Paterson, 2014, ¶ 18). In an increasingly globalized 
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society, local geopolitical events are having an ever-increasing impact on a larger 
national and global stage.  
 O’Tuathail’s (1996) fourth principle of geopolitical reasoning argues that 
hegemonic powers write the rules. Blommaert (2005) explained that historically, 
hegemonic powers were leaders or governments that maintained a dominant ideology 
over society. In many cases, hegemonic powers tried to stifle opposition, often using 
great violence to do so. Pickles (1992) identified cartography as a hegemonic practice 
where ruling parties used maps for propaganda purposes. By manipulating the 
communication process of map making, hegemonic powers gained power, property, 
natural resources, or other items of interest/value. Evidence of this practice will be 
noted when I discuss the imperial/colonial history in South Africa and Mexico later in 
the dissertation. 
 Hegemony comes in many forms including the use of political and cultural 
domination over others to maintain or gain control (Blommaert, 2005). Modern events 
such as globalization and the rapid spread of information with powerful technologies 
are changing how political and cultural hegemony functions. As a result, who has 
political, economic, or social/cultural power over a particular group or nation is also 
changing. In 2014, hegemonic powers exist in the form of clandestine transnational 
actors (Andreas, 2003; Donnan & Wilson, 1999; Nguyen, 2006).  Nguyen (2006) 
describes, “In national security– speak…[it is] a catchall term for undocumented 
migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, drug and human smugglers, potential 
terrorists— all those who cross borders and transgress national boundaries without state 
authorization” (p XIV). Donnan and Wilson (1999) describes several other clandestine 
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actors that have frequently navigated heavily fortified borders at the risk of death, such 
as refugees, soldiers, nomads, ethnic, and indigenous groups. While these groups do not 
have a state, they have a very real influence on larger hegemonic powers. Andreas 
(2003) explains that regardless of how effective deterrents are, border enforcement by 
hegemonic powers has continued to be a valuable symbol of state power. Even small 
actions such as checking documents at ports, luggage inspections, and arresting 
perceived “unwanted” people are all part of a larger symbolic wall the hegemonic 
powers have used to define who belongs and who does not.  
 
Geopolitics and National Security  
 The four geopolitical principles have laid the foundation for scholars to research 
immigration, border control, and other national security issues (Adamson, 2006; 
Andreas, 2003; Brunet-Jailly, 2012; Brunet-Jailly & Dupeyron, 2007; Jones, 2010; 
Maril, 2004, 2011; Nevins, 2002; Patrick, 2007). Given how nations perceive 
immigrants after 9/11, it is no surprise to see scholars and practitioners becoming more 
concerned about the walls that attempt to control borders. In addition to terrorism, drug 
war concerns, and rising immigration numbers, there is also a concern that walls are 
becoming more technologically complex. Mumford (1934) explains that humans create 
technologies to expand our abilities and potentially improve ourselves. It often requires 
great wealth and resources for governments or corporations to create those technologies. 
Hegemonic powers are likely to be the controlling factor in what they determine is 
improvement. Hegemonic powers currently employ smart borders technology making 
them more dangerous than ever before.  
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What secure actually means is a highly misunderstood and widely interpreted 
idea in the geopolitics literature (Ackleson, 2005). Adamson (2006) explains that there 
are over 180 million displaced peoples worldwide and 5 to 10 million people moved 
across international borders in a given year. The 9/11 Commission (2004) suggested 
that more than 330 million noncitizens were entering the U.S. each year. The 
government classified more than 500,000 immigrants as illegal aliens, not because they 
crossed the border, but rather, they stayed in the country long after their work visa 
expired. The U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) Apprehension Statistics (2013) indicate that 
illegal immigrants represent a security threat. From 1990 to 2006, USBP apprehended 
over one million people per year along the entire Southwest border. Those rates dropped 
significantly from 2007 to 2013 to around 500,000 people apprehended per year. CBP 
Commission Kerlikowske (2014) argues that the decrease was because President 
Obama greatly increased border enforcement efforts throughout his presidency, further 
confirming that the government perceived immigrants as a security concern. The 2014 
influx of 60,000 unaccompanied minors, with many more on the way, continues to 
make immigration a geopolitical security concern (Dinan, 2014; Foreman, 2014).  
 One of the more recent geopolitical buzz terms for border management is smart 
borders. There have never been enough law enforcement personnel (also known in the 
Intelligence Community as Law Enforcement Officials or ‘LEO’) to monitor all the 
borders. Smart borders were supposed to be a way to increase LEO capabilities. In the 
1990’s the government tried to make efficient use of remote surveillance cameras and 
ground sensors but their efforts were unsuccessful (Haddal, 2010; Maril, 2004, 2011; 
Rudolph, 2005). In the post 9/11 security conscious environment, Patrick (2007) 
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explained, “this technology-oriented response to securing U.S. borders against terrorist 
incursions includes screening, biometrics, and information technology” (p. 197). In 
December 2001, the U.S. and Canada signed a smart border agreement with much of 
the plan supporting more security fencing over other kinds of technologies (Patrick, 
2007; Press Secretary, 2002). A short time later President Bush and President Fox of 
Mexico met and discussed a similar agreement (Bush, 2002; Romero, 2008).  
By 2006, Congress and President Bush made a huge geopolitical decision by 
signing the Security Fence Act that provided all the federal funding and support 
necessary for the DHS “to achieve and maintain control over international land and 
maritime borders of the United States…. [preventing] all unlawful entries….by 
terrorists, other unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other 
contraband” (Security Fence Act, 2006, p. 2). The main purpose of the law was to build 
a wall to secure the 1951 miles of the Mexican border, but it was broad enough to 
include support for smart border provisions. Despite all the rhetoric from politicians, 
federal contractors, government agencies, and the American people who supported the 
fence, by 2010 DHS had only built 700 miles of the busiest and most dangerous parts of 
the border. Maril (2011) explained that most of the smart technologies associated with 
border management has failed, usually when LEO need them the most.  
 National security on the borders has been a critical geopolitical issue throughout 
President Obama’s tenure. Immigration policies and border enforcement were major 
campaign issues in the 2008 and 2012 Presidential Elections (Carter, Ellis, Hossain & 
McLean, 2008; Cisneros, 2014; Maril, 2011a). Despite winning 71% of the Latino vote 
in 2012, President Obama was unable to produce meaningful immigration reform 
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(Brown, Sherman, & Raju, 2012). In 2013, the Republican controlled House of 
Representatives rejected the bipartisan Senate “Gang of Eight” immigration reform 
package (O’Keefe, 2013). In 2014, the DHS and the FBI are committed to the 
counterterrorism and border enforcement missions (Core Missions, 2014; ‘What We 
Investigate, 2014). With the latest failures to pass immigration reform or help the 
thousands of unaccompanied minors in the U.S., immigration and border security will 
continue to remain salient issues for geopolitical research and scholarship.  
 The consequences of poor geopolitical decisions by a few elites are becoming 
more obvious all the time. Building walls or using smarter technologies does not deter 
immigrants from trying to cross the border. Nevins (2002), Sheridan (2009) and 
Spencer (2009) indicate that these security strategies force many immigrants to make 
dangerous trips in desolate areas to cross the border. Sheridan (2009) describes that if 
something goes wrong during the trip, immigrants are less likely to receive help because 
fewer CBP agents are patrolling these desolate border sections. Sheridan (2009) and 
Spencer (2009) explain that immigrants have to pay higher prices to Coyote smugglers 
which is often more dangerous than if they move across treacherous terrain alone. 
Therefore, one of the unintended consequences of U.S. wall building is that it helps feed 
corruption by letting people make a profit from the helpless and destitute. While it is 
true that there are those who may cross the border to engage in illegal activities, there 
are also many honest people with good intentions. Rivera-Batiz (2000) argues that 
immigrants come to find work, or join families already naturalized in the States, or 
contrary to what people believe, they return home to their country of origin because 
they do not want to be in the states permanently. Border enforcement practices are an 
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excellent example of using geopolitics to try to control acceptable or unwanted people. 
Government officials and practitioners ought to reconsider whether walls provide 
security. They should listen to all stakeholders to provide better border management for 
everyone. 
 
Landscapes, Visual Rhetoric, and Borderlands Research 
 The introduction of security walls on borders permanently altered landscapes. 
Borderlands scholars have called for more research on specific ways that walls 
physically and visually affected landscapes (Amilhat Szary, 2012; Barnes & Duncan, 
1991; Daniels & Cosgrove, 1988; Duncan, 1990; Sheridan, 2009; Till, 2004; Toal & 
Agnew, 2003). Like geopolitical decisions, landscape studies do not exist in a vacuum. 
Till (2004) argues that context is necessary to understand and sometimes break away 
from various unquestioned traditional meanings of a landscape. Till (2004) concludes, 
“Such an approach would look critically at the ways the landscapes reinforce and have 
potential to disrupt dominant categories of belonging, including categories of political 
community” (p. 358). As an interdisciplinary field of study, landscape literature 
provides many broad interpretations on what a landscape can be. Because borders and 
security fences serve communication functions as part of landscapes, I review some 
landscape literature in this part of the dissertation.  
We view landscapes in media form through photographs, films, and other social 
media formats. No matter how we view a landscape, they represent a visual argument 
somewhere along a spectrum. On one end of the spectrum, there are ideological images 
that become iconic due to an important event. On the other end of the spectrum, images 
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may be arguments based on individual perspective. Scholars have employed the 
Hermeneutic Circle to analyze images in order to find where they fit on the argument 
spectrum. Hermeneutics and semiotics have helped scholars uncover important 
meanings of how people perceive landscapes (Barnes & Duncan, 1991; Daniels & 
Cosgrove, 1988, Duncan, 1990; Toal & Agnew, 2003; Thornton, 2008, 2009; Till, 
2004).    
 Hariman & Lucaites (2003) describe that all images have some ideological 
basis. Whether they are immediately recognizable or more hidden is a different story. 
Hariman & Lucaites (2001) clarify that iconic images are those that have an ideology 
that comes from specific historical meaning. Hariman & Lucaites (2001) stated:  
It is not enough to say that the photo sums up or symbolizes a historic 
moment….We define iconic photos as those photographic images produced in 
print, electronic, or digital media that are recognized by everyone, are 
understood to be representations of historically significant event, activate strong 
emotional identification or response, and are regularly reproduced across a range 
of media, genres, or topics. (p. 7) 
 
Hariman & Lucaites point out examples of iconic images, including the Kent State 
University riot shooting picture on May 4, 1970; the explosion of the Challenger Space 
Shuttle on January 28, 1986; and the Chinese student dubbed “Tank Man” squaring off 
with a line of tanks after the Tiananmen Square massacre on June 5, 1989. There are 
many other recent iconic images particularly related to the concerns of this dissertation 
such as the images of the attacks on 9/11, many iconic photos and video images of 
border fences, and 2014 iconic images of undocumented minor immigrants waiting to 




 Semiotics and hermeneutic scholars (Barthes, 1964/1973; Ikeda & Kramer, 
1998; Mitchell, 1986; Noth, 1985/1990; Saussure, 1972/1983) fall at the opposite end of 
the spectrum. They believe that signs are arbitrary until a community or individual gives 
meaning to understand the sign. Hence, even if there is some communal consensus 
about how to interpret a sign such as a news photo, these scholars argue that each 
person’s interpretation of that photo will be slightly or vastly different but equally real. 
Researchers using hermeneutics gather as many perspectives within historic contexts as 
they can to gain a more holistic context for why communities and individuals may see 
the same picture but interpret it so differently. In other words, what one community 
and/or culture thinks is an icon may have no relevance to another community/culture.  
Finnegan and Kane (2004) expand the image argument spectrum to include 
extreme ends, from the Iconoclast who claims that every image has meticulous and 
perfectly clear meaning verses the Iconophilic who argues there is no meaning to an 
image. Rather than being fanatical, Finnegan and Kane (2004) suggest listening to 
discourse in the public sphere, and allowing everyone to have their opinion. Moreover, 
Finnegan (2005) establishes a middle ground on the argument spectrum referred to as 
image vernacular. This means that images are enthymemes that allow the individual 
looking at the picture to fill in the argument of the picture. For example, when the 
Associated Press prints pictures of border fences, it is possible a person could look at 
those pictures and make inferences about what the fence means (Thornton, 2008, 2009). 
By engaging in the study of image vernacular, Finnegan (2005) concludes, “the critic 
avoids the extremes of either assuming that peoples responses to images are….merely 
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eccentric, or….an inevitable product of ideology that leaves no room for the agency of 
the rhetorical actors” (italics added, p. 34).  
Border security walls clearly have a significant impact on the landscapes of 
nations. Some borderlands scholars focused on how landscapes are changing through 
border art. This is where artists use the wall barriers as canvass to share their messages 
whether they are political or for some other purpose (Amilhat Szary, 2012; Durazo, 
2013; Fox, 1994, 1995-96; Gomez-Pena, 1991; Sheridan, 2009). Fox (1995-96) found 
that border art is difficult to categorize since some artists use it for political messages 
while others use the canvass to celebrate borderlands diversity. Curators and museums 
cannot appropriately categorize border art due to disagreement on “whether ‘border art’ 
describes art about the border, art by people living on the border, or simply art located 
at the border” (p.58). Sheridan (2009) and Amilhat Szary (2012) pointed out that border 
art became a much more poignant geopolitical phenomenon after the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) built the security wall in 1990 in the San Diego-Tijuana 
area. On the Tijuana side, Sheridan (2009) describes, “The border wall at Tijuana has 
taken on its own identity and become a community bulletin board to discuss different 
facets of migration” (p. 112). Nevins (2002) argues that border art is influential because 
it is anonymous, so anyone can feel like they can communicate about important social 
issues without having negative government or other repercussions. Border art is clearly 
an important communication function on border security walls. This is an area of 
borderlands research where communication scholars could contribute more to the 




Chapter Three: Structuration Theory, Dimensional Dissociation & Accrual  
Structuration Theory 
Communication plays a central role in structuration theory (ST) but 
communication scholars have generally avoided the theory due to its apparent 
complexities and ambiguities (Banks & Riley,1993; Heracleous, 2013; McPhee, Poole, 
& Iverson, 2014; Olufowote, 2003). McPhee, Poole, and Iverson (2014) found that 
scholars apply ST most consistently in organizational communication and systems 
theory contexts. Within the corporate business context, scholars study formal 
communication structures and climate (Howard & Geist, 1995; McPhee, 1985; Poole, 
1985), labor conflicts, (Keough, 1989), political culture (Riley, 1983), small group 
deliberation, leadership, and complaints (Brashers 1991; Brashers & Meyers, 1989; 
Canary, Brossman, & Seibold, 1987; Canary, & Weger, 1989; Garner & Poole, 2009; 
Poole, Seibold & McPhee, 1985). Scholars also apply ST in marketing strategies and 
news media coverage (Jaehee & Lee, 2009; Shimp, 1976; Zhu 2000). ST has limited 
use in contexts beyond organizational communication. One potential criticism of ST is 
that Giddens (1984, 1993) provides concepts and definitions, but does not offer 
guidance on how such concepts may be applied. This dissertation works on those 
ambiguities to offer new insights on how ST may apply to other areas of 
communication research. In this section, I will discuss the development and core 
concepts of ST and present research questions relevant to the dissertation. 
  ST came about due to Giddens’ (1993) frustration with previous ideologies 
including Functionalism and Structuralism that tend to focus too broadly on the entire 
system of human production, or very narrowly on a particular area or social 
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phenomenon. After a critical review of prior philosophies, Giddens (1993) concludes, 
“Neither school of thought is able to grapple adequately with the constitution of social 
life as a production of active subjects” (p. 127). Regarding the reproduction of social 
structure, Giddens (1993) explains:  
The production of society is a skilled performance, sustained and ‘made to 
happen’ by human beings. It is indeed only made possible because every 
(competent) member of society is a practical social theorist; in sustaining any 
sort of encounter he or she draws upon social knowledge and theories, normally 
in an unforced and routine way, and the use of these practical resources is 
precisely the condition of the production of the encounter at all. (20-21) 
 
Giddens presumes the principles of phenomenology and hermeneutics in arguing that 
ST is a valuable research tool to analyze social structures. Giddens recognizes that 
scholars need to study actively reproducing social structures in their full context. 
Giddens (1984) explains “to study structuration is to attempt to determine the conditions 
which govern the continuity and dissolution of structures or types of structure….[Or] to 
enquire into the process of reproduction is to specify the connections between 
structuration and structure” (p. 127). In other words, social structures reproduce because 
life and communication are, “active constituting process[es], accomplished by, and 
consisting in the doings of active subjects” (p. 127).  This dissertation examines the 
reproduction of social structures in South Africa and the U.S. Mexico borderlands, and 
important physical artifacts of apartheid and the security wall that resulted because of 
those social structures. 
Gebser (1949/1985) suggests that scholars use systasis to conduct the kind of 
holistic analysis for which Giddens was searching. Systasis is a Greek word that means 
“putting together” or “connecting” (Kramer, 1997; Murphy & Choi, 1992; Vitale 1992). 
Vitale (1992) explains that systasis, “describes the process of joining of parts to form a 
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whole while retaining the consistent presence of the origin” (p. 105). Kramer (1997), 
and Murphy and Choi (1992), suggest that systasis can account for differences between 
the parts while still maintaining they are all a part of a greater whole. This dissertation 
employs systasis to the social structures of South Africa and the U.S. Mexico border. I 
analyze individual concepts within each structure such as how agents applied power, 
rules, resources, and discourse to reproduce social structures. In addition, I examine 
how all the parts of the social structures interact and how they generate the conditions 
for the apartheid wall and the security wall on the border. The following section 
outlines the core concepts of ST.  
 
Practical & Discursive Consciousness  
 Giddens (1984) defines practical consciousness as “circumstances in which 
people pay attention to events going on around them in such a way as to relate their 
activity to those events. In other words, it refers to the reflexive monitoring of conduct 
by human agents” (p. 44). Giddens suggests that humans as agents collect and maintain 
knowledge from a variety of sources then make intentional decisions based on that 
knowledge. We as agents discover intentions through the discursive consciousness 
(discourse or interactive communication). Sometimes as agents, we make intentional 
decisions knowing that they will have consequences. Often however, there are 
unintended consequences that may leave lasting damage from our decisions. ST is 
interested in both intentional and inadvertent or ignored actions that result from our 




 We develop routinization or routine in the practical consciousness and act it out 
through discourse (Giddens, 1984). Our daily individual routines combine to make up 
our social structures, from interpersonal to organizational to community relationships. 
Giddens (1984) explains, “Routine is integral both to the continuity of the personality of 
the agent, as he or she moves along the paths of daily activities, and to the institutions 
of society, which are such only through the continued reproduction” (p. 60). Through 
routine, we establish our identities and communication practices. Sometimes we have 
small routines that often seem so invisible to us that we do not think about them at all, 
but ST asks researchers to consider why we do them. In addition, we have many 
interactions throughout any given day with any number of people that we consider 
nothing more than a “fleeting moment [or] brief and trivial interchanges” (Giddens, 
1984, p. 72). However, Giddens argues that if we put these encounters in the context of 
repeating actions that are part of and continue to produce social life, these seemingly 
insignificant moments have an entirely new meaning. 
Agents & Agency 
 All individuals act socially and are therefore agents able to interact to share 
mutual knowledge. Giddens (1984) states:  
Every competent social actor is herself or himself a social theorist, who as a 
matter of routine makes interpretations of her or his own conduct, and of the 
intentions, reasons and motives of others as integral to the production of social 
life. (p. 160) 
 
Much of the sharing relies on our connotative assumptions about each other. We assume 
other members of society are aware of shared social codes and we take it for granted in 
most of our communication. Giddens employs previous phenomenological ideas about 
intention to his own theory by suggesting that intention is the concept of agency. 
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Giddens (1993) explains “agency is any act which the agent knows (believes) can be 
expected to manifest a particular quality or outcome, and in which this knowledge is 
made use of by the actor in order to produce this quality or outcome” (p.83). Moreover, 
“agency refers not to the intentions people have in doing things but to their capability of 
doing those things in the first place….agency concerns events of which an individual is 
the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given sequences 
of conduct, have acted differently” (Giddens, 1984, p. 9). 
 Thus, ST is interested in knowing how agents use their agency and knowledge to 
be motivated to act. What are the intended and unintended consequences of those 
actions that ultimately affect our social structures either on a personal level, or at a 
larger societal level? Giddens is interested in comprehending how we as agents can 
change focus from one thing to another, such as driving and communicating at the same 
time or choosing which subject to study at a particular time. Giddens uses the term 
hierarchy of purpose in the same manner as Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. We need 
social functioning after we meet our basic survival and security needs. Intention exists 
in the conscious part of the brain, therefore, philosophical methods that study 
consciousness and its various interpretations are very useful in the ST discussion.  
Power 
 Another term closely related to agency is power or the ability to influence the 
actions and choices of others. Giddens (1993) explains the connection between action 
and power: 
 Action intrinsically involves the application of ‘means’ to achieve outcomes, 
 brought about  through the direct intervention of an actor in a course of 
 events….power represents the capacity of the agent to mobilize resources to 
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 constitutes those ‘means’. In this most general sense, ‘power’ refers to the 
 transformative capacity of human action. (p. 116-117). 
 
I should mention some characteristics of power here. Within the material I collect, 
different authors/creators have various kinds of power to create and interpret messages 
about walls. If I can identify which type of power an author/creator uses to make their 
artifact, it will help me comprehend why they interpret the wall the way they do, and 
how that has an impact their immediate social structure as well as the larger structure of 
which they are a part.  
 One important characteristic of power is that it acts as an immaterial 
commodity. This signifies that an agent who uses it can do so currently for an objective, 
or can collect and store it for later use. For example, in the political structure context, 
the President of the United States has a certain amount of influence or political capital 
he can use to get a bill passed or put a specific judge on the Supreme Court. If a policy 
is positive, the President receives more capital to push on more issues. Likewise, if a 
policy is negative, the President loses some ability to push other issues. Power in ST is 
the same idea; agents can use it now, store and use it later, or lose it as well.  
 Another characteristic of power is that it is contingent with conflict. Just because 
power exists in a situation does not mean a conflict will occur. However, if an agent 
individually, or an agent as a collective uses power to legitimize a controversial 
decision that a local community does not agree with, the likelihood that a conflict could 
occur is more likely. In the section on forms of institutions, there is further analysis of 
how legitimization functions to support the institutional use of power that creates and 




Rules & Resources  
 In order to interact in any social structure, we must know something about its 
rules and our abilities to act within that system. If one knows the rules and resources 
available to them, they may be able to align themselves to gain more power in that 
structure, as well as influence specific actions. Giddens notes that we find the 
foundation for this knowledge within the practical consciousness, which is a unique 
characteristic to human agents. Giddens (1984) clarifies, “resources….are structured 
properties of social systems, drawn upon and reproduced by knowledgeable agents in 
the course of interaction….[They] are media through which power is exercised” (p. 15-
16). Media in this context refers to anything from tacit or expert knowledge on a subject 
that someone needs, from money and physical infrastructures, to anything someone can 
potentially use to influence others to act. 
 Giddens (1984) defines rules as, “techniques or generalizable procedures applied 
in the enactment/reproduction of social practices…. formulated rules….are thus 
codified interpretations of rules rather than rules” (p. 21). Therefore, rules serve as a 
general guideline within structural reproduction. Often, agents give them more than one 
interpretation rather than reading them in one concrete way. Formulated rules might 
include general legal laws for a country or very specific rules made for a specific 
purpose, such as building a wall to protect property, or a national border. However, 
even those rules are often open to interpretation based on the experience of a person 
construing their meaning. Moreover, there are characteristics of rules that are of interest 
to research in social analysis (See Table 2). As illustrated, we need to recognize that 
these characteristics are points on a large spectrum of interpretation. Because we are 
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always shifting in time and space, we adapt to new circumstances. Finally, while there 
are larger and more known rules in social life, we must remember the trivial rules as 
well, or what I previously described as the little routines we carry out on a day-to-day 
basis. Comprehending how we understand rules could provide us with more insights 
into a variety of human behaviors and choices.  
  
 
 Rules come with more nuances than resources do. Giddens (1984) specifically 
discusses five elements of rules including distinctions that include social rules. First, 
sometimes when we think of rules, we think of games with which they are associated. 
However, whereas the rules of a game like baseball are more or less clear and not up for 
interpretation, the laws and other social rules we live by are debatable on a mass scale. 
Second, sometimes we think of rules separately, rather than collectively, which usually 
takes them out of context. Third, “rules cannot be conceptualized apart from resources 
[italics added], which refer to the modes whereby transformative relations are actually 
incorporated into the production and reproduction of social practices. Structural 
properties thus express forms of domination and power” (Giddens, 1984, p. 18). Fourth, 












Table 1 - "Main characteristics of rules relevant to general questions of 
social analysis" (Giddens, 1984, p.22). 
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situation. Finally, rules have two conceptual frameworks. They provide meanings for 
social interaction and sanction social conduct. I should not conflate the two in research, 
so I must use extra caution in this area.  
 Agenda setting theory in the mass media is an example of how we can 
comprehend the connections between rules, resources, and agents that manipulate the 
rules and resources to influence decisions. We turn to the media for our information 
beyond our immediate social structure. We try to trust that the media will tell the truth 
and be ethical in reporting. This gives the media great power to dictate what ought to be 
important in our minds. They cannot dictate what we think, but the media definitely can 
influence what we think about (Cohen, 1963). The entire population of the world 
receives its news and information from roughly 10-20 transnational corporate media 
outlets (Thussu, 2006). Walter Lippman argued in 1922 that during World War 1 
journalists on both sides of the war wrote a picture of victory. Essentially, the 
journalists lied to millions of people and the governments encouraged this propaganda 
so they could gain more support for the war. The propaganda was so powerful that it 
limited what people could read, see, and hear (McCombs & Bell, 1996). Assuming 
Lippmann’s argument was correct, this gives a relatively few agents massive power 
from a critical resource, and any number of opportunities to prop up what they think is 
important over the wants and needs of audiences around the globe.  
 
Duality of Structure  
 When agents act, they are making a small move that may have personal 
consequences, but many actions also have systemic repercussions as well. This brings 
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us to another important concept that Giddens (1984) defines as the duality of structure, 
which is viewing both micro and macro social interactions together as one larger 
system. Giddens identifies form and content as structures and systems. Structuration is 
the lens whereby researchers analyze the continuity and/or transformation of structures 
and systems to reproduce a currently existing one, alter it slightly, or transform it into a 
new system entirely. Giddens (1984) describes two ways agents integrate themselves 
into social life. First, we socially integrate ourselves in small groups and interpersonal 
relationships. Second, we integrate ourselves systemically, meaning we make up larger 
social networks in organizations, the mass media, communities, and other larger groups 
in the system. Giddens is critical of academics who create unnecessary dualities such as 
action verses structure, or individual verses society. This removes such events from the 
context that gives them meaning. It is unnecessary because each event helps produce 
and reproduce the same social structures in which we all operate.  
 Table 2 is an illustration of what the duality of a given structure might look like 
both from a micro and macro perspective. It includes structural behaviors called 
Institutions, which I cover in the next section. It also demonstrates modalities (logically 
necessary channels) that messages pass through to create different types of interaction 
that make up a social system. The table further embodies the great capacity humans 
have to monitor their own actions by obtaining and utilizing knowledge of the systems 
in which they participate as well as being able to describe them discursively to others. 
They can also monitor other humans doing the same thing at the same time (Giddens, 
1979, 1984, 1993). Giddens (1993) concludes, “This duality of structure is the most 
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integral feature of processes of social reproduction, which in turn can always be 




Table 2 - "The Dimensions of the Duality of Structure" (Giddens, 1984, p. 29). 
 Using Table 2 as a guide, I can examine a micro process such as a norm an agent 
is living or a routine they conduct on a daily basis even if it may seem insignificant. 
Even though it may seem normal, trivial, and perhaps even invisible, those small 
routines still constitute pieces in the larger puzzle of a social system. Alternatively, I 
can examine the communication in a social network from a micro and macro view. At 
the micro level, I can examine specific facilities that are modes in a network and how 
they view their relationship to the larger system. At the macro level, I can look at how 
norms in one part of the system relate to sanctions in another part of the system. 
Another duality I could analyze would be a consequence of a personal action verses 
those of a group decision. They are dual parts of the same structure and tend to affect 
one another as part of a system.  
 Another excellent example of the duality of structure is a human body in action 
(Giddens, 1984). There are many biological functions in the human body that each have 
an individual identity and separate role to play to keep the body working properly. 
However, they also work as a coherent collective and have a unified identity as well. In 
addition to the micro verses macro duality, there are other types of dualities to consider. 
For example, in ST, I can look at the difference between rules that seem shallow verses 
others that are very intense. 
Structure (s) Signification Domination Legitimization 
Modality (ies) Interpretive Scheme Facility Norm 




Forms of Institutions 
 Giddens (1984) suggests that political, economic, and legal institutions are some 
of the most enduring features in social systems. Institutions provide two functions for 
agents. First, institutions help agents develop a social identity through meaningful 
interaction with other agents. Second, institutions help agents comprehend social rules 
and norms of the social structure. Many other institutions such as families, church 
groups, schools, and community organizations also influence agents. Institutions are 
comprised of three structures: signification, domination, and legitimization (see Table 3) 
(Giddens, 1979, 1984). Giddens argues that it might be possible to examine the 
intentions of agents when they act within these institutional structures.  
Structure (s) Theoretical Domain Institutional Order 
 
Signification Theory of Coding Symbolic orders/modes 
of discourse 
Domination Theory of resource 
authorization and allocation 
Political/economic 
institutions 
Legitimization Theory of normative 
regulation 
Legal Institutions 
Table 3 – “Principles of Institutions” (Giddens, 1984, p. 31). 
Signification 
 The way Giddens describes signification at both a theoretical and practical level, 
it appears at times in ST to be synonymous with the broader concepts of what makes up 
a culture. Giddens (1979, 1984) borrows the theoretical concept of ‘signification’ from 
semiotics, defining it broadly as a theory of coding. Semiotician Ferdinand de Saussure 
(1972/1983) explains that the first signification is language, and language is necessary 
to have culture that encompasses all other sign systems. Regarding the importance of 
language Hall (1966) explains:  
71 
 
Man’s very perception of the world….is programmed by the language he 
speaks, just as a computer is programmed. Like the computer, man’s mind will 
register and structure external reality only in accordance with the program. Since 
two languages often program the same class of events quite differently, no belief 
or philosophical system should be considered apart from language. (p. 1-2) 
 
Kramer (2013) describes that, “Without language, gestures, and words that convey 
conventional meanings---communication---is impossible. This is the basic fact of 
human existence” (p. 132). Furthermore, Kramer (2013) explains that ‘signification’ or 
communication happens in the semantic field of culture that “enables humans to sustain 
and transfer knowledge, beliefs, values, motives, meanings, and identities from one 
generation to the next” (p. 123). According to Giddens (1979, 1984) signification is 
entrenched in how agents communicate, maintain social relationships, and how perceive 
their own identities. Barthes (1957/1987) demonstrates the prevalence of signification 
in many otherwise mundane areas of social life that agents often take for granted. For 
example, Barthes (1957/1987) demonstrates that signification is in soap used to wash 
clothes, or toys children played with, or in entertainment people engage in, or even the 
food people choose to eat from restaurant menus. In sum, signification is the basis for 
reproducing the sociocultural product Giddens calls forms of institutions.  
 Giddens (1979) suggests that one way to comprehend the signification of 
institutions was by studying their ideologies that ST defined as sets of symbols and/or 
modes of discourse. Giddens argues that ideologies, which reproduced institutions, are 
only one piece of the overall social structure of society. Giddens (1979) states that 
analyzing ideologies “is to examine how structures of significations are mobilised to 
legitimate the sectional interests of hegemonic groups” (p. 188). Giddens argues that 
agents were selfish and ideologically motivated to protect interests in institutions within 
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their social structures. Agents act out their intentions based on their cultural values or 
beliefs. By applying the signification principle, scholars and practitioners can identify 
motivating cultural factors for how agents reproduce certain social structures. To put it 
another way Kramer (1997, 2013), and Kramer and Ikeda (1998) explain that in 
signification, what agent/institution “A” says to or about agent/institution “B” says 
something about “B”, but it also reveals something about the identity and perspective of 
“A” albeit often unintentionally. By examining the signification principle in ST, 
scholars and practitioners can ask questions about motives that reproduce social 
structures. For example, what cultural values made it possible for agents to reproduce 
the social structure of apartheid for so many years? Moreover, what cultural values 
made it possible for agents to reproduce the security wall that provides minimal or no 
security at all?  
Domination 
Giddens (1979, 1984) argues that agents dominate the discourse and/or actions 
of others using power in the form of authorization and allocation. For example, Theal 
(1897) described how the Dutch East India Trading Company was a powerful agent that 
had authorization to create a colony in South Africa. Upon arrival, the company 
allocated resources to company members to start settling Cape Town. In the case of the 
U.S. Mexico Border, President James Polk both authorized the U.S. military to invade 
Mexico and allocated many resources to the cause. This domination lead to the U.S. 
Mexico War and the annexation of Mexican lands as far south as the Rio Grande River, 





 The final part of institutions is how they engage is legitimization. Giddens 
(1979, 1984) explains that agents and institutions use normative means such as enacting 
laws to protect their interests. ST assumes that agents should be accountable by giving 
reasons for how they legitimize their actions. Agents should accept responsibility for 
the consequences of how they legitimize actions, although in reality agents obviously 
do not always accept responsibilities. In particular, one normative means institutions 
and agents use is geopolitics to demarcate where their space begins and ends, whether 
they are protecting property or some other interest. To Giddens, the physical 
environment of a social encounter is as significant as the message shared or other parts 
of the encounter. Generally, scholars have not discussed connections between 
geography and communication despite evidence of a strong link between the two fields. 
Geopolitics is a strong means of legitimization that communication scholars could 
analyze in future projects.  
 
ST Research Questions 
 While previous organizational and corporate communication research is helpful 
in understanding the axioms of ST, my research may offer new insights on how the 
theory functions to explain communication in other contexts. Giddens (1984) outlines 
several potential research areas with ST. My dissertation presents two areas that are the 
most useful for answering important questions about the communication functions of 
walls and their surrounding structures. First, unintended consequences from actions 
within social structures are as important as what agents intended to happen. Therefore, I 
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can pose some of the following research questions: When building the wall, did some 
agents and institutions unintentionally communicate their true or perceived intentions 
about the wall’s purpose? If so, how did other groups receive the true intentions 
affected by the wall-building project? What were some unexpected effects that occurred 
with the decision to build the wall? How did those effects alter the communication 
within the social structure? If the agents that built the wall had not done so, would 
another agent or institution build the wall anyway? Finally, were there only certain 
agents/institutions within the social structure that had the power, resources, and 
authority to build the wall?  
 The second ST premise on which to build future research about walls is to 
examine events as parts of a fluid social system rather than individual events randomly 
happening. Researchers can analyze what kind of rational or irrational patterns agents 
and institutions form. Even though one agent’s intentions may seem insignificant, 
together with many agents and/or institutions, those actions reproduce the social 
structure. Similarly, within my own research on the communication functions of walls, I 
am looking for evidence that individual agent actions when connected with others do in 
fact create a coherent social structure. This idea prompted the next set of possible 
inquiries. What are the unique cases of wall building by different cultures and 
civilizations? Is there any connection between these cases? If so, what is the holistic 






Dimensional Accrual and Dissociation Theory 
 Kramer (1997) developed this theory nicknamed DAD, as a way to study 
intercultural communication. The major difference between DAD and ST is that 
Giddens tends to see everything from western, modern, or what Kramer calls a 
perspectival point of view. DAD theory suggests there other “structures of awareness” 
or cultural perspectives that have existed throughout human history that scholars need to 
consider (Kramer, 1992, p. XI). DAD theory tries to encompass these structures of 
awareness rather than labeling them as outdated, unnecessary, superstitious, or non-
sense. Kramer (1992, 1997, 2013) argues that if someone believes in a god, it is not the 
scholar’s job to destroy that belief but rather to understand how it influences values, 
expectations, motivations, and behavior. Kramer (1992) accept that scholars always 
have biases, but in order to do better research, scholars need to see the horizons of 
cultures that are different from our own. He further explains that this differentiation is 
not threatening.  
 The axiology of DAD comes from Gebser’s (1949/1985) consciousness 
structures, which are modes of awareness that encompass how humans think, see, 
communicate about, and otherwise identify ourselves. DAD also integrates ideas from 
Mumford’s (1934) critique of technology, and Kramer’s own ideas on the meaning of 
communication. DAD focuses on four consciousness structures identified as the 
magical, the mythical, the modern/perspectival, and the integral. Within each structure, 
communication displays values, behaviors, context, emotion, history, and motives that 
can help researchers identify and comprehend different worldviews (Kramer, 1997, 
2013). Kramer (2013) argues that if there are “fundamentally different structures to 
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cultural reality, then there must be fundamentally different modes of communication” 
(p. 137). Kramer clarifies that many human behaviors do not make sense if we try to 
study them from only one viewpoint (in this culture we typically employ the modern 
perspectival view. For example, I cannot use statistical, empirical data to explain why 
the Tohono O’odam tribe is incredibly angry with the U.S. Government for building the 
wall across the borderlands (Hendricks, 2010; Morse, 2012; Schlyer, 2012; Weber, 
2011). Statistical data can tell me how many tribal members might cross from one side 
of the border to the other, and perhaps some reasons why they travel. However, that 
data cannot explain or account for the deep emotional concern tribal members have by 
seeing Mother Earth stabbed by metal knives that will permanently upset the balance of 
the universe (Hendricks, 2010). There is context, emotion, history, beliefs, motives, 
values, and varying levels of knowledge surrounding these behaviors. Kramer (2013) 
concludes, “DAD offers a solid approach to understanding cultures and intercultural 
misunderstandings including competing efforts to re-socialize and enculturate the 
Other” (p. 137).  
 
Gebser & Mumford Contributions to DAD 
 Gebser (1949/1985) illustrates that there are at least four periods throughout 
history where human consciousness structures altered substantially. Gebser labels these 
shifts mutations, identifying them as the archaic, the magical, the mental, and the 
integral. Gebser analyzes a large body of evidence found in all aspects of historic and 
current civilizations to demonstrate that consciousness shifts take place. Some of the 
evidence includes prehistoric cave paintings, pottery, idols made of wood and stone, 
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tapestries, literature, paintings, and modern scientific techniques. Gebser (1949/1985) 
found that as new mutations emerge, humanity gains additional perspectives, 
experiences, and knowledge, while at the same time retaining parts of previous 
structures. Regarding these mutations, Kramer and Mickunas (1992) explain:  
To Gebser’s own surprise, the phenomena suggested vast periodic 
transformations, mutations of awareness that restructure human modes of 
perceiving, conceiving, and interacting Such mutations not only yield novel 
structures of awareness but also integrate and position other modes of awareness 
within the requirements of the currently predominant structure (whenever that 
may be). (p. XI)  
 
In DAD theory, Kramer (2013) describes the accruing of consciousness structures as 
similar to building a skyscraper. The foundation of the skyscraper is necessary to build 
the additional floors, and without it, the building would fall. Likewise, Kramer (2013) 
argues that the magical and mythical consciousness structures were present in humans 
for thousands of years. They persist in some form as part of the foundation for the 
perspectival consciousness structure. 
 Gebser (1949/1985) concludes that humanity is facing a global crisis in the 
individualistic, selfish, mental culture that cannot sustain itself. Gebser suggests that the 
emergent integral structure is one possible solution to avert the crisis. As I noted in the 
ST section, systasis is an integral way of thinking and a method scholars employ to 
describe the interdependence between parts of a social structure and the whole (Gebser 
1949/1985; Kramer, 1997; Murphy & Choi, 1992; Vitale 1992). For further evidence 
regarding mutations of consciousness structures, readers should refer to Gebser’s 
seminal work on the topic, “The Ever Present Origin”. 
 Like Gebser, Mumford (1934) describes several distinct periods of technological 
development that shaped humanity to what it is today. Mumford (1934) discusses the 
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influences of technology reaching back at least 10000 years. Mumford argues that 
humans dissociate or separate reason and emotion from technologies, decreasing the 
chances that we will actually stop long enough to question their ethical consequences. 
Although there could be some benefits to technology, there might be negative effects as 
well. Mumford (1934) explains that the introduction of Capitalism with “abstract 
symbols of wealth” (p. 23) during the Paleotechnic period caused a greater dissociation 
between people and technologies than ever before. Mumford (1934) stated:  
Capitalism turned people from tangibles to intangibles: its symbol, as Sombart 
observes, is the account book: ‘its life-value lies in its profit and loss account’. 
The ‘economy of acquisition’, which had hitherto been practiced by rare and 
fabulous creatures like Midas and Croesus, became once more the everyday 
mode: it tended to replace the direct ‘economy of needs’ and to substitute 
money-values for life-values. (p. 23) 
 
Mumford (1934) further clarified that Capitalism was an all-encompassing culture that 
preferred the use of technology to increase profits. Mumford (1934) declared, “The 
brute fact of the matter is that our civilization is now weighted in favor of the use of 
mechanical instruments because the opportunities for commercial production and for 
the exercise of power lie there” (p. 274). To ask powerful Capitalists in industry, 
government, or other trades to stop and reflect on the social consequences of their 
technologies would seem ridiculous to them since it would take up valuable time, 
businesses could lose profits, and progress would stop. Mumford (1934) concluded:  
Because the process of social evaluation was largely absent among the people 
who developed the machine in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the 
machine raced like an engine without a governor, tending to overheat its own 
bearings and lower its efficiency without any compensatory gain. (p. 282) 
 
The lack of social guidance or control of technology during the Paleotechnic period was 
highly destructive. Mumford (1934) summarizes, “this second revolution multiplied, 
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vulgarized, and spread the methods and goods produced by the first [Eotechnic period]: 
above all, it was directed toward the quantification of life, and its success could be 
gauged only in terms of the multiplication table” (p. 151). 
 Mumford (1934) describes the most recent era or mutation as the Neotechnic 
period that we currently live in. According to Mumford, two facts define the Neotechnic 
era. First, scholars and scientists apply the scientific method across all aspects of life, 
not just the physical sciences or mathematics. Mumford (1934) explains, “the sense of 
order became more pervasive and fundamental” (p. 217). During this period, social 
scientists seek to explain and categorize most human behaviors. The second fact of the 
Neotechnic era is that all knowledge has to have a practical application or it is of no 
societal value. Mumford (1934) demonstrates, “It was Henry who in essentials invented 
the telegraph, not Morse; Faraday invented the dynamo, not Siemans; it was Oersted 
who invented the electric motor, not Jacobi; it was Clerk-Maxwell and Hertz who 
invented the radio telegraph, not Marconi” (p. 217-218). Mumford’s Paleotechnic and 
Neotechnic period are comparable to Gebser’s mental consciousness structure. In DAD 
theory, Kramer (1997) explains it as “the current world condition [that] is dominated by 
the value of becoming “modern,” “modernizing,” “westernizing,” “developing,” in a 
word perspectivism” (p. 96). 
 
The Dimensions & Dissociation 
 When discussing the different dimensions and their accrual it is important to 
comprehend that change in and amongst dimensions, accrual, and dissociation is neither 
progression nor regression in the modern sense of trying to reach some final goal 
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(Kramer, 1997, 2013). Kramer (2013) argues that the purpose of DAD theory, “is rather 
an explanation for how and why things are as they are, and offers some guidelines for 
predicting outcomes given a set of known preconditions” (p. 133). In the perspectival 
world at times, there have been those who consider magic and/or the mythic cultures to 
be antiquated and choose to ignore their value systems, which Kramer argued might be 
dangerous. Kramer (2013) denounces such notions by concluding, “All that can be said 
is that some structures of awareness manifest more dimensions than others. History has 
shown that this is not necessarily “better or more “evolved, “mature”, “competent”, or 
even more “cognitively complex” (p. 133). In this section, first I discuss the 
characteristics of the magic, mythic and perspectival dimensions. Second, I discuss the 
dissociation and accrual process and its consequences in intercultural communication. 
 
The Magic Dimension 
There are three major characteristics of the magic dimension (also known as 
magic culture, magical worldview, magical structure, etc.) as articulated by Kramer 
(1997, 2013). First, identity does not yet exist in the magical dimension. The collective 
is most important, and everything in the cosmos is a spirit in balance with everything 
else. Second, magic cultures are highly idolic both in actions and in their incantations or 
other word rituals. Finally, the magic world is conservative and traditional. When 
change occurs to upset the harmonious balance, the magic world falls into chaos.   
Kramer (2013) describes the magic dimension as, “spaceless and timeless one 
dimensional pre-perspectival magic worldview” (p. 143). According to Kramer (2013), 
the root for the word magic is to enable, meaning the magic world is the first attempt by 
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humans to exercise choice by separating themselves from the cosmos (this was the 
beginning of culture). Still, in the magic world, exercising free will and creating 
separation is very limited. Kramer (2013) expresses: 
In the magic world, animism predominates. Emotional identification is 
extremely strong and shared. Collective identity prevails. An important aspect of 
the magic world is that there is total one-to one identity between all people and 
things, and therefore there is no identity as it is conceived by Moderns. For the 
Modern, identity requires difference. If all people are identical, then no 
individual has identity. My identity depends on you being different from me. 
But this is not identity in the magic sense. In the magic world, there is no 
identity because everything is interchangeable via sympathetic magic with no 
direction or fragmentation. (p. 151-152) 
 
Since there is no individual identity in the magic world, and everything is alive, this 
means that the rivers, trees, animals, humans, and all else have a spirit and ought to be 
treated equally. In a magic worldview, it would be unimaginable to build a wall on 
sacred lands, as they are alive. The Tohono O’odam people have lived on both sides of 
the USMX border for generations. For more than 6000 years, the Sonora Desert has 
played an animistic role in their worship (Weber, 2011). In the 1990’s it was 
inconceivable to “traditional” O’odam members that the U.S. Government built the 
fence. Tribal elder Ofelia Rivas exclaimed, “It’s like a knife in our mother [earth]. 
These metal things are going to go in our mother and we can’t pull them out” 
(Hendricks, 2010, p. 119). Another example in the O’odam culture of how everything is 
alive and shares the same identity is the story of the saguaro fruit. Hendricks (2010) 
illustrated:  
The O’odham consider the saguaro plant, with its bent-elbowed arms, to be 
human, magically transformed by “elder brother,” the god-like I’itoi, into a 
rooted plant. “A boy was fighting with his brother and I’itoi heard him and told 
him the O’odham don’t fight with their siblings,” López repeated the legend. 
“The boy wouldn’t stop. He ran toward I’itoi. And I’itoi made him into a 
cactus.” Another O’odham woman told Nabhan, the naturalist, that the stately 
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plants must be treated with reverence: “The saguaros, they are Indians too. You 
don’t ever throw anything at them. You don’t do anything. (p. 103) 
 
Another example of this principle is the magic culture of the indigenous Altaians in 
Siberia. In the Altaian aquatic culture, the river, the forest, and the people share a 
spiritually identity (Wohl, 2011). The Altaians were greatly concerned with the Russian 
government’s plans to build a dam on the Katun River in the late 1980’s (Klubnikin, 
Annett, Cherkasova, Shishin, and Fotieva; 2000; Wohl, 2011). Building even one dam 
would dramatically upset the balance the Altaians had with the spirits. Klubnikin (2000) 
et al. and Wohl (2011) note that the project ultimately failed due to increased protests 
and unprecedented media coverage. What was most interesting in public hearings about 
building the dam was when the Altaians testified, they were not concerned with the 
health effects, or money. Wohl (2011) points out that their major concern was to protect 
the spiritual life relationship they have with the rivers. 
Another characteristic of magic cultures is that they are highly idolic. For 
example, Kramer (1997) explains, “In the magic world, there is practically no 
dissociation or detachment of emotional commitment between what an expression 
means and its concrete presence. For instance, if I steal an idol, I have stolen a god” (p. 
xiii). Kramer (2013) illustrates that the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca and the specific rituals 
performed are examples of an intense emotional commitment. Kramer (2013) explains:  
Ka’bah is not a random structure, and the Black Stone embedded in its eastern 
corner is not a random meteorite, nor is the rock inside the structure upon which, 
it is said, Abraham stood with Ishmael on his shoulders….For Muslims, the 
Tawaf of the Ka’bah is ritual enactment that parallels the Tawaf that runs above 
the Jannat al Firdaws in the seventh heaven or paradise (often described as a 
blissful garden), which touches Allah’s throne, the Arsh. It marks the act of 




In another example, Kramer (1997) describes how Egyptian hieroglyphics were idolic. 
Kramer (1997) comments, “Images of animals were often either not completed on 
purpose, or presented in segments, for fear that otherwise they would literally jump off 
the surface and run away” (p. 69).  
 Kramer (2013) also argues that, “the magic worldview manifestly exhibits an 
idolic incantatory mode of communication that is identically univalent” (p. 145). In the 
example above, part of the ceremony for Muslims is to say a very specific prayer 
praising Allah that has an absolute and emotional meaning to them. Malinowski 
(1935/2002) shares extensive evidence that incantation has been an extremely important 
part of communication in magic cultures. While studying the people of the Trobriand 
Islands, Malinowski (1935/2002) argued, “the pragmatic relevance of words is greatest 
when these words are uttered actually within the situation to which they belong and 
uttered so that they achieve an immediate, practical effect….for it is in such situations 
that words acquire their meaning” (p. 52). The Trobriand youth are educated about 
rituals such as why the community burn gardens, because they have “fertilizing power 
of ashes” (Malinowski, 1935/2002, p. 51). Words mattered so youth learned exactly 
what to utter. If said incorrectly, the incantation would fail and the community would be 
in trouble. Consequently, the community used the narratives to maintain social cohesion 
in addition to using specific words from the narratives to produce magic. 
 An additional characteristic of the magic culture is that it is very conservative, 
harmonic (Kramer, 1997, 2013). Changes cause chaos in the magical structure. Gebser 
(1949/1985) uses the example of the Aztecs destruction to show the collision that 
happens between magic and perspectival cultures. Gebser argues that Cortez and the 
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Spanish Conquistadors did not win the war by using advanced technology. Rather, the 
Aztec empire lost because within their consciousness structure, they expected their 
magic to defeat the invaders. Kramer (1997) further describes, “the worst thing one 
people can do to another is forcibly deny their metaphysical assumptions, because then 
all orientation is lost (p. 64). Kramer (2013) describes how Cortez killed the royal 
family, and then committed the ultimate atrocity of killing Montezuma II, the emperor 
of Tenochtitlan and God of the Aztec people. With their God destroyed, the Aztec 
people fell into chaos allowing only a few hundred soldiers with minimal modern 
weaponry to conquer them.  
 To summarize, Kramer (1997, 2013) outlines a few major characteristics of 
magic cultures. First, identity does not yet exist in the magical dimension. The 
collective is most important, and everything in the cosmos is a spirit in balance with 
everything else. Second, magic cultures are highly idolic both in actions and in their 
incantations or other word rituals. Finally, the magic world is conservative and 
traditional. When change occurs to upset the harmonious balance, the magic world falls 
into chaos.   
 
The Mythic Dimension 
Three characteristics describe the mythic world (Gebser 1949/1985; Kavolis, 
1992; Kramer, 1997, 2013; Kramer & Mickunas, 1992; Mickunas, 2008). First, Gebser 
(1949/1985) argues that the essential characteristic of the mythical world is awareness 
of the soul and time manifested in cyclical form. Next, Kramer (1997, 2013) argues that 
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the mythic world is one of ambivalence as manifested in polar relationships. Finally, 
mythic communication is symbolic (Kavolis, 1992; Kramer, 1997, 2013).  
The essential characteristic of the mythical world is awareness of the soul and 
time. Regarding how time was manifested in mythic human, Kramer affirms, “[They 
are]….directly aware of various cycles that orient everything, creating cosmic and (its 
polar complement) particular sense. Cycles of birth and death, solar, stellar, and lunar 
cycles, the seasons, day and night, and so forth, dominate the mythic world” (p. 66). 
Furthermore, Gebser (1949/1985) notes that the acknowledgement of time keeping in 
cultures is evidence in a shift from the magic to the mythic consciousness. Gebser 
(1949/1985) contends:  
Wherever we encounter seasonal rituals in the later periods of the magic 
structure, and particularly in astronomical deliberations and various forms of 
calendar, as for example among the Babylonians and later in Egyptian and 
Mexican civilization, we find anticipations of the mythic structure. Such forms 
of evidence indicate that the coming-to-awareness of nature has reached its 
conclusion, a process whereby the rhythm of nature with conspicuous auditory 
emphasis becomes, in a purely natural way, temporal. This is a decisive step 
taken by magic man out of his interlacing with nature. (p.61) 
 
Kavolis (1992) and Mickunas (2008) clarify that mythic time differs from the magic 
time in that it does not have “eternal recurrence” (Kavolis, 1992, p. 165). Mickunas 
(2008) comments: 
Eternal recurrence is a never ending sequence of repetitions no matter how vast 
or complex, whereas mythological cycling has a formation such that, on a circle, 
every event, as if it were moving to the future, meets its past, as well as any 
event, seeking its past, will circle to meet itself in the future that is already 
circling and catching up from the past. No historical time orientation and no 
repetition is yet available. (p. 13) 
 
As the mythic person recognizes time, they also begin to find some sense of 
individuality. Kramer (2013) argues, “with the advent of mythical consciousness, a 
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nascent sense of space intensifies. The first inkling of ego –self begin to emerge ‘out’ 
from the ocean whole as individuation. The whole is left behind” (p. 153). Such a 
separation allows for some possibilities of individual agency. While not completely free 
to do as they choose, the mythic person is no longer bound to the collective as they are 
in the magic world.  
The second characteristic of the mythic world is that it is full of ambivalence as 
illustrated through polarity of relationships. Kramer and Mickunas (1992) explain:  
Polarity means the dynamic movement of one event, image, or feeling that 
provokes, attracts, and requires another event. The appearance of sky is also the 
appearance of its polar aspect, the earth; the appearance of love is likewise the 
appearance of hate, while the appearance of high, demands the polar presence of 
the low. One is never given without the other, and one may replace the other. (p. 
xix) 
 
Kramer and Mickunas (1992) conclude that the Chinese tai chi with the polarities of yin 
and yang is a good example of the mythic mentality. Kavolis (1992) further describes 
the polarity of the mythic world as “mutually dependent, nonantagonistic polarities 
(which can be embodied as apparently contradictory qualities within particular entities)” 
(p. 164). The language choices of the mythic world provides further manifestations of 
ambivalence and the importance of polar relationships (Kramer, 1997). For example, 
Kramer (1997) demonstrates that mythic words maintain both parts of polar 
relationships as illustrated in the Latin word Altus that meant high and low; or Sacer 
that meant sacred and cursed. 
 The third defining characteristic of the mythic dimension is that communication 
is symbolic opening up the possibility of interpretation. Gebser (1949/1985) indicates 
that the etymology of the word mythos has two polar meanings that include to talk or 
have sound, and to be silent. Kramer (1997) states:  
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While myth is related to mouth, it combines the polar aspects of both speech and 
silence, emphasizing the necessity for interpretation of the ‘hidden’, or silent 
meanings. Hence, the importance of oracles, channelers, and interpreters 
(metacommunicators) even for the gods. Needs are expressed by such symbolic 
entities as Hermes and the Muses” (p. 67) 
 
Furthermore, individuals in the mythic world now have the ability to choose some 
interpretations meaning that words start to take on literal and figurative meanings 
Kramer (2013) describes: 
The mythic world manifests a symbolic mode of communication that exhibits 
bivalent ambiguity between figural and literal meaning and a semi-linear proto-
spatial narrative form. Magic incantation works as soon as it is uttered. The 
words, their intonation, and their sequence are not arbitrary, nor are they mere 
symbolic embellishments or representations, but rather they literally conjure the 
thing, and if the spell is broken the thing or event vanishes. (p. 152) 
 
 Kramer uses the example of a statue of God to clarify how interpretations start to be 
figural and literal. In the magic world, the statue of God is God but with mythic 
communication, the statue is a symbol of the God. This separation is a sign of 
dissociation from the magic to the mythic consciousness. In another example, Kramer 
(1997, 2013) demonstrates that in the magic world the cross of Christ is the actual wood 
that Romans used to crucify him and has magical power. In mythic symbolism, the 
cross is no longer the actual wood, but merely a symbol of Christ’s crucifixion. Yet, 
because there is still an emotional connection accrued from the magic world to the 
mythic, Kramer clarifies that if I step on the wood, it is not like stepping on a 
meaningless stick. The cross represents something very emotional, my relationship to 
Christ.  
 Another aspect of mythic communication is the way mythic people deliver the 
message. Because myth is related to mouth and sound, mythic communication is 
delivered orally through story telling often in the form of dancing, poetry, or other 
88 
 
musical means (Gebser, 1949/1985; Mickunas, 2008). Kavolis (1992) expresses that in 
the mutation from the magic to mythic, “The magic ritual, the incantation, becomes 
musical poetry as the crucial form of cultural expression” (p. 164). Kramer (2013) 
further clarifies: 
The mythic world is a word built on sacred stories and extenuating 
commentaries that develop out of telling and retelling. Interpretation is a form of 
explanation of the text in the very telling of it. Mythic performance is yet very 
emotional, inspired And in this modality performance extends, enhances, 
embellishes; proto-explanation. (p. 154) 
 
 One possible consequence of dissociation into the mythic consciousness is that 
humans become detached from nature or an overall god or life force that connects 
everything. This detachment causes individualism allowing people to justify their 
selfish needs. Greek myths are full of humans who selfishly try to aggrandize 
themselves in some way and take advantage of the Gods, but receive punishment for 
their unwise ways. The story of Icarus demonstrates how egocentric humans use 
advanced technology such as flight. However, because Icarus flew too close to the sun, 
Apollo decided humans did not need to fly, melted his wings, and killed him. This story 
demonstrates ego-individualism (personal ambition and its dangers from the point of 
view of the mythic world) in the literal and figural use of technology and magic culture. 
Icarus and his father literally put feathers and wax on their arms to escape the Minotaur 
maze, and the hot sun melted their wings; but according to the myth, the symbolic 
magic of Apollo was the cause of their demise. 
In summary, three characteristics describe the mythical dimension. First, the 
mythical world introduces an awareness of the soul and time manifested in cyclical 
form. Second, the mythic world is one of ambivalence as manifested in polar 
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relationships. Third, mythic communication is symbolic allowing for interpretation, and 
mythic communication is oratory typically in musical form or other modes of 
storytelling. 
 
The Perspectival Dimension 
 Gebser (1949/1985) uses the term mental structure to describe the perspectival 
culture. He etymologically breaks down the term ‘mental’ to show how the Greek word 
menis (courage and wrath) has the same stem as menos (resolve, anger, courage, and 
power). In addition, the Latin word mens has an interrelationship with these concepts, 
but also means thinking, deliberation, mentality, and imagination. De-liberation stops 
free flowing association and emotion replacing it with logical necessity and the law 
such as the law of non-contradiction. Gebser (1949/1985) argues that the mental 
structure is the first time we see independent discourse and deliberation, which is “an 
unprecedented event, an event that fundamentally alters the world” (p. 75). He uses the 
example of Moses and the Nation of Israel worshipping a monotheistic God as a huge 
contrast from the magic and mythic consciousness structures where polytheism played a 
central role. Such solidification of perspective into tolerance, total exclusivity, 
individualism, and dissociation opened up the way for a fragmented society in a way 
that had never happened before. There is one truth. This is the historical origin of 
positivism. Kramer (1997, 2013) outlined two broad concepts that make up the three-
dimensional, perspectival, or modern culture. First, all meaning is completely arbitrary; 
individual desire is paramount. Second, the modern world is concerned with progress, 
expansion, and fragmentation of space. 
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The first principle of the perspectival world is that all things are arbitrary and 
individual desire is the paramount goal. Kramer (2013) explains, “As the universe 
comes to be seen as random with no inherent purpose or meaning (sacred or otherwise), 
it becomes available for willful agency to construct what it wishes. Egocentric 
performance flourishes” (p. 159). The three-dimensional perspectival culture is a 
disruption of the mythic and magic perspectives (Kramer, 1997). In the magic culture, 
everything is one; in the mythic culture, there is harmony among polarities such as yin 
and yang or sky and earth. In perspectival culture, Kramer (2013) argues that 
dissociation influences everything. Modern communication becomes signalic meaning 
that, “binary computer language, with no emotional content proliferate[s]. 
Sentimentality is denigrated. Language becomes a tool for ulterior means. 
Communication itself is measured in terms of efficiency of goal-attainment” (Kramer, 
2013, p. 162). Kramer (1997) posits that moderns try to remove emotion and motive 
from the communication we have with each other. During the Linguistic Turn, scholars 
such as Saussure and Levi-Strauss tried to make the study of language into a science 
where symbols, signals, or signs are completely arbitrary until communities assign 
meaning to them.  
  Kramer (2013) argues that dissociation allows the creation of nation-states who 
want to own geographical territory. Moreover, “property is privatized, words are strictly 
defined, laws are rigorously upheld, authorship is emphasized, religion fragments into 
sects of feuding theologies and continues to splinter until individuals have their own 
singularly ‘personal beliefs’ and so forth” (Kramer, 2013, p. 161). Dissociation widely 
affects other aspects of the modern culture. Individuals dissociate themselves from the 
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magic collective and/or the mythic ideology where the gods watched them from afar. 
Kramer (1997) posits that in modernity, “magic correspondence and mythic 
complementarily no longer apply except as ‘superstition’ and ‘fantasy’” (p. 93). 
Furthermore, Kramer (2013) notes that in the modern culture, to be emotional, religious, 
or spiritual is a waste of valuable time and is even perceived as “lacking cognitive 
complexity” (p. 143). 
 A problematic aspect of the arbitrary modern view is that because nothing has 
value, everything is replaceable (Kramer, 2013). This is vastly different from 
worshiping the sacred in mythic cultures or being at one with the universe so the idol is 
the god. For example, Kramer (2013) states: 
The Modern also has trouble understanding why a "mere spot of land," which is 
used for the Jewish Temple Mount, which is used for worship, or the Muslim 
Dome of the Rock (the Al-Aqsa Mosque) in Jerusalem, evoke so much emotion. 
To the Modern, land and structures are arbitrary and contingent-negotiable and 
replaceable. One can always move if there is a dispute because space has no 
inherent meaning but is rather the dimension that enables movement….To the 
Jew and Muslim, however, nothing could be more wrong. This land is not 
arbitrary. It is sacred (eternal) and, as such, irreplaceable. To suggest it is 
negotiable, even in the pursuit of mortal/political peace, is blasphemy. This mere 
"piece of land" is worth defending to the death-worth raising one's children to 
defend to the death. After all what is mere mortality in the face of eternity? Such 
places constitute identity, magic, timeless being. (p. 149-150) 
 
This example brings us to the second defining principle of the modern 
dimension, which is concerned with progress, expansion, and the fragmentation of 
space. Kramer (1997) states, “The modern world is obsessed with the method of 
fragmentation. According to modernism, the best way to solve problems is to first break 
them down into pieces (their “component parts” as if everything was made on an 
assembly line)” (p. 2).    
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Kramer (1997) further clarifies that the modern is obsessed with fragmenting all sorts of 
knowledge and events from creating disciplines in schools to trying to define sectarian 
conflict from other kinds of battles.  
One of the most influential forms of fragmentation in perspectival culture is the 
introduction of the clock because it is precise and proportional (Kramer, 1997, 2013; 
Mumford, 1934). Kramer (1997) explains that, “Clockwork became the model for all 
subsequent machine development including the factory and the bureaucracy. A moral 
person became a person who was organized, prompt, and punctual “just like clockwork” 
(p. 105). Kramer (2013) also states, “the mechanical clock likewise dissociates time 
from the actual and variable length of light and dark that varies according to seasons. 
Virtual values displace actual entities. Identity is reduced to the sum of measures” (p. 
161). Moreover, Kramer (1997) concludes that that the clock along with other machines 
that followed it express important values to the modern culture including the value of 
mindless automation, absolute control by surveillance, maintaining equilibrium in the 
status quo, and reductionism or ever-increasing fragmentation. 
 Kramer (1997, 2013) grants that not all of the modern culture display negative 
tendencies. Positive benefits from modern fragmentation include the ability to analyze 
which led to important evolutions of knowledge in areas such as physics and math. 
Modernity also allows discourse and debate to occur over political actions or 
philosophical questions. In modernity, we ask questions such as, what is human nature, 
or why should we employ ethics in a given situation? In magic and mythic cultures, 
there is no debate or analyzing why things happen because in those cultures everything 
happens not by reason, but by their nature. In modernity, everything begins to fragment. 
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For instance, what is moral may no longer be the same as what is legal. People who 
digress from the way things are in the collective end up dead for questioning tradition.  
 Despite some positive effects of progress in the perspectival world, it also can be 
deficient, especially in this globalizing world of hypertrophic or extreme individualism 
(Gebser, 1949/1985; Kramer, 2013). Kramer (2013) defines an efficient social system, 
culture, or form of life as one that can self-replicate and endure, while a deficient 
system cannot. For example, in the deficiency of the perspectival culture, we often see 
corporations that value gaining money and/or power at the cost of all things, including 
human lives. At this point, such a perspectival view is unsustainable or deficient. In 
2014, General Motors (GM) proved this point in the fact that they did not want to recall 
cars to save lives based on their quantitative cost benefits to the corporation. In a 
globalized world, nations are finding increasingly devastating ways to manipulate the 
environment. Kramer (1997) posits that in the perspectival culture, “humans do not 
passively adapt to the environment but instead, they adapt the environment to their own 
interests, wants, and needs. Interests, wants, needs, and capacities constitute the very 
shape of the human world” (p. 50). This includes forcing subalterns to adapt, treating 
people as instruments of production. To summarize, there are two broadly outlined 
concepts that make up the three-dimensional, perspectival, or modern culture. First, all 
meaning is completely arbitrary and the individual is of paramount importance. Second, 







 While some dissociation occurs during consciousness shifts, Kramer (1997, 
2013) argues that humans accrue or accumulate culture and communication habits from 
each dimension rather than leaving one completely in the past and assimilating 
themselves into the current level of consciousness. Modern culture presumes magic and 
mythic consciousness structures. Throughout history, many leaders and civilizations 
have connected the perspectival with magic and mythic combinations to create a very 
potent force. For example, Ravenscroft (1973) relates the story of Hitler and the Spear 
of Destiny. Legend claimed this was the spear used by the Romans to pierce Christ in 
the side at his crucifixion. Hitler believed the Spear held magical power that would help 
the one holding it conquer the world. Immediately upon conquering Vienna, Hitler went 
to the Museum and when he held the spear, he looked as if he had a magical aura about 
him. Other witnesses later explained that Hitler claimed to have visions of his future 
success when he first held the Spear. Hitler is not unique in combining magic and 
mythic cultures with the perspectival. We find highly symbolic and idolic rituals and 
ceremonies throughout the modern world. Kramer (2013) illustrates: 
 We declare war. We pronounce couples husband and wife. We take oaths to 
protect the Constitution of the United States as we change our identities from 
foreign national to "naturalized" citizen, from civilian to soldier. We swear on 
the Bible to tell the truth. We christen children, ships, and space vehicles with 
ritual ceremony and ''spirits" as a process of naming, and the name carries 
connotations transferred to the sense of the child and machine. Such utterances 
must be spoken aloud and publically for the magic binding force to work. 
(p.148) 
 
Kramer (2013) posits one possible consequence of accrual is combining 
perspectival technology with strongly emotional magical or mythical beliefs. This 
combination leads to a high potential for volatile conflict. In the previously cited 
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example about Hitler, it is easy to see during his rise to power in the marches and 
rhetoric of the Third Reich, a violently persuasive movement combined magical and 
mythic beliefs with perspectival military technology to enforce that ideology. In 2014, 
many nation states and nongovernmental or what Andreas (2003) calls clandestine 
actors have the capacity and will to combine magic and mythical beliefs to enforce their 
will in the modern world. Some of these actors include terrorist groups (Al Qaeda, 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Al-Shabab, Hezbollah, and others), transnational 
criminal groups, and other types of extremist groups. Consider the belief system of a 
terrorist, who combines a nuclear weapon with their magic beliefs. What would they be 
willing to do? This is not to say all cultures that have one set of beliefs or that have 
some combination between the magic, mythic, and perspectival will automatically be 
harmful, but in this globalized world, this is a very real possibility. However, if we 
could exist in an efficient or integral social system where we would treat all dimensions 
as if they exist on the same plane, the result could be mutually beneficial to everyone. 
The integral area of DAD theory is the part that needs more work and many more 
examples to see if it could actually function, as opposed to just being a good idea. 
Within my research on walls, I plan to strengthen this section of the theory. 
Applied DAD Theory  
 As early as 1992, Kramer started elaborating on Gebser principles that 
communication scholars could apply to study messages. Kramer (1997, 2013) does not 
initially conceptualize DAD as a communication theory, but in later development 
illustrates the intricate relationship between communication and culture. This 
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dissertation is further evidence that DAD theory is effective in explaining the 
communicative functions of walls.  
 The physical structures we build contain messages, whether they are intentional 
or not. The choices about what to build says more about the individuals, communities 
and nations who construct the project than those who look at it and/or utilize it. 
Sometimes the structures can be highly controversial, as in the case of the Enola Gay 
Bomber, which the United States built for war. Ikeda and Kramer (1998) describe that 
after the plane dropped the atomic bomb, the Enola Gay became a highly iconic and 
controversial artifact. Ikeda and Kramer (1998) apply DAD theory to illustrate the 
various magical, mythic, and perspectival interpretations of the bomber when the 
Smithsonian Institute in Washington D.C. displayed it to commemorate the 50
th
 
Anniversary of the dropping of the bomb. By the time the controversy was finished, the 
museum had almost entirely changed the original plans for the exhibit. Ikeda and 
Kramer (1998) clarify how several dimensions were simultaneously present in the 
iconic artifact:  
The Enola Gay[‘s]…. material presence-at-hand, magically evinces its identity 
as the "actual" machine that dropped the first atomic bomb on people. 
Mythically, it symbolizes hot war, cold war, national pride, evil, and many other 
potential adumbrations. Perspectivally (in the modern sense) this weapons 
system demonstrated itself to be the most efficient machine of mass destruction 
yet used….It is at once an idol, a symbol, and a sign. (p. 50-51) 
 
This was only the first impression of the messages a person might have received while 
considering the bomber. The plane itself, as well as the context and history surrounding 
it contain a great range of messages for all the parties involved in the controversial 
decision of whether to put it on public display. Using DAD, Ikeda, and Kramer (1998) 
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examine the messages one at a time to understand what the iconic artifact 
communicated for different people. 
 Zuckerman (2008) provides another example is particularly relevant to a 
discussion about the semiotic nature of walls. Through a Gebserian analysis that 
included aspects of DAD theory, Zuckerman attempts to explain the troubles in 
Northern Ireland from several viewpoints. He argues that scholars tend to divide the 
Irish along national or racial lines, which ignores the importance of religious and 
political differences. Gebser consciousness structures allow for the inclusion of religion 
and politics because Gebserian analysis is interested in more than a few demographic 
traits. Zuckerman (2008) insists that the conflicts in Northern Ireland are more than 
about religion. Zuckerman examines political murals on barrier walls that display 
faction symbols and diverse language used to express divergent identities and even 
neighborhood boundaries. Zuckerman (2008) states: 
Idolic and mythic boundary markers have become a ubiquitous part of the 
Northern Irish landscape. To the outside observer, the most obvious boundary 
markers are the hundreds of murals found in Belfast. These murals appear 
through the sectarian areas and seem to increase in intensity at the boundary 
areas where the Catholic and Protestant neighborhood meet. Here the murals 
frequently take on their strongest tone. (p.95-96) 
 
Zuckerman (2008) concludes that the painters and others who support the murals are 
very aware of messages they are trying to send to those who see and read them. The 
murals serve as idolic and mythic emotional boundaries that people do not cross lightly. 
They serve as a magical means to keep enemies out of the neighborhoods. Like in the 
case of the walls in Northern Ireland, I noted in the literature review that murals on the 
security fence across the USMX border contribute to the identity and communication of 




DAD Research Questions 
 To gain greater knowledge of what walls mean as communication artifacts, I 
offer the following research question. What are the magic, mythic, and perspectival 
dimensions of walls and what does that communicate about them? With the open-ended 
nature of DAD theory, as I work to uncover horizons, I may find additional research 
questions during the analysis process. 
 
Chapter Four: Methodology & Research Design 
Methodology 
Phenomenology 
 In order to understand why the research design of semiotic analysis is 
necessarily open ended, it is helpful to understand phenomenology that is the foundation 
for hermeneutics, semiotics, ST, and DAD. Spiegelberg (1971) defines phenomenology, 
“as the study of the general essence of consciousness and of its various structures” (p. 
105). Husserl, (1910/2006) expresses that the individual consciousness comprises 
subjective physical and mental experience that they use to discern the world around 
them. One place to look for why we act a particular way or how we communicate is in 
the consciousness of the human mind. Husserl contends that individuals have 
knowledge, values, and motives we use to accomplish a particular action or intention. 
These actions result in receiving new experiences that we add to our knowledge base, 
then form new intentions, and act again (Spiegelberg, 1971). Husserl's examination of 
intentions, also referred to as studying the human transcendental consciousness is akin 
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to communication scholars studying various aspects of the entire communication 
process. In DAD theory, Kramer (1997, 2013) clarifies that communication is a 
necessary co-evolutionary process for humans to exist. Kramer (2013) uses the term 
“pan-evolution” as a way to describe this integral and important process (p. 129-130). 
This is where our intentions and thoughts come together in our minds and then we are 
somehow able to put together messages we share, and the mutual exchange of shared 
messages that creates the social and cultural structures in which we live. 
 Phenomenology is critical of empirical ways of thinking because complete 
objectivity is unobtainable, and unnecessary. Husserl (1910/2006) contends that 
because we engage in science with our biases, we cannot obtain absolute truth of a 
phenomenon; rather, we can only see it from our subjective perspective. Many 
intercultural communication behaviors are so subjective that it may not be helpful to use 
surveys and questionnaires. It is unlikely such tools can accurately tell a researcher why 
a community picks one sign to represent them over another, or what particular cultural 
behaviors mean to their people. Quantitative data is only interested in averages so it is 
almost entirely ineffective in trying to comprehend and explain cultural behaviors. 
When an outlier exists, quantitative researchers label it as irrational or pointless and 
exclude it from their explanation. Quantitative research cannot explain why certain 
cultures rely on magic such as incantations or a belief in a natural life spirit. Instead, it 
is essential that as a researcher, we obtain the perspective or experience of those people 
and communities for why they make their choices, as far as it is possible to do so. An 
understanding of phenomenology opens up a path for valuable semiotic and 




The Hermeneutic Circle  
Semiotics scholars explain that semiosis is both an internal and external process. 
Internally, the human brain is in a constant state of interpreting and assigning meaning 
to the barrage of signs we receive externally through communication channels (Noth, 
1985/1990). In conversations, a sender has thoughts based on their experience and they 
communicate these thoughts as a message. We receive and interpret the message based 
on our own experience, then construct and send a new message as a reply. Through this 
semiosis exchange and by employing instinctive abilities, we build a sense of individual 
identity. German philosopher Hans Gadamer (2004/1975), an expert in hermeneutics, 
defines the field as the study of interpretation. Furthermore, Gadamer defines identity as 
horizon, which is the interpretation of lived experiences, or a context for our unique 
perspective on things. We use our horizon to identify who we are and see how we are 
different from others. In qualitative research, Foley (1997) and Schwand (2003) clarify 
that the hermeneutic circle is the process of a researcher gathering and reconciling the 
various horizons in the semiosis process to gain a more comprehensive understanding of 
an artifact under study. 
 According to Gadamer (1975/2004), I have pre-conceived notions about the text 
under study. As I step into the hermeneutic circle, I have my own prejudice viewpoint 
that I need to understand before I can begin gathering other perspectives with which I 
can compare. In this case, my hermeneutic horizon comes from several years of 
studying the theories, South African history and apartheid, and the USMX security 
fence (see Table 5 in the data collection section for a complete list of where I developed 
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my perspective). The circle is representative of the idea that interpretation is always 
happening because we all have prejudicial horizons. My dissertation proposes to add 
more horizons to the circle as well as use the semiotic method to reconcile the various 
perspectives and come up with conclusions about what I learned. There are many more 
meanings than I can gather in a dissertation, but the process is still a worthy endeavor to 
understand the communication functions of the artifacts.   
 American semiotician Charles Peirce and Gadamer (1975/2004) demonstrates 
how semiosis and hermeneutics function together. Peirce states that a painter shares 
thoughts by painting them on a canvas that through the semiosis process becomes a 
piece of communication (Noth, 1985/1990). People can try to view the painting from 
the artist’s horizon but they cannot exactly comprehend it in the same way. 
Alternatively, people may interpret the communication of the painting in another way 
based on their own lived experiences. Gadamer (2004/1975) stated, “.…everyone who 
experiences a work of art incorporates this experiences wholly within himself: that is, 
into the totality of his self-understanding, within which it means something to him” (p. 
xxvii). In some cases, like the postmodern painter, an artist or observer may articulate 
that a painting has no meaning (although this position itself is placing meaning on 
something). They may insist that an observer take away whatever meaning suits them 
the best or the artist might not care at all what others think. Many artists would concede 
that art is a never-ending process of semiosis where interpretation takes place regarding 
their communicative act. We not only interpret art but we interpret and assign meaning 




The Semiotic Method 
 In the theory section when explaining the concept of signification, I explain 
Saussure’s (1972/1983) argument in that language is the most important sign system 
and makes up all other sign systems that humans use to communicate. Saussure argues 
that humans think of pictures in their minds and combine them with sounds. The 
resulting noise that comes out of the human mouth is communication. Elsewhere in the 
dissertation I refer to this process as transcendental consciousness (Husserl term), or 
pan-evolution (Kramer DAD theory term). Although there are some shared definitions 
on signs, each individual has a unique perspective so humans can have an infinite 
number of perspectives on any subject. We demonstrate this by how differently we 
speak about, culturally shape, and perceive the meaning of space. Saussure (1972/1983) 
postulates three characteristics about language structures that became the foundation for 
the structural analysis methodology. First, linguistics systems are the most important 
empirical and practical system. Second, linguistics is the most advanced of all 
semiological sciences, and third, the study of linguistic structures offers a basis to study 
and comprehend other semiological and structural questions.  
 French semiotician Claude Levi-Strauss (1964/1975) advances Saussure’s 
concepts far beyond just studying linguistic structure, to include creating the Science of 
Myths. Levi-Strauss and Saussure influenced other semiotician’s including Barthes 
(1957/1987, 1964/1973) who also studied the Science of Myths, and American 
communication scholar Ed Hall who studied how space is culturally structured. The 
common thread between these scholars is that the systematic study of linguistics is a 
cornerstone for understanding, analyzing, and describing other systems of signs that 
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make up social and cultural structures. We think and perceive in words and develop 
everything else on that basis. Hall (1966) explains,  
Man’s very perception of the world….is programmed by the language he 
speaks, just as a computer is programmed. Like the computer, man’s mind will 
register and structure external reality only in accordance with the program. Since 
two languages often program the same class of events quite differently, no belief 
or philosophical system should be considered apart from language. (p. 1-2) 
 
 Levi-Strauss (1958/1963, 1964/1969) developed a semiotic methodology to 
conduct a structural analysis of cultures called a Science of Mythology. Levi-Strauss 
postulates that humans operate from similar mental classification systems so regardless 
of how their myths develop and differ, scholars should be able to see some similarities 
in their mental structures. One such characteristic according to the Russian semiotician 
Roman Jakobson is how humans, starting as babies, categorize everything into binary 
opposites so we can comprehend the world around us (Noth, 1985/1990). Levi-Strauss 
following Jakobson's theories argued, “Language may appear as laying a kind of 
foundation for the more complex structures [and categories] which correspond to the 
different aspects of culture” (Levi-Strauss, 1958/1963, p. 69). In an extensive 
ethnography on the myths of the Bororo Indians in Central Brazil, Levi-Strauss 
(1964/1969) classified myths into empirical categories. Major concepts within 
categories have binary opposites. One central binary opposite in this study was the 
distinction between nature and culture. Food analogies such as "the raw and the cooked, 
the fresh and the decayed, the moistened and the burned" (Levi-Strauss, 1964/1969, p. 
1) were all examples of what Levi-Strauss argued was the difference between nature 
and culture. Natural food was raw, fresh, and moistened but when people try to cook it, 
burn it, let it decay, or otherwise manipulate it, it is cultural. Before starting the 
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analysis, Levi-Strauss conceded that the study of myths was a new, broad field that 
scholars needed to apply to other structural or social systems.  
 Berger (2011), a communication scholar and semiotician offers a basic method 
for conducting an effective semiotic analysis of binary oppositions. Berger refers to 
binary opposition analysis as conducting a paradigmatic analysis of texts. First, a 
researcher should categorize a text into opposing pairs. Then the researcher should 
discuss denotative and connotative meanings associated with the oppositions in the 
artifacts. Berger (2011, p. 64-65) uses the poem "Humpty Dumpty" to illustrate how 
paradigmatic analysis works. The following oppositions are present in the poem:  
On the wall On the ground 
Unsteadiness Stability 
Danger Safety 
Liquid in container (egg) Solid object  
Fragile Hard to break, strong 
Pieces Wholeness 
Can't be reconstructed Reconstruction is possible 
Table 4 - Humpty Dumpty Binary Opposition Terms 
The primary opposition is “being on the wall” or “on the ground”. The rest of the 
oppositions are subsets of the first opposition. Berger (2011) claims that researchers 
could reveal social and cultural messages by discussing the denotative and connotative 
meanings associated with each term or phrase. 
 By definition, walls are a binary opposite that divide space creating opposing 
positions. Therefore, to analyze the communicative functions of walls, we should apply 
the paradigmatic, binary opposition analysis. Depending on which side of the wall you 
fall on, you are going to have dissimilar views about the way things are. In order to 
illustrate how paradigmatic analysis of walls will work, I use the example of a carrot 
patch and fence. An open carrot patch is unprotected from rodents who may eat the 
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crops, weeds that may creep into the garden, people who may step on the crops because 
they are unaware that the carrot patch is there, or other problems. Putting a fence around 
the carrot patch creates a binary opposition by dividing the space. Inside the fence, the 
carrot patch now has a certain level of protection and its own space to grow. It is also 
contained to some degree so it cannot escape or grow wild crops or weeds. Anything 
outside the fence is wild or unwanted that may include animals, people, weeds, and 
anything else deemed to be an unimportant element to the carrot patch. The fence also 
may denote owned space that requires defensive measures from potential dangers 
lurking outside. While this example is an over-simplification, it does provide an 
illustration of how the analysis will function as I discuss the more complex issues of 
apartheid and the USMX security fence with their cultural and social characteristics. 
 
Research Design 
 The research design for this dissertation has five steps. First, I develop my 
hermeneutic foundation. Gadamer claimed (1975/2004) that the hermeneutic circle has 
no beginning or end; it is both the first and last step in the research process. Therefore, 
as a first step, I identified my own knowledge and background on the topic. 
Comprehending my own horizon (that is inherently prejudiced) provided me with some 
context to start with. Throughout the project, I collected other hermeneutic horizons to 
give a more complete context for apartheid and the USMX security fence. As I worked 
through the research process, my own horizon also began to change to give me a greater 
comprehension of all the issues surrounding these two wall artifacts. Gadamer 
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(1975/2004) constantly cautioned against trying to gather all perspectives in order to 
create some kind of “objective” result because it is impossible and unnecessary.  
 
Data Collection 
The second step is to find data to add to my hermeneutic horizon in order to try 
and better understand the artifact under study. Within the data collection there are 
contrasting viewpoints but all are helpful in creating the most comprehensive, holistic 
view of the artifact. The units of analysis are historical apartheid in South Africa, and 
the USMX border fence. I found semiotic data in verbal communication such as 
interviews, official comments and letters, movies, TV, and the news. I found more 
evidence with non-verbal data to include books, legal arguments, photos, art images, 
written news articles, and a variety of texts on the Internet. Personal experience and 
observations are critical to comprehension and analysis. Preliminary data collection 
started in the spring 2008 semester after my first dissertation committee meeting and 
continued through 2014 (see Table 5 for complete details).    
Table 5 - Research & Hermeneutic Background 








Planning meeting, topic discussion to 
begin shaping my horizon 
Fall 2008- Fall 
2009 
Coursework and research in semiotics, 
hermeneutics, phenomenology 
Spring 2010 
OU Institutional Research Board (IRB) for 
Human Subjects Research Board  
Spring 2010 
Visited U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (USICE) office in Oklahoma 
City, and spoke with the Customs and 
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Border Protection (CBP) Port Authority. 
Also sent email proposal asking for help 
from the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) Public Affairs office in 
Washington D.C.  
Summer 2010-
May 2012 
Wrote dissertation proposal drafts, and had 













As noted in the literature review, a 
preliminary review in these areas indicates 
that they are where the majority of any 
literature about walls exists, or is relevant 




In a basic search on walls, besides 
marketing of walls and wall related items, 
there are plenty of websites discussing 
specific walls as tour areas, historical 
artifacts, etc. They can be useful textual 






South Africa & 
USMX border 
Develop semiotic historic context and 
current descriptions of apartheid and the 
security fence, and examine/answer 
theoretically related research questions for 
both artifacts.  
Internet search 
engines, websites 
Visit to El Paso, 
TX Border Fence 
 A search in Dictionary.com maintains a compilation of sources with 22 
meanings, synonyms, metaphors, or characteristics of the word “walls” (Ammer, 
2002; Collins, 2008; Dictionary.com, 2008; Easton, 1897; Etymology, 2008; 
Heritage-Steadman, 2012; Kipfer & Chapman, 2007). Table 6 reveals the 22 
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characteristics that provide a basis for collection of data from 2008-2014. Both the 
USMX border fence and apartheid fit several of the 22 meanings throughout the data.  
Table 6 – Definitions of meanings of "walls" 
NOUNS   
1. Shelter any of various permanent upright construction
s  
having a 
length much greater than the thickness 
and presenting a continuous surface 
except where pierced by doors, windows, etc.: 
used for shelter, protection, or privacy, or to  
subdivide 
interior space, to support floors, roofs,  
or the like, to retain earth, to fence in an area, etc. 
2. Physical defense rampart raised for defensive purposes 
3. Intangible idea 
immaterial or intangible barrier - wall of 
racism 
4. Enclosure, physical or mental example wall of fire, wall of troops 
5. Physical embankment sea wall, levy 
6. Historical object Great Wall, Berlin Wall, etc.  
7. Scientific (physics/biology) 
Outermost structural layer or film protecting, 
surrounding, and defining physical limits of 
an object 
8. Mining 
side of a level or drift; overhanging side of a 
vein; hanging wall or footwall 
ADJECTIVES   
9. pertaining to a wall wall space 
10. growing on a wall wall plants, wall cress 
11. situated, placed, installed wall oven, wall safe 
VERB   
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12. Enclose, divide, protect 
wall in the yard, someone is walled in on 
every side 
13. to seal or fill a doorway wall an unused entrance 
14. seal or entomb    
IDIOMS   
15. climb the walls -  become intense or frantic 
16. drive or push 
force into a desperate situation - back against 
a wall 
17. Over the wall 
break out of prison, overcome some great 
obstacle 
18. go to the wall 
be defeated in competition; fail in business 
especially finance; to be put aside; take an 
extreme and determined position 
19. hit the wall 
physical strength depleted, willpower 
becomes the key to overcome an obstacle 
20. off the wall bizarre or crazy occurrence 
21. up against the wall 
firing squad, failure, tight position seems 
eminent 




 Step three of the research design was to justify the choice of samples in the data 
collection. There are three reasons for my sampling choices. First, the “Security Fence” 
plays an important role in the Intelligence Community (IC), federal, state, and local law 
enforcement communities. Due to my employment, I have an obvious hermeneutic 
interest in the border fence as it functions as a message about national security across 
this nation and around the world. The subsequent research I conducted in the literature 
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review, and further discussions with the committee, and co-workers in the IC, the 
communicative functions of the security fence became even more intriguing.  
The second rationale is my personal and academic interest in the study of 
communication in international and intercultural contexts. The dissertation committee 
made up of communication and anthropology scholars felt the USMX border is an 
important artifact for scholarly study and it is comparable to apartheid. Furthermore, 
scholars in multiple academic fields as highlighted in the literature review claim that 
wall barriers are a critical social and cultural issue that we should study. A number of 
events from 2008-2014 increased the debate about the USMX border security. There 
continues to be a significant interest and awareness of how border walls function on a 
global scale and my data samples reflect that interest. 
 The third rationale for picking two specific walls is that trying to study anything 
larger would explode the research burden for a dissertation project. For example, as my 
committee pointed out in my proposal defense in 2012, a study of how walls create 
sacred space covers centuries of material and concepts about space that philosophers 
have a difficulty explaining. It is unlikely in this small amount of time I can cover such 
large concepts. There are more security walls in the world than I can write about in one 
dissertation project. Further comparison and discussion of those walls should be 
included in future research projects.  
 
Data Analysis 
 There are two parts to step four in analyzing the wall artifacts. First, I will use 
the collected data to describe the hermeneutic history and context on each artifact. 
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Second, I will employ the paradigmatic analysis technique by examining the literal 
binary opposition of each wall, and then reviewing the related denotative and 
connotative definitions and explanations. I expect that some analysis will be obvious 
and some of the analysis will reveal hidden information. Through the discussion of 
meanings, I expect the analysis to reveal information about the people who built the 
walls and what that communicates to them, as well as the messages it communicates to 
other people who deal with the walls. 
 
Theoretical Inquires 
 In step five, I apply the theories to the analysis to answer some research 
questions. Ultimately, I want to find the communication functions of the walls because 
they are more than inanimate structures without meaning. Do walls only fall in the pre-
existing 22 categories? Does that communicate enough about their social meaning? If it 
does not fall under the categories, what are the additional characteristics that ought to be 
included in the meaning? ST and DAD provide an important basis for discussing 
additional essential characteristics of walls.  
 
Chapter Five: The Apartheid Wall 
Apartheid in South Africa was a legal and racial wall born out of social, cultural, 
and linguistic values. It forcefully separated people destroying meaningful 
communication starting in 1652 when European White colonists arrived at the Cape. 
Similarly, the USMX Security Fence separates people and their ability to communicate 
about important issues on an international, national, and perhaps most importantly, at a 
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community level. Lentin (2010) suggests that General Jan Smuts first used the word 
apartheid in 1917. In the Afrikaan language, apartheid means ‘of separateness’ or 
‘apartness’ (Lentin, 2010). Derrida (1983/1985) explains the connotative version:  
APARTHEID: By itself the word occupies the terrain like a concentration camp. 
System of partition, barbed wire, crowds of mapped out solitudes….the word 
concentrates separation, raises it to another power and sets separation itself 
apart: ‘apartitionality’….there’s no racism without a ….it institutes, declares, 
writes, inscribes, prescribes. A system of marks, it outlines space in order to 
assign forced residence or to close off borders. It does not discern, it 
discriminates. (p. 292) 
 
This chapter employs semiotic and hermeneutic analysis to outline the historic, 
communicative functions of the apartheid wall, and the way people responded to it. 
There was minimal opposition to the colonial message for almost three centuries. 
Common to this time-period, the imperial European powers had an ideology consisting 
of Caucasian, Christian, European superiority over all other races, religions, cultures, or 
nations. Under that ideology, they immediately began to deceive and later physically 
remove indigenous groups from their lands. First the Dutch, and then British 
imperialism propped up this elitist ideology for over three centuries. The legalized wall 
of apartheid defined the South African identity until the late 1990’s when it was finally 
abolished. The effects of apartheid are still rippling across South Africa today.  
 
The Semiotics and Hermeneutics of Apartheid 
My horizon developed by reviewing books and Internet websites related to 
South African history so I could comprehend what apartheid is before trying to compare 
it to a seemingly incomparable communication artifact in the USMX security fence. 
Gathering a historic perspective is so important, that three prominent authors discussed 
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it when they wrote about and participated in the South Africa War (a.k.a. Anglo-Boer 
War, The Great Boer War, 1899-1902). They noted that understanding the war was 
critical to having a perspective on where the South African identity would be later on. 
My research starts with the history of colonization, wars and social affairs with 
indigenous peoples, the development of the Boer or Afrikaan culture, the Boer wars, 
and the establishment and influences of apartheid on the country and future leaders like 
Nelson Mandela. I argue that the ideology of apartheid existed in communication and 
actions long before the official law came into existence in 1948.  
While developing my hermeneutic horizon, I identify a number of important 
binary opposites stemming from apartheid listed in Table 7. I conduct a paradigmatic 
analysis using connotative and denotative historic examples to give context to the 
consequences of the apartheid binary opposition. Of note is the fact that some of the 
words in Table 7, or the ideologies they represent are not antiquated ideas, but we still 
see them in a post-apartheid South Africa struggle, and in the U.S. immigration and 
security fence debate.  
Table 7 - Apartheid Binary Opposition Terms 
Separate Attached 
Apart Together 
Burgher Poor farmer, slave, local colonist 
Christian Heathen 
Civilized Tribal society (Uncivilized) 
European concept of  property rights, 
borders, and law 
Tribal rights, customs, and 
understanding of borders 
White (European Caucasian) African, Indian, Chinese 
(any race other than White) 
European Dutch Afrikaan Boer 





Colonial South Africa and the Dutch East India Company (1652-1785)  
In 1652 the Calvinist Dutch, and in 1688, a small group of French Protestant 
refugees called the Huguenots and a mix of German religious refugees settled at Cape 
Town. They became a Dutch East Indies Company (DEIC) stop on the trading routes. 
Slavery was technically illegal in Dutch colonies, but entrepreneurs illegally found 
ways to import slaves from East Asia to help develop the Cape colonies. There were 
several indigenous communities already on the land including most prominently the 
herding people known as the Khoi Khoi (Kohekohe is the current morphological and 
syntax title of the Khoi Khoi language and people and will be the reference used 
hereafter). The colonists gave the Kohekohe the nickname of Hottentots, a derogatory 
reference about their language using many clicking sounds. There was also the San 
Bushmen whom colonists confused for Kohekohe. They were mountain dwellers with 
excellent hunting skills. The Bushmen had a reputation for being plunders so colonists 
and indigenous groups all treated them as subhuman heathens (Hahn, 1881 & Theal, 
1897). Important indigenous groups in the East included the Xhosa translated in Khoi as 
angry men in Khoi (Peires, 1982). The Xhosa rebelled against colonial rule on a regular 
basis. Nelson Mandela was a descendent from the Abathembu (Thembu) Royal Line, 
one of the main tribes in the Xhosa group (Xhosa Culture, 2013). In addition, the Zulu 
who had a vast population would prove to be a difficult force for a time against foreign 
imperial governments (Beck, 2000).  
Colonists at Cape Town employed Kohekohe to work on their farms, and used 
slaves imported from India and the Far East (Jenkins, 2012 & Unrepresented Nations 
and Peoples Organization (UNPO), 2009). Variava (1989) explains that despite some 
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internal discord, white Burgher (Dutch name for Bourgeoisie) settlers wanted to 
distinguish and separate themselves most importantly from colored natives and 
foreigners, but also from poor white people in various classes. In order to communicate 
their superiority, they created the title of Afrikan, or Afrikaner, or Trekboere (Boer) 
(translated as Dutch farmer; nomadic; pastoral). They developed a local version of the 
Dutch language called Afrikaan and typically communicated only among themselves, 
deeming other races, cultures, and languages as subhuman. The Boer Afrikaner 
ideology of apartheid became essential to perpetuating the walls of persecution within 
the government and social arenas. 
Table 8 - White Burger Binary Opposition 
White Burgher Poor farmer, indentured servant, 
slave (Chinese, Indian) Afrikan Boer 
Free Burgher 
White (rich or poor irrelevant) Kohekohe, Xhosa, San Bushmen 
Civilized Uncivilized 
Kohekohe “civilized tribal society” San Bushmen “heathen tribe” 
 
George M. Theal, South African historian, had excellent access to many Cape 
Town government documents and other resources. Theal (1897) described the early 
history of the Cape Town Colony from the perspective of the Dutch East Indies Trading 
Company who ruled from 1652 to 1795. This is admittedly a biased written view from a 
person originally of European descent. Indigenous peoples more often kept their history 
through oral histories rather than written, so accessing their written work is more 
difficult. Under the apartheid ideology, most white missionaries and colonists saw all 
indigenous peoples as less than human, and likely used witchcraft that came from the 
devil. Theal indicated that the only reason for the Dutch to establish any presence at the 
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Cape was due to its geopolitical importance as a shipping lane between Europe and 
Asia. Many authors note the harsh conditions of the land including an intimidating 
climate, tough topography, the threat of attacks from indigenous peoples, smallpox 
(1713, 1755, & 1767), and the wilderness beyond the coastal areas. Despite these 
objections, the Boer and later, immigrants from the rest of Europe began to establish the 
region as formal colonies. The challenges faced in the colonization could be an in-depth 
discussion, the implications of which I could explore in future research.  
The Free Burghers were originally indentured servants of the Company, but 
became part of the Boer culture upon release. In 1657, the Company took the first step 
towards legalizing apartheid, almost 300 years before the 1950’s movement began. The 
Company released indentured servants into the indigenous South African populations 
with strict conditions including regulating what they could grow and sell, how much 
they could sell for, and many other regulations. In addition, the Company expected the 
former indentured servants on new settlements to provide them with food and 
provisions. The Herman and Stephens groups formed to take the risk of leaving the 
colony because they perceived it was better than remaining a slave. Many free burghers 
obtained their freedom and left South Africa, but the few that remained became part of 
the Afrikan culture (Theal, 1897).  
 Instead of trying to communicate by learning any indigenous language, the 
Dutch and later the British established the apartheid ideology by speaking the most 
advanced languages that they egotistically perceived as their own native tongue, Dutch 
or English. One example that reveals this feeling of superiority was how early settlers 
gave derogatory Dutch and English geopolitical nicknames to tribal chiefs and their 
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territories. Indigenous people did not have written records or maps like the colonists as 
they had a different cultural understanding of the land. So many settlers used the 
nicknames that they became part of the social and geopolitical culture of the territories. 
For example, one of the first Kohekohe chiefs who interacted regularly with the Dutch 
was Gogosoa, who was nicknamed “Fat Captain” (Theal (1897).  
Table 9 - European Values Binary Opposition 
Christian Heathen 
European concept of  property rights, law  Collective respect/share land 
resources 
Nationalism and borders Tribe/Clan, Family  
 
Table 9 identifies values the Dutch and other European colonists brought into 
South Africa that would strengthen the apartheid ideology and its subsequent binary 
opposition, including religion and land rights concepts. Theal (1897) expressed that 
Christian baptism was more critical than who belonged to which race. The 
communication of Christian conversion was a religious wall that segregated members of 
civil society from the heathens. It is no coincidence that ‘being clean’ and ‘acceptable’ 
was synonymous with being Dutch or English, white. Furthermore, it was a Christian 
desire to live in a modern colony, not live like the heathens outside the fence. 
Conversely, being another race or having a different cultural/religious viewpoint was 
comparable to being unclean, unfit, and one was ultimately damned for it. In addition, 
they were unwelcome in the modern city, and white social or political life. Heathens 
and outcasts such as indigenous peoples and foreigners made up the vast majority of the 
population.  
 The DEIC introduced the concept of legal property ownership to indigenous 
peoples in South Africa. According to borderlands scholars (Asiwaju, 1993; Magoro, 
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1985), the modern concept of property ownership, and the subsequent creation of 
borders to privatize property caused unique and devastating consequences across the 
African continent for centuries. Asiwaju (1993) argued that as recently as the 1990’s, 
African nations and local tribes were still dealing with the consequences of property 
contracts that were hundreds of years old. These contracts have continued to fuel 
conflicts between countries and ethnic groups competing for resources. In Gebserian 
terms, the DEIC and imperial European powers acted from a perspectival consciousness 
structure in declaring humans could have land as a possession. From a magical 
consciousness structure, the Kohekohe could not imagine “owning” the land because 
the land was a spirit and equal with the people. The different magical and mythical 
cultures structures of the indigenous people were incredibly complex. In a Dutch 
perspectival world of 1659, there was no place for magic.  When the Kohekohe saw the 
colonists claiming and crowding the cattle ranges, rebellions broke out. The Dutch had 
powerful technology like better flintlock guns and modern war tactics that quickly put 
the indigenous people under submission. Indigenous people had to contend with many 
new kinds of foreign values and technologies that would severely destroy their way of 
life.   
In 1672, the commissioner Van Overbeke communicated that deception in trade 
was a normal practice so tribal leaders should be deceptive. For example, Van Overbeke 
revised negotiations with Chief Mankagou, son of Goagosoa who the Dutch colonists 
knew as Schacher. A cursory review of the etymology for Schacher is a swindler, 
haggler, or person who wanders in the woods. As far as the Burghers and colonists were 
concerned, Mankagou could fit any of those categories and appeared to be shifty in his 
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trading and other deal making with white people. Despite Mankagou’s negotiating 
skills, Van Overbeke deceptively stole lands and resources to gain a stronger position 
over the Kohekohe. The deal included eight parts such as forcing tribes to sell their 
cattle only to the Company, and expecting that the tribes not harm the Company, in turn 
for some protection against other tribes. Mankagou also made some money and support 
in return for these deals. He signed his mark on the contracts indicating with the help of 
an interpreter that he comprehended all the transactions of the deal. Van Overbeke 
never intended to follow through on Company commitments so in essence there was no 
deal (Theal, 1897). As quickly as a deal was made, a new commissioner would come to 
the Cape and re-arrange agreements. More often, new commissioners discarded the 
generous deals for ones that only benefited the Company and a few bourgeois Burghers 
who supported the Dutch government in Europe. Within 30 years, the original white 
colonists culturally fused with the Kohekohe and slaves to create a new Afrikan 
community largely led by the Boer.  
Table 10 - Dutch Culture and Language Binary Opposition 
European Dutch Culture Afrikaan Boer Dutch 
Intercultural fusion between Boer, 
Africans, and foreigners  




Other languages and dialects 
 
Table 10 identifies the binary opposition set up in Cape Town by Commissioner 
Simon Van Der Stel in 1679. Van Der Stel strongly believed in the wall of 
discrimination by separating everything Dutch from everything else. Anything Dutch 
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was superior to anything else. Similar to how physical wall deters communication or 
collaboration, Van Der Stel’s policies effectively restricted communication so African 
natives and foreigners could not gain social, political, economic or legal power.  Van 
Der Stel held the core belief that anything not Dutch was not only worse, but 
completely unnecessary, including the entire culture and language of many indigenous 
tribes (Theal, 1897). During his reign from 1679-1691, Van Der Stel fought to restore 
the Dutch language and culture to the colony by importing white Dutch settlers who had 
been loyal to Holland. In addition, Van Der Stel built a courthouse and schools where 
the “legal” language of the people was Dutch. Only Dutch people could marry other 
Dutch people. There was not to be a continuing intercultural mixing of the races and/or 
religions between the settlers, the indigenous people, and others. By 1687, Van Der Stel 
gained so much influence over the Kohekohe that he chose the successor of the 
Goringhaiquas tribe. Finally, Van Der Stel was so influential that the colony named 
Simons Bay (currently Simonstown) after him. Using language to enforce segregation 
had a profound and lasting impact on South Africa. 
One sure way to erase the culture of a people is by killing their means of 
communication through banning their language. One of the most effective ways to 
entrench linguistic ideology is by passing and enforcing laws that elevate the 
oppressor’s language over others. In two more extreme situations, the new walls created 
by legal means had very real, very horrific consequences. First, the Nazi Holocaust led 
to the genocide of six million Jewish people. Prior to the death camps, the Nazi political 
party passed laws against Jews especially in Poland that physically segregated them into 
certain parts of the cities that became known as Ghettos. By 1941, there were over 1100 
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ghettos, with the largest ghetto in Warsaw housing over half a million Jewish people 
(Holocaust Museum, 2013). 
The second example where the oppressor’s language was an enforcement 
mechanism with horrific consequences was the Sudan genocide starting in 2003. The 
Sudan government and the Janjaweed killed over 400,000 people and displaced almost 
three million more. Nyombe (1997) illustrates how language and its relationship with 
the law created a political crisis in Sudan that resulted in South Sudan declaring 
independence in 2011, but tensions continue to flare in the region. Prior to the 
independence of South Sudan, the northern government used laws to enforce Arabic as 
the national language. Millions of Southern Sudanese speak native dialects, English, or 
other tongues. This is largely because during the colonial period the British at one point 
supported the South, and then turned their backs on them when the Khartoum 
government, who was Arabic, took power. Schools teach Arabic since it is the official 
language. This means that children are learning to speak the language of the new 
hegemony while their parents and other adults cannot participate in society. Destroying 
language effectively eliminates opposing ideologies and competing cultures. 
Throughout South African modern history, foreign leaders constantly employed 
destructive language policies to eliminate unique indigenous languages.  
The apartheid wall employed by the DEIC devastated the culture, language, and 
livelihood of the Kohekohe people. Around 1724 the DEIC peaked with success and 
then declined in power until they disbanded in 1795. By the 1760’s when Governor 
Tulbagh came to power, Theal (1897) argued that in the first 100 years of colonization 
in South Africa, the most racism and violence came from infighting between the 
122 
 
indigenous tribes. By this point, many indigenous people worked for Boer farmers or 
within the Company. The Kohekohe launched many uprisings from 1755-1775 that 
made the Burghers anxious that the Kohekohe were becoming too powerful. The 
indigenous tribal people had their own tactics and weapons that could increase problems 
for colonists.  
 When Governor Plettenberg became Company Commander in 1771, there were 
several local and global events taking place that would continue to lead the Company to 
its demise. Like the American colonies at war with the British, the Afrikan’s felt more 
and more compelled to defend their own interests that were different and in opposition 
to the Dutch motherland. Although many were Dutch by descent, the Afrikaners had 
their own interests to protect, including the right to free enterprise. Even for loyalists, it 
would have been difficult to maintain constant, reliable, up to date communication with 
the motherland. Message traffic moved with ships that took weeks and months to get to 
and from South Africa to Netherlands. About this time, South Africa was becoming a 
larger trade hub and export center so free trade was becoming increasingly important. 
However, the DEIC tried to keep the success suppressed in order to keep itself in 
business. The Burghers still had some attachments to the Company and made up the 
South Africa militia, but they were scattered across 500 miles of territory. By 1781, the 
Afrikaans knew that Great Britain had declared war on the American colonies. 
Although the Company continued to rely on Burgher and local support, they ultimately 
failed. The French and the British fought to take control of the Cape and when the 
British prevailed, they eliminated the DEIC in 1795 (Theal, 1897).  
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Notwithstanding the extensive analysis that is helpful to understanding the 
history of South Africa, some of Theal’s comments in 1897 reveal the superiority 
complex that White people still had after centuries of intermixing with other peoples. 
This is further connotative evidence of the vast binary opposition in place, which 
continued to separate and divide white people from all others throughout the country. 
Theal compared records from the 1600’s to those recorded around 1790 to see whether 
education, gardening, and/or moral training had increased among the Bantu. The 
common conclusion was that tribal peoples made no progress in their gardening 
techniques to improve the quality of tobacco and maize. Records also suggested that if 
any member of the Xhosa culture used modern farming techniques, the Xhosa people 
would accuse them of witchcraft. Finally, records suggested that the Kohekohe were 
smarter and more respectful than the Bantu was. In both cases, Theal’s comments reveal 
that throughout the colonization period, anyone who was not White was of lesser human 
status, and this was a prevailing attitude that would provide an early foundation for 
domination.  
Cape Governor Janssens comments in 1803 are further evidence of the racial 
superiority complex in the Cape. In spite of the cultural fusion that spanned 150 years, 
Whites still identified themselves primarily by their race and religion and were much 
more likely to communicate with similar sociocultural groups. Race and class 
distinctions caused communication to be difficult between the various groups. Variava 
(1989) notes,  
Significantly, the white community soon began to create powerful distinctions 
between themselves and the blacks. By conceiving of themselves as 'burghers', 
'Christians' and inhabitants, the whites saw themselves as distinct from and 
superior to non-burghers, slaves, heathens and aliens. In 1803 Governor 
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Janssen’s remarked of the Cape whites that 'they call themselves people and 
Christians, and the Kaffirs and Hottentots' heathens, and on the strength of this 
consider themselves entitled to anything.  This overriding sense of cohesion and 
unity was centered on the notion of being white' and 'European’. (no p.) 
 
 
Hermeneutic Horizons and the Political Significance of the Boer (1795-1902) 
The Boer had an increasingly central role to play in the history of South Africa 
throughout the Nineteenth Century. Two prominent scholars involved in Boer life, 
culture, and the Boer Wars felt a strong need to communicate their perspectives as to 
the motives of the British and Boer peoples. Their opposing writings help illuminate 
why strong communication disparities existed, and how those disparities resulted in the 
apartheid wall later on. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (1900) wrote a defense of the British 
Empire in their actions and relationship for 100 years leading up to the Great Boer War 
(1899-1902). Dr. Willem Johannes Leyds (1906) was the State Attorney, Secretary of 
State, and Special Envoy to Europe for the South Africa Republic (Zuid-Afrikaansche 
Republiek, ZAR) between 1884 and 1902. Even after his removal from South Africa, 
for many years Leyds supported the Boer cause in Europe (Shuttle, 2012). Both authors 
justified their hermeneutic analysis by reviewing many major chronological events in 
the history of South Africa. Their comments echo Gadamer’s (2004/1975) argument 
that shared hermeneutics are important to help people understand their identities.  
Doyle (1900) defended British actions in the Great Boer War (1899-1902). To 
help the reader properly appreciate the strength of the Boer, or their stubbornness, 
Doyle highlighted important Boer events leading up to 1899. Doyle was entrenched in 
the underlying British ideology that whites, and particularly the British, were the 
superior race even over other white groups like the Boer. As a field doctor in 
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Bloemfontein Sir Doyle received firsthand experience about what it was like to face 
Boer strength, cultural identity and self-determination. He also documented stories from 
numerous patients and informants. Doyle described the character the Afrikaans from 
1652-1795,  
Take a community of Dutchmen of the type of those who defended themselves 
for fifty years against all the power of Spain at a time when Spain was the 
greatest power in the world. Intermix with them a strain of those inflexible 
French Huguenots who gave up home and fortune and left their country for ever 
at the time of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The product must obviously 
be one of the most rugged, virile, unconquerable races ever seen upon earth. 
Take this formidable people and train them for seven generations in constant 
warfare against savage men and ferocious beasts, in circumstances under which 
no weakling could survive….Then, finally….an ardent and consuming 
patriotism. Combine all these qualities and all these impulses in one individual, 
and you have the modern Boer…. (Ch. 1 ¶1) 
 
Leyds (1906) disagreed with the bias of English scholars like Doyle for making 
apologies and trying to cover up the British imperial oppression. Leyds (1906) stateed: 
A result of the annexation of....[Transvaal] and the Orange Free State….the Boer 
people have become an intimate factor in the political life of Great Britain. In 
order to judge the probable effect of this influence….with the British 
Government, we must first familiarise ourselves with their past relations. For in 
spite of the endorsement of the " clean slate" theory by certain English 
politicians, that theory is worthless in the estimation of those who realise that 
history is embodied experience and that the future is the outcome of the past. It 
follows that the Earlier Annexation of the Transvaal, its consequences, and the 
manner and circumstances in which it was brought about, should be matters of 
the utmost significance and interest to all who are concerned in the future of 
South Africa. But, just as it is impossible to consider recent events intelligently 
without a knowledge of the past from which they sprang, so is it impossible to 
deal satisfactorily with the annexation of 1877 without first reviewing, however 
briefly, the preceding incidents of which that annexation may be considered the 
climax. (P. vii-viii) 
 
Beck (2000) explained the British conquered Cape Town from the French in 
1795 to stop French control of trade with India and East Asia, but had no interest in 
developing it at the time. They held it from 1795-1803, briefly gave back to the Dutch 
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and then permanently took over in 1806. Afrikan farmers continually revolted against 
British rule to protect the lands for which they had fought so hard. The Industrial 
Revolution and the Enlightenment that introduced anti-slavery movements in Europe 
had an influence on the Dutch settlements even though they were half way around the 
world. The Boer ironically felt like the British were oppressing them when after 
abolition there were increases in labor shortages in 1808. Maho (2002) clarified that 
only the slave trade was abolished, not the owning of people as property. Full abolition 
did not occur under the law until 1833.  
Beck (2000) discussed the missionary movement that received support from the 
British commercial classes. Although Christian missionaries were willing to visit and 
even mingle in some ways with African people, the ethnocentric message they taught 
served to build up the wall that divided rather than united the people. The missionaries 
elevated their religious and cultural values as superior to those inferior people they tried 
to convert. Any message to help Africans was at odds with Afrikaners’ who used slaves 
for simple labor. Dr. John Philip (1819-1851), a missionary who had been influential in 
the Emancipation movement in England, wrote many arguments in favor of equal rights 
for the Kohekohe from 1826-1833. Afrikaners’ were angry when emancipation 
occurred because they felt that slave labor was their economic means of survival 
(Doyle, 1900). After the emancipation, the British government compensation only 
offered owners 1/3 of the local price per slave and in order to retrieve the funds, the 
owners had to go to London or send someone that was not worth the cost of the 
compensation (Beck, 2000; Doyle, 1900).  
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  Beck (2000) and Maho (2002)
 
demonstrated that British appointed governors 
reinforced a wall of separation in South Africa as early as 1809. The Earl of Caledon 
instituted the Hottentot Proclamation in 1809, or what local residences called the 
Caledon or Hattentot Code. The communication function of the codes was similar to the 
communication function of walls. Walls try to keep people and/or resources in while 
also dividing and excluding others. The proclamation required the Kohekohe to have a 
permanent address or mission statement from their white employer. In addition, the 
code required the Kohekohe to obtain moving passes from a magistrate if they traveled 
outside of their local district. Sir John Cradock who took power in 1811 enforced the 
Hattentot Code fiercely by sending Colonel John Graham’s military in 1812 to remove 
over 20,000 off their tribal lands (Beck, 2000).  
Although this was a step in the right direction for the Boer, they still perceived 
the British as too sympathetic to the indigenous people. Sir Cradock introduced circuit 
courts that lead to the 1815 Slagtersnek Rebellion. Beck (2000) stated,  
“….Black employees, even slaves, could now testify in court against their 
masters. Kohekohe workers, aided by British missionaries, sued farmers for 
abusive treatment, even murder, and sometimes won…. The Slagtersnek 
Rebellion… [began in 1815]….when Kohekohe soldiers killed an Afrikaner 
farmer named Frederik Bezuidenhout who resisted arrest for mistreating a 
servant. Johannes Bezuidenhout, Frederik’s brother, declared war on the 
colonial government, but local authorities quickly put down the rebellion, killing 
Johannes and hanging five ringleaders. Although the incident was relatively 
insignificant at the time, during the twentieth century Afrikaner Nationalists 
depicted the Slagtersnek rebels as early martyrs in the struggle against British 
cruelty and oppression”. (p. 46) 
 
Just as Van Der Stel had used language barriers in 1679 to create walls of separation 
between cultural groups, Craddock utilized the same policy in 1812 to make English as 
the official language in Cape Town. Language barriers became a very effective means 
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of diminishing communication between the British, the Boer, and the native population. 
The Boer and the native people could not attend English language schools or obtain an 
English only government job. With reduced opportunities to gain economic or political 
power, the Boer saw Craddock’s policies as grievances that would ultimately lead them 
to war.  
Lord Charles Somerset took over in 1826 for Cradock. Somerset immediately 
pushed for greater “Anglicization” by creating a Supreme Court with English rule and 
replacing the Dutch Burgher Senate with an English Council of Advice (Beck, 2000). 
Somerset also created social public institutions including a library, a museum, the 
Commercial Exchange, and a hospital. In 1820 over 5,000 British colonists, mostly non-
farmers arrived at the Cape and moved towards the east frontier with Somerset’s 
blessing. This push into Boer lands further divided the British and Boer people. The 
British reinforced that they had a superior, civilized lifestyle that the Boer and 
indigenous groups could learn. Afrikaners felt that teaching native people British 
sociocultural ways was another intrusion because the Boer perceived the Africans as a 
labor source without human value (Beck, 2000).  
 
The Great Trek & Continual Destruction of Indigenous Groups  
By 1834, the Boer felt pushed to action because of the vast large and small 
cultural and political changes forced on them by British rule. 15,000 Boer Voortrekkers 
or pioneers caused a mass migration over 600 miles from the Eastern part of the Cape 
Colony (Port Elizabeth) to the north (Mosega south of modern Johannesburg) and 
further east (Port Natal, Durban) (Durban, 2008). The migration became an important 
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historic marker in Afrikaner cultural beliefs (Durban, 2008). Doyle (1900) explained 
that such a huge migration by the Boer was comparable only to the migration of the 
Mormon Pioneers
2
. The Voortrekkers felt beleaguered to the point of removing 
themselves from the law and influence of the British Cape Town. SAHO (2013b) 
pointed out that although the pioneers perceived themselves on a religious quest, this 
period in South Africa was wrought with social upheaval, land grabs through violent 
means, and forced labor on the conquered Ndebele, Zulu, Xhosa, and other African 
groups.  By the time the trek was over in the late 1840’s, the Voortrekkers had 
established the Transvaal and Orange Free State. Natal also had Voortrekker roots from 
the Trek, but fell to the British at Durban in 1842 (Durban, 2008). In 1845, the British 
Governor informed the Boer that regardless of how they felt, the people were still under 
British rule (Leyds, 1906).  
The British government sent Sir Harry Smith to the Cape in 1847 to quell further 
rebellions. Theal (1893) described that Smith was already a hero from previous battles 
he fought in South Africa and India. This made Smith the ideal military appointee to fix 
problems and enforce British rule in South Africa. Within weeks of arrival, Theal 
(1893) explained that Smith proclaimed that all the lands in the South African region 
were part of the English Sovereign. Thus, according to Smith, all previous arrangements 
made by the Boer, indigenous people or any other group, the English considered void. 
Theal (1893) further described that Smith’s meetings with regional tribe chiefs revealed 
how strongly Smith intended to enforce British apartheid against any opposing forces. 
                                                 
2
 The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints Newsroom (2014) explained 
that the Mormon Pioneer Trek from 1847-1869 was comprised of 30,000 plus 
members of the Mormon Church who walked or traveled by wagons and 
handcarts from western Illinois to the Salt Lake Valley (roughly 1200 miles). 
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Smith characterized himself as the great chief and representative of the Queen of 
England. Smith required that each chief to kiss his feet in order to demonstrate their 
complete submission. He also threatened that if they caused rebellion the British 
military would destroy them. Smith outlawed witchcraft and local customs such as 
cattle robbing. Furthermore, Smith required that the tribal people listen to Christian 
missionaries to destroy heathenism across South Africa. For their obedience, the 
indigenous people would receive a yearly feast from the Great Chief. Smith placed 
military garrisons in the region to reinforce his divisive, exclusive wall-like strategy.  
Near the end of 1848, Smith went to the Orange State to put the affairs in order 
but entirely underestimated the Boer and their willingness to achieve independence 
(Doyle, 1908). The Boer people so anxious to fight that they were willing to join 
African natives to revolt. After considerable losses and constant infighting, the British 
determined it would be in their best interest to relieve themselves of the Transvaal and 
its problems. This led to the Sand River Convention in 1852 where Transvaal received 
their independence, and became the first South African Republic. Shortly thereafter in 
1854 the Orange Free State also became independent (Theal, 1893). At no point during 
the 1852 convention or later were any indigenous people acknowledged as having any 
legitimate claim to any land from which they had been violently removed. Like the 
characteristics of walls that serve to partition off space, foreign invaders portioned off 
native Africans so they could not communicate or fight for their homeland. The British 
destroyed the independence of one indigenous group after another. From 1811-1819 the 
Xhosa were defeated (Meredith, 2007). The British went on to subjugate or kill 
members of the Sotho and Tswana during the same period (Beck, 2000). The Zulu 
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illustrated strong war-fighting capabilities when they won their first major skirmish, but 
were shortly thereafter defeated in 1879 due to greater British technology and much 
larger modern military forces. The British partitioned the Zulu into 13 smaller groups 
with one tribe even including a white tribal leader. The British judges ruled that most of 
the former Zulu land became Boer territory. Within 25 years of defeat, the Zulu 
received government reservations that consisted of 1/3 of the lands they lived on for 
generations. The British government opened the rest of the land for White settlement 
after the Boer Wars (Beck, 2000).  
 
The Diamond Rush, Uitlanders, and Gandhi (1867-1899) 
According to Giliomee and Mbenga (2007), native children playing in a river 
discovered shiny objects on the ground in 1867 near Griqualand West in the Orange 
Free State. The discovery of diamonds and the subsequent discovery of gold in the 
1890’s would permanently change the economic outlook of South Africa in the world. 
From 1867-1870, 10,000 prospectors flocked to the area. The Afrikaan name for 
‘foreigner’ was uitlander or ‘outlander’; by 1890, the uitlanders outnumbered the Boer 
by more than two to one. Despite having no legitimate claim, the British government 
used political corruption to obtain the land from the local Griqua (combination of Boer 
and Kohekohe languages and culture first heard around 1730). At the time, the Griqua 
were living in a territory just outside of the Transvaal borders. The Griqua revolted 
against the miners after the British annexed their lands, but were easily defeated. In an 
ironic twist, the Griqua went to work in the mines that had originally been their 
territory. Doyle (1900) argued that the British had not previously known about the value 
132 
 
of the land and diamonds. Leyds (1906) disputes this claim providing significant 
evidence that the British government not only was aware of the valuable land, but also 
made several deceptive plans to annex many areas. The Boer had little choice but to 
accept British rule again. 
 The 1877 Sand River Convention that re-annexed Transvaal back to the British 
incensed the Afrikan people so much that historians argue the convention was the 
prequel to the Great Boer Wars of 1899-1902. The Boer complained that the convention 
gave too much political power to the uitlanders. In 1881 at the Convention of Pretoria, 
Transvaal was again given back to the Boer a second time. The people elected Paul 
Kruger as President who remained in the role in Transvaal for 18 years. Under Kruger, 
apartheid was reintroduced and the Boer expanded their lands to create the Republic of 
Goshen and Stellaland (Leyds , 1906). Kruger’s legal wall protected the Boer interest 
and disenfranchising uitlander voter rights. For example, the controversial Act of 1890 
dictated that in order to vote, uitlanders’ had to be a resident for 14 years, be a 
landowner, be 40 years old, and be a member of a Protestant church. Few people were 
able to fit in this group, and most could not speak Dutch well enough to participate in 
government affairs (Hammond, 1901). In 1877 and in 1881 at Pretoria, both the British 
and the Boer denied indigenous people any rights to their homelands, thus forcing the 
native Africans to accept minority white rule.  
Gandhi (1929/1940) recounted how the government and people in South Africa 
discriminated specifically the uitlander Indian population. Gandhi described that 
Indians, most of which belonged to the working class had long been derogatorily 
nicknamed coolies or samis, which ironically translated from Tamil and Sanskrit as 
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master. Despite having received British legal credentials, when Gandhi arrived in Natal 
in 1893, the local law society tried to reject his right to practice the law there. Gandhi’s 
comments highlight the extent to which Boer governments would go to protect White 
power over other races. Gandhi (1929/1940) expressed: 
The Law Society now sprang a surprise on me by serving me with a notice 
opposing my application for admission…. the main objection was that, when the 
regulations regarding admission of advocates were made, the possibility of a 
coloured man applying could not have been contemplated. Natal owed its 
growth to European enterprise, and therefore it was necessary that the European 
element should predominate in the bar. If coloured people were admitted, they 
might gradually outnumber the Europeans, and the bulwark of their protection 
would break down. (p. 175) 
 
 Three examples demonstrate the extreme discriminatory laws specifically forced 
on the Asian races. They are further evidence of how the British and Boer peoples used 
the laws to consolidate power into the hands of the minority group of Whites over the 
vast majority of African and other races. These laws were walls that communicated 
uitlanders and natives had no rights in South Africa. First, the Law 3 of 1885 passed in 
Transvaal by the Boer controlled government. The law disallowed native “Asian” races 
from becoming land owning Burghers, forced Indians to pay tolls on their movements 
and hold a permit for movement past curfew, and the government could assign housing 
for sanitary purposes. Gandhi noted that this law applied equally to various races but 
Arab looking people tended to be exempt from it (Gandhi, 1929/1940; SAHO, 2013a). 
Second, in 1888 Transvaal and Natal used the law to exile the Indian people from their 
homes. Third, from 1894-1896 a series of laws were introduced to disenfranchise 
Indians of voting and political rights (SAHO, 2013a). During these troubled times, 
Gandhi (1928/1968) described the animosity the Indians faced:  
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The Europeans throughout South Africa had been agitating against Indians on 
the ground of their ways of life…. [The Indians] were very dirty and close-
fisted. They lived in the same place where they traded. Their houses were mere 
shanties. They would not spend money even on their own comforts. How could 
cleanly open-handed Europeans with their multifarious wants compete in trade 
with such parsimonious and dirty people? Lectures were therefore delivered, 
debates held, and suggestions made at Congress meetings on subjects such as 
domestic sanitation, personal hygiene, the necessity of having separate buildings 
for houses and shops and for well-to-do traders of living in a style befitting their 
position. (p. 49) 
 
 
The Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902 
After conquering tribal groups, the British turned on the Boer to put down their 
rebellious states against the crown. Wessels (2011) echoes the words of Doyle, Leyds, 
and other scholars explaining, “One cannot understand the history of twentieth century 
South Africa (including the country’s political developments) without a knowledge of, 
or insight into the traumatic history of the Anglo-Boer War and the consequences it had 
for ….[all races regardless of color] (p. 14). Wessels argued that the Anglo-Boer war 
affected all of South Africa despite the fact mostly Whites fought in it and they only 
represented a fraction of the population. This could more accurately be describe as the 
second war between the two nations as the British had already given them independence 
in 1881. Seeing the great value in diamonds, gold, and geopolitical position, the British 
were now determined to take back the lands. On October 12, 1899, the Boer declared 
war on Great Britain. The British and historians believed the war would be a short 
skirmish but the Boer turned out to be the most difficult enemy the British ever faced up 
to that point. Biggins (2013) breaks up the war into three major stages including the 
Boer Offensive, the British Response, and Guerilla Warfare. For eight months, the Boer 
Offensive caught several British positions off guard defeating some strategic military 
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territories. When Lord Richards and Kitchener arrived in 1900, they doomed the Boer 
to defeat as the British Imperial military began to outgun and out match dwindling Boer 
forces. Lord Roberts took over Bloemfontein, Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Transvaal in 
1900 presuming the war was over. Stage three consisted of guerilla warfare where the 
Boer fought in small mobile units to try to regain some of their lost lands.  
 Meredith (2007) explained that in response to the guerilla tactics the rebels used, 
the British started employing a scorched earth policy burning over 30,000 farms. The 
British used over 3700 miles of wire fencing to enforce borders and stop rebels from 
gaining any advantage. At one point, in order to capture the leaders, the British spread 
9000 troops across a 45-mile stretch, one soldier for every 12 yards, but these attempts 
ultimately failed. In addition to their own military of 250,000 troops, the British formed 
a coalition with thousands of Boer and African rural families to fight the rebels. 
According to Beck (2000), when the British strategically moved to incite and arm the 
African people, the rebels realized that the war would end. The Boer understood that the 
African people had plenty of reason to fight with the British because the Boer had 
originally moved the African people off their homelands. The Africans received little 
compensation from the British government for their service and it did not help them in 
regaining their lost homelands. Besides arming the Africans, the Boer rebellion leaders 
also decided to end the conflict to stop their own people from more displacement. At the 
end of the conflict there were 105,000 Boer in concentration camps, and a diminished 
ability to wage war against the more power British forces. On May 31, 1902, the Boer 
gave up political control, and yielded to new British rule.  
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 Sir Alfred Milner directed the negotiations; Milner was a racist, dedicated 
British imperialist who saw the British as superior to all other races. He had a great 
distrust for the Boer, and took no thought of any other race. The Boer commandos 
agreed to surrender independence in exchange for political autonomy, the ability to 
keep their language in government and education institutions, and massive economic 
assistance in the post war period. The question of language was still essential because 
whomever controlled communication could limit political participation from those who 
did not speak Dutch or Afrikaan, which essentially excluded the native African peoples, 
the Chinese, and the Indians. Milner left the question of what to do about the Africans 
up to the Boer (Beck, 2000). Gandhi (1928/1968, 1929/1940) and Beck (2000) argued 
that neither the Africans, nor the Indians, both of which helped the British win the war, 
received any help of any kind. Instead, the British became traitors when they left both 
groups in the hands of new Boer government rule. 
 
Transition Years and the Union of South Africa (1902-1910) 
 After the Anglo-Boer War, the White minority government passed laws to 
oppress any race, ethnicity, or culture who threatened the power structure. From 1902-
1910, over 20 major laws served as a wall in Transvaal, Natal, and the Orange Free 
State to further disenfranchise and subjugate the vast majority of Africans, and foreign 
immigrants (in addition to 69 previously passed laws since 1806). The wall of the law 
was an enduring communication artifact to Africans and uitlanders that they would not 
and could not obtain political power and/or social equality. The major generals of the 
Anglo-Boer War including Jan Smuts, Louis Botha, and Barry Hertzog, among others, 
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would help found the new union and set up the political momentum that led to the 
official 1948 Apartheid Movement.  
Smuts had been associated with Cecil Rhodes until he realized Rhodes and 
Joseph Chamberlin wanted to crush Boer resistance to British Rule (Lentin, 2010).  
Lentin (2010) described Smuts rise to political power after he fought in the war against 
the British. In 1904, Botha, Koos de la Ray, and Smuts formed the Vereeniging Het 
Volk (Peoples Union). Smuts went to England in 1906 to gather support for the Union. 
The message was that the British government should be-friend the Boer because they 
did not want to have another Irish catastrophe on their hands in South Africa. Smuts ran 
on a platform of reconciliation between the Boer and the British in order to create a 
united South Africa with the White minority in political power. The Boer felt 
combining with the British after having suffered defeat was a betrayal of principle, but 
Smuts made a convincing enough argument that in 1907, British Prime Minister 
Campbell-Bannerman returned self-government to the colonies. The British politicians 
also knew that having the economic power of South African diamonds was a positive 
benefit that they could only obtain with Boer cooperation and reconciliation.  
Levy (1917) identified many times how Smuts used segregation propaganda 
against the Chinese miners and the Indians to win political victories. In 1906, Lord 
Milner imported 10,000 Chinese miners that outraged the Boer. Smuts staunchly 
criticized this policy both in private letters, and in public interviews, and made promises 
that the policy would be changed so White workers could obtain equal pay with foreign 
workers. Smuts also used this kind of propaganda to garner support for the union of the 
four states, and that his people should run the government in order to protect themselves 
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from foreign encroachment. In 1907, Smuts stated, “the introduction of the Chinese was 
a crime. We shall not rest until every Chinaman has left the shores of South Africa” 
(Levy, 1917, p. 93).  
Smuts voiced similar distain for the Indians, particularly when he had to deal 
with Gandhi’s peace movement. Gandhi (1928/1968) illustrated the binary opposition in 
Smuts ideology:  
South Africa is a representative of Western civilization while India is the centre 
of Oriental culture. Thinkers of the present generation hold that these two 
civilizations cannot go together. If nations representing these rival cultures meet 
even in small groups, the result will only be an explosion….the Indian question 
cannot be resolved into one of trade jealousy or race hatred. The problem is 
simply one of preserving one's own civilization, that is of enjoying the supreme 
right of self-preservation and discharging the corresponding duty….The Indians 
are disliked in South Africa for their simplicity, patience, perseverance, frugality 
and otherworldliness. Westerners are enterprising, impatient, engrossed in 
multiplying their material wants and in satisfying them, fond of good cheer, 
anxious to save physical labor and prodigal in habits. They are therefore afraid 
that if thousands of Orientals settled in South Africa, the Westerners must go to 
the wall. Westerners in South Africa are not prepared to commit suicide and 
their leaders will not permit them to be reduced to such straits. (p. 89-90) 
 
Given his background in the Anglo-Boer War, his hatred for the indigenous people, and 
foreigners of any other type, all of the political players knew of Smuts intentions when 
he called for a constitutional convention in 1908. In 1910, the Het Volk party, led by 
General Botha, took control of the new Union of South Africa government, with Botha 
becoming the Prime Minister, and Smuts becoming second in command (Lentin, 2010).  
 
African National Congress (ANC) 
The ANC was the primary means of communication to opposition of Boer 
policy almost from the inception of the new South Africa and especially from the 
1950’s through the 1990’s when Nelson Mandela took over leadership of the 
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organization. According to SAHO (2013b), Pixley Ka Isaka Seme was the founder of 
the ANC. He was born in Natal, worked with white missionaries who helped him move 
to the U.S. to receive an American High School education. Seme later attended 
Columbia for his law degree and just before the 1910 Union was formed, he returned 
home to South Africa. In 1906 while still attending Columbia, Seme gave an important 
speech entitled, “The Regeneration of Africa”, which outlined Seme’s intentions 
regarding the future political life of the African people. After the Union formed, in 
order to combat the policies of the new Boer government, Seme called on all of the 
African people regardless of their race or ethnic differences to put them aside and fight 
for the cause of freedom. In 1912, Seme founded the South African Native National 
Congress (SANNC) that was the precursor to the ANC.  
 According to the ANC (2011), the Land Act of 1913 brought the people together 
like never before. The Land Act prevented Africans from buying, renting or using lands 
outside of their reservations. The ANC fought against laws like the Land Act, and other 
policies that forced them to live in rural areas and work for whites in mines, farms, or 
other occupations. Most African people were only able to return home once a year. The 
ANC was willing to work with other groups like the Communist Party that formed in 
1921, in order to fight the minority white government in any way they could.  
 
Political and Labor Discrimination (1910-1948) 
 When the Union Act of 1910 created the country of South Africa, 1,300,000 
Whites became citizens while other races and ethnicities became aliens in their 
homeland. Among the disenfranchised peoples, there were about 4 million Africans, 
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500,000 foreigners of various races and ethnicities, and 150,000 Indians (Beck, 2000). 
Beck argued that race was the most important of all the new issues the Union had to 
deal with. The following example is indicative of racist government policy that could 
eventually apply to all aspects of a white led South Africa. Beck (2000) described how 
South Africa faced labor strikes and problems similar to other industrializing nations. In 
May 1913, White workers in the mining industry wanted to unionize and protect their 
jobs. In order to quell rebellion, the Boer requested British military help in 
Johannesburg. The new government promised to help the workers, but the Parliament 
voted against the workers in the same year. Strikes continued through 1914 when new 
South Africa Union troops came to protect government interests against a revolution. 
World War I temporarily caused labor issues to dissipate, but after 1918, they continued 
to plague the nation.  
Between 1918 and 1922, African miners revolted against lower wages that were 
worse than what Whites received for doing the same job. In 1921, 20,000 Afrikaner 
miners started to strike against the corporate use of cheaper African labor due to a 
depression of gold prices in the post-World War economy (Beck, 2000; SAHO, 2013b). 
The Communist Party of South Africa were particularly interested in the outcome of the 
strikes, and moved to support White labor. On March 15, 1922, the Rand Revolt 
occurred in Johannesburg and had the feel of a revolution again. Lentin (2010) 
described that Prime Minister Smuts, determined to crush rebellion, declared martial 
law, and took personal command of the 7000 troops with air and artillery support to put 
down the workers.  
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Two years later in the 1924 election, former General Hertzog won the election 
over Smuts and began to consolidate and strengthen Afrikaner power. Hertzog 
supported modernizing farming with better loans for farmers. He also increased job 
opportunities for Whites only in manufacturing of steel and iron, the railroad, and the 
government. Hertzog helped pass the Mine and Works Amendment Act 1926 that gave 
White workers guaranteed skilled jobs. By 1934, Hertzog and Smuts put aside political 
differences to create the Purified Nationalist Party that protected and created new racist 
minority government policies (Beck, 2000). For example, SAHO (2013b) noted that in 
1936 the Representation of Natives Act and the Development Trust Act (Land Act) both 
became law making it impossible for Africans to own land outright. They were required 
to deal with a bureaucracy of White committee members to dispute land claims and/or 
borrow land appointed to them by the minority government. Africans and Indians faced 
a number of additional policies with similar racist underpinnings. Daniel Francois 
Malan (D.F. Malan) worked under Smuts and Hertzog but felt they were becoming too 
moderate. SAHO (2013b) described that Malan formed the Purified National Party (NP) 
in 1938, garnered support and won the 1948 election 10 years later. The NP platform 
was to institutionalize apartheid policy, which Malan made happen shortly following 
the elections.  
 
The Apartheid State and Nelson Mandela (1948-1994) 
 General Smuts first used the word ‘apartheid’ in 1917 (Lentin, 2010). In 
Afrikaan, apartheid means separateness or apartness. The connotative meaning was 
much broader and encompassed the culture of white supremacy to maintain control 
142 
 
throughout the country (Lentin, 2010). O’Malley (n.d.) listed over 160 laws enacted 
from 1948-1991 to firmly root the wall of apartheid over the majority of the population. 
In 1973, the word and act of apartheid was globally synonymous with racial 
discrimination in South Africa. The United Nations (U.N.) passed resolution 3166, 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 
(ICSPCA)
 
 defining the act as a crime against humanity (ICSPCA, 1976). It is of 
interest to note that from 1973-2013 the following globally influential nations have 
neither signed nor ratified the convention due to various political misgivings: South 
Africa, the U.S., Canada, Great Britain, Israel, the majority of European nations (with 
exception of Poland), Australia, Brazil, China, and Japan. Mexico ratified the treaty in 
1980, but never signed it (ICSPCA, 2013). 
Derrida (1983/1985) and 85 other internationally recognized artists in 1983 
condemned the oppression of the white minority government in an U.N. hosted 
exhibition. Derrida’s condemnation of the word communicates how much power it has 
both as a linguistic metaphor, and a literal means of controlling people by setting them 
apart one race from another. Derrida (1983/1985) stated:  
Since [World War Two], no tongue has ever translated this name – as if all the 
languages of the world were defending themselves, shutting their mouths against 
a sinister incorporation of the thing by means of the word, as if all tongues were 
refusing to give an equivalent, refusing to let themselves be contaminated 
through the contagious hospitality of the word for word. Here, then, is an 
immediate response to the obsessiveness of this racism, to the compulsive terror 
which, above all, forbids contact. The white must not let itself be touched by 
black, be it even at the remove of language or symbol. Blacks do not have the 
right to touch the flag of the republic. In 1964, South Africa’s Ministry of Public 
Works sought to assure the cleanliness of national emblems by means of a 





McClintock and Nixon (1984/1986) argued that Derrida was admirable in detesting 
minority white regime actions. However, in his critique, Derrida missed the chance to 
outline the context for how the word gained its linguistic power. McClintock and Nixon 
believe the word is a unique movement. Derrida’s assertion that the word had universal 
meaning was incorrect. McClintock and Nixon (1984/1986) argued: 
[Apartheid] has its own history, and that history is closely entwined with a 
developing ideology of race which has not only been created to deliberately 
rationalize and temper South Africa's image at home and abroad, but can also be 
seen to be intimately allied to different stages of the country's political and 
economic development. (p. 141).  
 
As McClintock and Nixon suggest, in my semiotic analysis of apartheid I provide a 
large historical context in which to comprehend the nature and oppression of the word 
and its unique attributes. Similarly, when I discuss the USMX security fence, it will be 
necessary to recognize that it has many linguistic and historical contexts.  
 Any discussion of South Africa in the 20
th
 must include the life of Nelson 
Mandela. Being a royal descendent of the Xhosa tribe, Mandela knew well the history 
of oppression the natives of South Africa faced (Xhosa Culture, 2013). Mandela 
experienced firsthand the realities of racial discrimination under the law. In 1942, 
Mandela found that the Communist Party that was less concerned about race than it was 
about important economic issues. However, the Communist Party had a White elite 
power structure so equality for Africans was not a priority. Mandela gravitated to the 
ANC but it was not radical enough so Mandela helped form the ANC Youth League 
(ANCYL) to push for stronger actions in equality (Meredith, 1997/2010; Mandela 
Center, 2013). As a young man, Mandela had seen racism in the mining industry and in 
educational institutions where he attended. In 1943, when bus fares went up from 
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racism, Mandela participated in his first protest with 20,000 workers who were feeling 
economically crushed. Through this and other early encounters with African and Indian 
friends, Mandela learned how to form more effective resistance movements. According 
to Meredith (1997/2010), Mandela followed the teachings of Gandhi who had been 
successful only a few years before.  
In 1948, Malan’s new government feared that the Communist Party was 
powerful enough to create an effective resistance (Meredith 1997/2010). The new  
government passed the Suppression of Communism Act, No. 44 of 1950 (SC44) which 
declared, “The Communist Party of South Africa [is] an unlawful organization; to make 
provisions for declaring other organizations promoting communistic activities to be 
unlawful and prohibiting certain periodical or other publications; to prohibit certain 
communistic activities” (Union of South Africa, 1950, p.549). This open-ended law 
encompassed all public gatherings in any way that resembled communism, essentially 
destroying public opposition to new government rule. By 1960, the South Africa 
government disbanded the ANC. In 1952, Mandela and 17 others started a “Defiance 
Campaign” to overturn the Suppression of Communism Act as well as other forms of 
discrimination coming from Malan’s new government. Mandela and the others were 
charged and convicted with violating SC44, but the judges postponed sentencing for at 
least two years (Mandela Center, 2013).  
There were multiple other occasions where the wall of apartheid had 
consequences for Mandela, his colleagues, and millions of his fellow Africans. Mandela 
faced arrest, detention, or prison in 1956, 1960, 1962, 1963, 1964, and 1982-1990 
(Mandela Center, 2013). For Mandela and a dedicated group of followers, the walls of 
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the Pollsmoor prison were symbolic of the oppression of the apartheid wall. After the 
prison closed, government and private funding renovated it into a museum to teach the 
world about the atrocities of apartheid so other countries would not make the same 
mistakes. Unfortunately, the current environment of wall building is an indication that 
people have not yet learned those lessons.  
 
Conclusion 
The ideology and wall of apartheid was ingrained in the social, cultural, and 
linguistic structure of South Africa from 1652-1994. This section covered the history 
and social impact of race from 1652 to 1990. Some of the racial segregation policies of 
note included manually removing indigenous people from their native lands, enforcing 
language and cultural laws to exclude certain groups. Later, they used the law and 
violence to disenfranchise the majority of the population of South Africa that included 
millions of native Africans, Chinese, and Indians. This semiotic review of the history of 
South Africa provides some hermeneutic context for the wall of apartheid that had 
immense consequences. These experiences and history are comparable to the problems 
facing the USMX border. An examination of the apartheid wall communicates that wall 
building has significant cultural, social, and linguistic consequences for people living on 
both sides.  
Theoretical Considerations 
ST Research Questions 




RQ 2: Were there many individual events and motives that combined to create a larger 
structural social system and if so, what are those consequences?  
The purpose of ST is to answer why social structures reproduce themselves and what 
we can gain from understanding that reproduction. ST ambiguously offers scholars 
several approaches on how to find answers to what he perceives to be the fundamental 
question. RQ 1 and RQ 2 are two areas that can help me comprehend and explain the 
social reproduction of walls, and their consequences for communication research. I 
answer the questions using the outline of the ST framework with its basic concepts and 
definitions as described in the theory chapter.  
Agents and Power 
In order to answer the what, it is helpful to know who is communicating. 
Throughout the history of South Africa, there are five main agents: first, the DEIC with 
its commanders and governors until 1795; second, the British government along with its 
military chain of command and governors; third, the African native people; fourth, the 
Boer/Afrikan people; fifth, uitlanders and slaves. The history of apartheid began with 
European agents and then the Boer minority government. Both agents held tight control 
of communication to reproduce the message they wanted people to hear, which was that 
of white (European) superiority was worth protecting at all costs. It was not until the 
early 1990’s that new agents began to change the social message, and they are still in 
the process of creating a new message for South Africa, over a decade after the country 
outlawed apartheid  practices.  
 The next ST concept is power, meaning who uses rules and resources to create 
the intended and unintended consequences in social reproduction? First, the DEIC 
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maintained power with resources such as Company employees, the Burgher colonists, 
indentured servants, and military troops on loan from the Netherlands. As noted in the 
history, the DEIC enforced their wall of laws when necessary with military troops. The 
use of military troops to enforce the wall of discrimination illustrated there were terrible 
consequences when the African tribes did not obey their white rulers. Additional tacit 
resources that helped the Dutch maintain control included using Dutch language to 
create the rules, spreading Christianity, and requiring intense loyalty, money, food, and 
equipment from the Burgher upper class in return for protection against the Africans. 
Although it appears irrational currently, the Burghers perceived from their horizon that 
they were better than other humans were and acted accordingly to reinforce a position 
of power.  
 Second, the British government used their power and resources in similar ways 
as the DEIC during their reign from 1800-1910 when South Africa became 
independent. The British had the most powerful military in the world, which also 
consisted of the most powerful naval fleet during the time and the agent with the most 
diversity of resources. The brutality of the British was much greater than the DEIC in 
trying to establish a permanent residence in the country. However, like the Dutch, the 
British used language tactics to cut off or severely limit communication and 
social/political participation. The British military crushed any rebellion by the African 
tribes or the Boer to communicate their presence would be permanent. During the 
Anglo-Boer war at one point, the British military even maintained a physical wall of 
men and fencing 45 miles across at points to stop the Boer from obtaining any 
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advantages. The way the Dutch and British used their resources left a profound intended 
consequence leaving white minority government in power until the 1990’s.  
 The Boer/Afrikan people were the third agent with resources who took over the 
government from the British in 1910. Several political players had resources that helped 
the Boer gain the political power they needed to eventually run the country and 
implement apartheid, such as President Kruger who ran part of South Africa for almost 
two decades. Others included General Jan Smuts, Louis Botha, Barry Hertzog, Prime 
Minister Malan, and many others. They used political, social, and physical resources 
such as the law, diamond mines and other means to reproduce their message. They 
planned to keep the law permanently, despite perceived discrimination it permanently. 
This is evident when they incarcerated Nelson Mandela and other leaders as late as 
1980.  
 The last set of agents is the huge number Africans, Indians, and Chinese that did 
not have power. Some of the better-known agents like Gandhi and Nelson Mandela 
tried to use the resources that were readily available. Regardless, the Africans, Chinese, 
and Indians faced the wall of discrimination for generations. According to the concept 
of power in ST, this group of agents had little or none. Their message of opposition to 
white power was not heard until the 1990’s when the ANC finally won their first 
election. Nelson Mandela led the people into a new age for South Africa that is still in 






Duality of Structure 
 The answer to RQ 2 is that when an individual acts, it not only affects them, but 
also has systemic repercussions. Individuals within the system of South Africa apartheid 
made individual and small group decisions that did affect the outcome of the country. 
Apartheid was more than just a word in a language. It was an individual and systemic 
hermeneutic horizon; the wall of discrimination was a culture. White people in the 
social structure perpetuated the wall of discrimination due to their belief that they were 
superior to other humans. Their perspectival consciousness structure allowed them to 
devalue some humans and make themselves feel better than others.  
The social structure of white oppression used language barriers to maintain their 
power within a small group. The group partitioned themselves away from other social 
structures to avoid communicating with them for fear that integration might infect them 
like a disease. Within this social structure, there was no room to communicate the 
cultural values of the Kohekohe, the Zulu, the Griqua, or any other African indigenous 
group. Nor was there room to communicate the cultural values of the Chinese who 
provided a vast amount of labor in that country. There was not room for the Indians to 
communicate their cultural values in the white social structure either. General Smut’s 
comments regarding the differences between Indian and European culture are strong 
evidence revealing that people in the Western world had no interest in learning about or 
integrating with each other. Anthropology studies or documentation of the native 
African cultures, or any foreign culture was limited largely due to the ethnocentric 
thought that these cultures were barbarian, sub human devil worshippers who practiced 
witchcraft or other evil magic. Maho’s (2002) list of over 200 laws prior to apartheid 
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coming into law in 1948 illustrate that a message can be reproduced and entrenched so 
much within the minds of people in a particular social structure, that the ideology 
behind the message starts to be ignored.   
 
DAD Research Questions 
RQ 1: What are the magic, mythic, and perspectival dimensions of the wall of apartheid 
and what does that communicate about the wall of apartheid?  
The research question related to DAD theory is open-ended because there are 
many horizons that might interpret and answer this question differently. There are 
dimensional manifestations of communication from each group. Great conflicts arose 
when one group communicated from a magic perspective while another group 
communicated from a modern perspective. The wall of apartheid is a deficient form of 
perspectival communication that led to violence and separation for two centuries due to 
its significant clashing with mythic and magic dimensions. Kramer (1997, 2013) 
explains that perspectival thinking is arbitrary, careless, spatial, and fragmentary. The 
apartheid wall was an ideology, a dominant social structure that eventually allowed the 
creation of arbitrary laws. These laws and the social structure communicated that some 
humans had less value than others did. Ethnocentric white colonists were in power to 
determine what value other humans had. The colonists, DEIC, and British used 
technologies like more powerful rifles and cannons to enforce the values of apartheid. 
Even after wall of discrimination came down in the 1990’s, many critics would argue 
that this deficiency continues to exhibit itself in the political and social life of the people 
of South Africa.  
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The modern consciousness structure drove the white European horizon but also 
at times revealed magical and/or mythical ideas. For example, in modern thought we 
make progress to meet an end goal (Kramer, 2013). In the mind of a Dutch Calvinism 
colonist, a good Christian tried to live a virtuous life by following the teachings of the 
Bible, and hoping that enough work and grace in this life would help them obtain 
paradise after death. Not only should the colonists strive to save themselves, but they 
also felt it was their divine, magical mission to convert the barbarian tribal people to the 
religion or they were spiritually lost. Another goal was to make a life and fortune 
through colonization. End goals included becoming rich by owning land, or become 
politically powerful and returning to the motherlands in glory. Captains and governors 
often revealed their hypertrophic individualism that is absolute selfishness with their 
personal obsessions to gain political and social power. If colonists or natives could not 
benefit them in some way then the leaders disregarded those people. Diamonds were 
more important than people were so the British removed the natives by force of 
violence or death. The DEIC and the British later on could make and break deals to 
benefit themselves. The colonial powers introduced modern government, western law, 
education, and domestic farming all as means of progress to a greater goal. Theal (1897) 
used progress as a measurement in agriculture to gage whether the indigenous people 
were becoming more modern and cultured because they used industrialized farming 
techniques. The heathens were those tribes who had chosen not to, or had not learned 
the techniques to take advantage of progress. The DEIC, the Boer, and the British used 
new war technologies to colonize, create borders, and industrialize South Africa, all 
characteristics of a modern perspective.  
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Even with a modern perspective in mind, the European Whites sometimes 
communicated in a magical or mythic way. Specifically, the Boer history indicates the 
people received a divine mission to colonize the Cape, the highlands, and the vast plains 
across the country. The Great Trek was an example of the belief of such a magical 
calling. The tradition of hard work and pioneer spirit became mythic for the Boer and a 
reason to fight against the British in the Boer Wars. Their myth of strength and 
determination was so powerful that both Doyle (1900) and Leyds (1906) highlighted it 
as a determining factor that almost crippled the British in the first stage of the war. 
Another telling example is the actions of Sir Harry when dealing with the tribe leaders 
when he arrived in 1847. Sir Harry portrayed himself as a magical God messenger for 
the Queen of England and required tribal leaders to give submission to his eminence. 
Furthermore, he exclaimed to both Africans and Boer rebels that an act against the 
Crown of England was an act against God. 
 
Chapter Six: U.S. Mexico Border 
 This chapter uses the hermeneutic circle and semiotics to identify the 
communicative functions of the USMX security border fence and responses to it.  
Long before anyone constructed a single piece of fence, numerous significant social 
factors helped make the security fence a reality. I found important communicative 
functions about the border in sociocultural, political, business, environmental, and legal 
controversies surrounding it. The discourse and assumptions of the earliest immigration 
laws communicated that foreign strangers from some parts of the world were not 
permanently welcome in the states. These strangers were only welcomed when they 
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could help grow the American economy. When American citizens and the U.S. 
government perceived immigrant workers as a burden, the government asked them or 
forced them to leave U.S. borders. Immigration laws within the last 100 years increased 
confusion and conflicting messages about the meaning of borders and the legal 
treatment of immigrants. Reforms to “secure” the border throughout the 1990’s, and 
especially after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 only made matters worse. 
The communication functions of the USMX Security Fence and immigration laws are 
comparable to apartheid (Nevins, 2002; 2006, 2012; Spencer, 2009). For example, 
apartheid separated people using laws to discriminate one group from another. 
Likewise, U.S. immigration laws categorize and oppress some ethnic groups more than 
others (Romero, 2013). Moreover, the ideological underpinnings that made apartheid 
possible were the same kinds of ideologies that made legal discrimination possible with 
American immigration laws. 
The research throughout this chapter illustrates the development of my 
hermeneutic perspective about the USMX border fence over a six-year period. The 
research includes the 2008 committee planning meeting, coursework from 2008-2010, 
the 2010 and 2012 proposal meetings, several meetings with the University of 
Oklahoma Institutional Research Board (IRB)  in 2010, a visit to El Paso, Texas in 
2013, and employment with the FBI from 2010-2014. It also includes reading books, 
news articles, and scholarly journals in many social science fields. I researched 
websites, blogs, listened to audio interviews, watched online videos and other media 
sources, and listened to lectures from professional sources.  
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This chapter discusses communicative functions of the USMX Security Fence in 
three sections. First, I analyze linguistic oppositions and key historic events that created 
the border and successive development. Second, following the semiotics tradition, I 
examine the history of immigration law as a set of essential characteristics that make the 
security wall possible. When necessary, I present relevant binary oppositions with 
communicative implications. Finally, I apply ST and DAD to my research to answer 
some questions about the fence.  
 
USMX Border Linguistic Oppositions 
The USMX Security Fence is an example of a binary opposition in need of 
paradigmatic analysis for two reasons. First, the physical structure literally creates a 
separation with two sides that are often in opposition to one another. Second, the fence 
is full of social, cultural, and political denotative and connotative meanings that have 
opposites. The binary oppositions are entrenched in prejudiced ideological language 
resulting in discrimination on both sides of the border. Table 11 provides a list of binary 
opposites using language that is at the center of the national controversies regarding the 
fence and immigration.  
Table 11 - Binary Opposition Terms about the Security Fence 
Illegal Legal 
Alien Naturalized or citizen 
Undocumented Naturalized 
Refugee Citizen 
physical or mental illness healthy 
Idiot/Insane person Regular person, not insane 







Fence, wall, barrier open 
Separate Connected 
Natural Barrier Human made barrier 
 
The term illegal alien is a powerful semiotic sign and binary opposite in the 
discourse of U.S. immigration. Like any other semiotic sign, the term has a rich historic 
context. Semiotics and communication scholars indicate that to understand how 
semiotic signs are currently used, we must first review their historical representation 
(Berger, 2011; Flores, 2003; Levi-Strauss, 1958/1963). The U.S. government definition 
of alien has remained quite similar for more than a century. For example, the 
Emergency Quota Act of 1921 stated an alien is, “any person not a native –born or 
naturalized citizen of the United States” (p. 5). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952 defined an alien as, “any person not a citizen or national of the United States” (p. 
166). In 2014, U.S. government agencies who deal with immigration issues still use this 
definition. When the colonies became a nation after the Revolutionary War, early laws 
quickly clarified that the American Indians and people of the island territories were 
neither considered native to nor citizens of the United States. Although they had been in 
the new world for thousands of years, the U.S. government dismissed indigenous 
populations as primitive barbarians not fit for “civilized” society. Moua, Guerra, Moore, 
and Valdiserri (2002) pose a critical question: “Does the term immigrant refer to 
someone who arrived here legally to study, to work, or to join family members, [to 
become a] refugee seeking asylum….Or, is an immigrant one of….420,000 people a 
year who come to America undocumented?” (p. 189). The complicated answer to the 
question is ‘yes’, but with a myriad of legal and bureaucratic conditions. According to 
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Guerette (2007), scholars, the media, and government officials use several terms in 
immigration policies to describe aliens including: “undocumented aliens’, 
undocumented immigrants/migrants’, ‘unauthorized aliens’, ‘unauthorized 
immigrants/migrants’, ‘illegal aliens’, and ‘illegal immigrants/migrants” (p. 5). The 
discourse of immigration is a significant part of the American identity. It is vital to 
examine the semiotics signs of immigration to more clearly comprehend the nature of 
the wall building on the border.  
The etymology comes from the Latin words alienus or alius which means 
‘belonging to another’. In the Middle Ages the earliest versions of the current word 
have similar connotations including ‘different’, ‘foreign’, ‘stranger’, ‘non-resident’, 
‘non-citizen’, and ‘unnatural’ (Harper, 2013). The concept of aliens crossing territories 
is as old as Old Testament stories of the Bible where sovereign territories and borders 
existed. For example, in ancient Israel, strangers were men of non-Israelite birth who 
lived in the Promised Land. Hoffmeier (2011) explains that Israeli law provided them 
with some fair treatment as outsiders. Throughout history, nations and cultures had 
similar terms or phrases for immigrants. The leaders of America were aliens themselves 
long before the American Revolution and the birth of the U.S. Republic. 
Notwithstanding this heritage, the culture of anti-immigration started with the Alien and 
Sedition Acts in 1798 that allowed the government to deport foreign spies or others 
under the cover of national security. The government repealed the act in 1800, but the 
alien label has remained a staple of American immigration laws for the last 200 years. 
 In the late 1890’s through the 1920’s the Southwest U.S. economy needed a 
greater labor force, especially due to increasing restrictions on immigrants from China 
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and Japan (Sanchez, 1993). Mexico became a primary source of new labor even in the 
face of new laws in 1917, 1921, and 1924 to limit immigration. Sanchez (1993) notes, 
“Not surprisingly, immigration restrictions directed against Mexicans were at first 
consistently deferred under pressure by southwestern employers and then, when finally 
enacted, were mostly ignored by officials at the border” (p.19). During this period, 
Sanchez (1993) describes that immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents played a 
central role in connotatively defining the term ‘alien’ in a racist way. For example, in El 
Paso, Texas, it was common knowledge that members of the Klu Klux Klan were also 
immigration inspectors. Sanchez (1993) describes:  
Officials would consistently denigrate those who crossed at the bridge, even if 
their papers were perfectly legal. Eventually crossing the border became a 
painful and abrupt event permeated by an atmosphere of racism and control— 
an event that clearly demarcated one society from another. An unintended result 
of the new immigration laws and the tensions they produced was to make 
temporary immigrants already living in the United States think twice about 
returning to Mexico. (p. 59) 
 
In addition to the overt racism found at border inspections, Gomez (2003) explains that 
because Mexicans did not assimilate into American culture by denouncing their cultural 
heritage, so Anglo-American citizens labeled them as different or alien. Gomez (2003) 
clarifies that Mexican Americans actually fused their lives in a bi-national, bi-cultural 
way. This is evident in the fact that the predominant language in the Southwest was 
Spanish from 1848 through at least the 1920’s, and locals still celebrated cultural 
practices and Mexican holidays.  
 Some scholars criticize various synonymous as being inaccurate and demeaning 
(“undocumented aliens’, undocumented immigrants/migrants’, ‘unauthorized aliens’, 
‘unauthorized immigrants/migrants’, ‘illegal aliens’, and ‘illegal immigrants/migrants” 
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(DeGenova, 2002, 2004; Dunn, 2009; Guerette, 2007, p. 5; Romero 2013; Nevins, 
2002; Sanchez, 2011; Spencer, 2009). De Genova (2002) argues that immigration 
scholarship focuses so much on giving answers to policy makers that scholars tend to 
miss most important data. De Genova (2002) clarifies, “Remarkably, little of this vast 
scholarship deploys ethnographic methods or other qualitative research techniques to 
elicit the perspectives and experiences of undocumented migrants themselves, or to 
evoke the kinds of densely descriptive and textured interpretative representations of 
every life” (p. 421). De Genova (2002, 2004) concludes that scholars should stop 
studying the “illegality” of immigrants and rather focus on collecting experiences from 
undocumented peoples so policy makers and other actors could truly hear their voices.  
In 2010, the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) began an education 
campaign arguing that the words “illegal alien” and “illegal immigrant” have 
derogatory connotations in journalism writing. The SPJ and the National Association of 
Hispanic Journalists (NAHJ) demand that derogatory terms be replaced by 
undocumented worker or undocumented immigrant. The NAHJ criticized the 
Associated Press because prior to 2011, the AP stylebook required that the former 
language was preferable to the new description (Lawrence, 2010). Lawrence (2010) 
argues that the implication of being an illegal alien is against the principles in the U.S. 
Constitution that imply everyone is innocent until proven guilty. Aguilar (2011) shares 
a critical narrative in the language debate at the SPJ convention, noting, “I’m the 
daughter of undocumented workers. Every time you use the phrase ‘illegal alien’, my 
mother – now a proud American citizen – you insult her....Every time you use those 
words….you insult all other Latinos” (p. 13). After much debate, the Associated Press 
159 
 
altered the stylebook to reflect the views of SPJ and NAHJ. The current stylebook 
suggests that the terms ‘alien’ and ‘illegal immigrant’ are derogatory so journalists 
should avoid using the terms where they can use alternative language (Cunningham-
Parmeter, 2011). The Diversity committee of the SPJ also “encourag[ed] editors and 
news managers to sit down with their staffs and have a healthy discussion over avoiding 
the “I-word”” (Aguilar, 2011, p. 13). 
Despite the calls from journalists and scholars for linguistic change, they have 
made little progress. In the U.S. legal system, Cunningham-Parmeter (2011) explains 
that, “[Immigrants] are aliens…. [and] ‘Alien’ is the most dominant metaphor in all of 
immigration law. In fact, lawyers and judges refer to aliens so frequently that few would 
identify the word as a metaphor” (p. 1568-69). Flores (2003) found that as early as the 
1930’s, the law rhetorically constructed Mexicans as ‘alien’, ‘other’, criminals illegally 
residing in the states. Politicians, federal agencies, media, and social groups, use the 
terms ‘illegal alien’, and ‘illegal immigrant’ as powerful rhetoric to depersonalize and 
portray immigrants as a security threat (Aguilar, 2011; BAC, 2012; Coleman, 2009; 
Dechaine, 2009; Durazo, 2013;  Flores, 2003; Hernandez, 2010; Laurence, 2010; 
Nevins, 2002, 2006; Rivera-Batiz, 2000; Spencer, 2009). Using the ‘illegal alien’ 
language to criminalize immigrants is such a powerful rhetorical force that it allows the 
government to construct security walls (Ackleson, 2005; Coleman, 2008; DeChaine, 
2009; Dunn, 2009; Jones 2012; Secure Fence Act, 2006). The government passed the 
Security Fence Act in 2006 under the pretense of stopping the “alien invasion” as 
America was supposedly “under siege” by illegal aliens, terrorists, and drug dealers. 
The federal government gave the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) unlimited 
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authority to build walls that theoretically would stop the “rising tide” and “flood” of 
illegal immigration (Rivera-Batiz, 2000). The Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 
The Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE), the U.S. Customs and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) and state law enforcement partners use the list of words 
interchangeably regard for perceived linguistic consequences (Hernandez, 2010; Maril, 
1986, 2004) (the list includes “undocumented aliens’, undocumented 
immigrants/migrants’, ‘unauthorized aliens’, ‘unauthorized immigrants/migrants’, 
‘illegal aliens’, and ‘illegal immigrants/migrants”, Guerette, 2007). The alien label is 
only the beginning of words used to help shape the powerful communication functions 
of the USMX security wall. There are many linguistic binary opposites in need of 
semiotic analysis in order to grasp the meaning of the security fence.  
 
History of American Immigration Law  
 The communication functions and hermeneutic interpretations of the USMX 
security fence come from a rich historical context. Sheridan (2009) states, “To 
understand the history of physical barriers and the heightening of physical and 
psychological risk at the border, we need to examine U.S. migration laws, policy, and 
practice” (p. 16). De Genova (2002, 2004) argues that too often scholars presume the 
law is correct rather than analyzing its historical and social construction to identify how 
the immigrant came to be automatically illegal. This dissertation acknowledges how 
people use laws to create the sociocultural meanings of the security fence that we know 
today. Table 12 identifies various words or labels that constitute binary oppositions in 
U.S. immigration laws dating back to the beginning of the country.  
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physical or mental illness Healthy 
Idiot/Insane person Regular person, not insane 
Discourse of the other Being a part of us 
Foreign Domestic 




Chinese immigrant coolies (interchangeable with alien especially in the 1800’s) 
came to the U.S. working for low wages on labor-intensive projects like the railroads. 
Chinese immigrants also entered illegally through the smuggling and slavery coolie 
trade, similar to the coolie trade in South Africa (Gandhi, 1929/1940; Flores, 2003; 
Harper, 2013). The coolie trade was well established by the time Congress passed the 
Anti-Coolie Act (1862) trying to slow the tide of Chinese migration. On the surface, the 
law appeared to be humane by stopping Americans from participating in a slave trade, 
but the underlying motive was an ideology of anti-Chinese immigration. The 
regulations against the Chinese throughout the late 1800’s reify the legal wall of 
discrimination they faced in America. Some of the following examples illustrate the 
bigotry against the Chinese, and demonstrate the contradictions and inconsistencies that 
were prevalent in American immigration laws. 
First, inspectors loosely applied the 1885 Contract Labor Act standards in the 
Eastern U.S., whereas in the Southwest, the standards were strict especially for Chinese 
workers. The law “prohibit[ed] the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens 
under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States, its territories, and the 
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District of Columbia” (Contract Labor Law, 1885). Congress designed the 1892 
Chinese immigration Act to deport all Chinese immigrants, but when there was a 
greater demand for labor, this Act was appealed (CBP, 2013a; Starkweather, 2007). The 
unintended consequences of these laws were that they actually increased the number of 
people crossing the border illegally creating a greater need for a border patrol to enforce 
the laws already on the books.  
The Immigration Act of 1891 amended the 1885 Contract Labor Act to expand 
the definition of Chinese workers being aliens (Ettinger, 2009). The Immigration Act 
(1891) also excluded:  
All idiots, insane persons, paupers or persons likely to become a public charge, 
persons suffering from a loathsome or a dangerous contagious diseases, persons 
who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor 
involving moral turpitude, polygamists, and also any person whose ticket or 
passage is paid for with the money of another or who is assisted by others to 
come, unless it is affirmatively and satisfactorily shown on special inquiry that 
such person does not belong to one of the foregoing excluded classes. (p. 1084)  
 
Ettinger (2009) highlights that during this period, European and Asian immigrants were 
three times as likely to enter the U.S. illegally as their Mexican counterparts were. With 
an expanding and relatively vague definition, the 1891 Act ultimately failed to curtail 
any illegal immigration. In politics, the law created the 1891 Federal Immigration 
Service but did not provide enough resources such as money, human power, or other 
necessities to establish an effective law enforcement presence at either the Canadian or 
the Mexican borders. The social impact of the 1891 law meant that thousands of 
medically unfit people had to find other means of entry that increased likelihood they 
would be smuggled into the country illegally. Two hundred years of people flowing into 
the U.S. is strong evidence that no matter what kinds of barriers the government tries to 
163 
 
construct, they cannot stop people from trying to cross U.S. borders. People are willing 
to risk their lives and the lives of others to come into the country (Panunzio, 1927). By 
1907, the Chinese, Italians, Greeks, Lebanese, and Japanese were all illegally coming 
across the Southwest borders. Border towns were creating economic growth with illegal 




The American government drew the USMX borderline in 1848 with the Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo and 1853 with the Gadsden Purchase. Hamnett (1999) explained 
that Mexico did not feel the full shift of political power and colonial expansion of the 
U.S. until the 1830’s even though it was evident as early as 1803 with the Louisiana 
Purchase, and 1819 when New Spain ceded Florida to the states. President James Polk 
wanted greater land expansion in the West. In 1845, the U.S. government and American 
settlers began occupying Mexican territories in Texas. Shortly thereafter, President Polk 
sent U.S. troops to occupy the Rio Grande River to illustrate his willingness to go to 
war for land expansion. The U.S. Mexico War lasted from 1846 to 1848, and ended at 
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that seized Texas, New Mexico, and California 
(Burton, 2000; Hamnett, 1999; Hernandez, 2010).  
Romero (2013) explained that the Treaty on paper protected Mexicans land 
rights, but in practice, the Mexican people lost almost everything. The American 
Supreme Court rulings favored American federal cases, regardless of proof from the 
Mexican people that they owned certain lands. The Gonzalez case in 1995 illustrated 
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some of the problems (Lopez, 1997). The Gonzalez case in Santé Fe, New Mexico used 
the 1848 Treaty as a premise of their argument to obtain their lands. Despite 
documented genealogical and other evidence, the U.S. federal courts still ruled against 
Gonzalez. Although Mexicans lost half of their country in 1848, the Mexican people 
freely roamed across the border into the 1890’s. Marentes and Marentes (1999) lament 
that the 1891 Immigration Act (designed to control the Chinese immigrants) actually 
has worse consequences for the Mexican people. With the introduction of a federal law 
enforcement agency and a broader definition of alien, the government fundamentally 
shifted how they perceived Mexicans moving forward. Almost overnight, the entire 
Hispanic population suddenly became aliens in the native lands they resided on for 
centuries. Cameron (1998) concludes that by 1930, the Hidalgo Treaty and 
supplemental immigration regulations created a new lower class. Cameron (1998) 
explains, “Mexican-Americans, through legal defeat, fraud, or financial exhaustion, had 
been all but wiped out as a landholding class….Their transformation from masters into 
servants had been completed, and set the stage for….the exploitation of low-wage, 
migratory Mexican and Mexican-American labor” (p. 8). A strong example of such 
discrimination came in the form of a 1930 Alien Labor Act passed by the California 
State Legislature that made it illegal for the government to hire illegal aliens to do 
public works jobs. This immediately caused over 900 Mexican workers to lose their 






American Immigration Legal Framework 
The core components of federal immigration policy from 1917-2000 are 
ingrained in the same anti-immigration sentiments that tried but failed to stop the 
Mexican and Chinese throughout the 1800’s. The laws are loaded with binary language 
such as the continued use of the term alien that separates people to create an “us/them” 
or “the other” dichotomy. The laws communicate a multifaceted message to many 
audiences who are part of the immigration issue. The ideology motivating these laws set 
the precedent to begin building fences, blockades, or other human barriers. Graham 
(1991) identifies some influential immigration laws that guide the historical discussion. 
These include the Emergency Immigration Act of 1921 (Emergency Quota Act, 1921), 
the Immigration Act of 1924 (Immigration Act, 1924), the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952 (INA, 1952), the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA, 1965), the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA, 1986), and Immigration Act of 
1990 (Immigration Act, 1990). In addition, there are supplemental regulations and 
programs that are a part of the fence discussion including major organizational changes 
in government agencies, especially after the 9/11 attacks, the Bracero program, and the 
1980’s and 1990’s border militarization strategies.  
Two issues have plagued immigration law over the last 100 years. First, the 
government does not identify goals to measure the effectiveness of the policies. Second, 
legal jargon is either so complex or purposefully vague that even politicians, federal, 
state, and local Law Enforcement Officers (LEO), and personnel cannot interpret what 
the policies are. On the first point, a body of scholarship indicated that there is no way 
to account for people who illegally cross the border successfully and then disappear. 
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Moreover, criminals who conduct smuggling and drug operations are not lining up to 
share their information about the best tradecraft they use to overcome fencing or other 
obstacles. On the second problem, if leaders, judges, and lawyers cannot comprehend 
nor apply the law, then why would an ordinary citizen or an immigrant speaking a 
second language be able to comprehend how it applies to them? With the myriad of 
interpretations from so many perspectives, it is almost impossible to narrow down what 
any particular statute may mean or how it applies to particular cases (Coleman, 2008; 
Coplan, 2010; Ettinger, 2009; Graham, 1991; Legomsky, 1997; Martinez, 1989; Maril, 
2011; Massey, 1981; North, 1987; Rivera-Batiz, 2000; USMX IRB, 2010).  
 
Quota Discrimination (1917-1952) 
The 1917 Immigration Act added over three pages of newly prohibited aliens to 
an already long list from earlier laws. Specific categories included Asians from island 
nations, the medically ill and insane, and criminals, especially if they were associated 
with socialists or anarchists. Physical examinations became stricter, newcomers paid 
more taxes, and literacy tests became part of the process. From 1917 to 1922, 
immigration was so widely debated that Dr. Scroggs, an education and public policy 
advocate, dedicated an entire issue of the University of Oklahoma Bulletin to the 
discussion. Scroggs (1922) stated, “Employers generally oppose restriction to 
immigration, while labor leaders generally favor it….Immigration is a great, a 
complicated and intricate question, and one which is very vital to our American life and 
to the present and future of our country” (p. 2).  
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The Emergency Immigration Act of 1921 also known as the Emergency Quota 
Act (1921) revised and tightened restrictions on admissions from the 1917 law. The 
quota system limited the number of entries to 3% per nationality in any given fiscal 
year, and based the number of foreigners already in the U.S. on the 1910 census. Martin 
(1993) described that the numeric quota system was the first attempt to make the 
immigration flow efficient or controlled. Between 1910 and 1920 the overall population 
of the U.S. increased by 15%. Six million people were newcomers, and in three of those 
years, the U.S. admitted more than one million foreigners. The INS statistics only 
accounted for legal migrants. Given the number of illegal entries at the same time, the 
INS statistics became unreliable (Martin, 1993). Other historical data suggested that 
when the government imposed the law, workers received triple pay and union 
membership increased (Briggs, 2001, 2007). The quota system was a wall with 
important communication consequences. The message of the quota policy wall was that 
America was no longer the melting pot or a land of opportunity. Instead, immigrants 
faced eugenics-based policies where the government actively discriminated against 
ethnic groups they perceived as inferior or undesirable. The government only permitted 
those immigrants with the most superior cultural traits to be a part of America (Briggs, 
2001, 2007; Chacon & Davis, 2006; McGowan, 2008; Ordover, 2003; Panunzio, 1927).  
 In ethnographic work, interviews, and observations, Paradise (1922) 
demonstrated how the quota system mirrored a wall in several ways. First, it was a legal 
wall forcing officers to separate people on paper. The story about a man from Liberia 
demonstrated this problem. The boat he arrived on was late to Ellis Island so Liberia’s 
quota was full, except for half of a person. The options were limited to cutting the man 
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in half, sending him back home, or splitting the difference into two fiscal years. After 
the officers discussed options, they determined the man could remain in the country. 
Not only did the government separate people in ledgers, but the government had several 
other ways to partition people as well. Even with a valid visa, newcomers had several 
barriers to overcome, such as rigorous physical examinations prior to receiving 
permission to enter the country (Panunzio, 1927; Paradise, 1922). Anyone with physical 
or mental disease faced quarantine and immediate deportation. This resulted in two 
consequences; first, families had to separate; second, the separation was a form of 
gender discrimination. Typically, mothers took care of children so if the child faced 
deportation, the mother would also accept it to take care of the child. Deportation was 
permanent, so the policy literally ripped families apart for life (Paradise, 1922). Beyond 
these problems, officers had great flexibility to accept or deny entry based on many 
other subjective categories (Panunzio, 1927; Paradise, 1922). Finally, the law indicated 
that those who came to the U.S. first would have the first chance to enter the country. 
When those numbers maxed out, inspectors would reject all others. Paradise (1922) 
contended that this was an impractical, illogical rule. Paradise posited, what would that 
mean if one boat came to the port quicker than another boat? People due to no fault of 
their own would have to turn back to their country of origin since they picked the wrong 
boat or had bad weather and the list could go on. Despite the problems of the quota 
system, it became a permanent condition. 
The Immigration Act of 1924 (Immigration Act, 1924) expanded the 1921 quota 
system by limiting the number of new people to 2% of the nationality already in the 
U.S. based it on the 1890 Census. The new statistics for the quota included citizens 
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many of whom had descendants from Great Britain and Western Europe, which 
increased the percentage of visas available to those people. Immigrants from Southern 
and Eastern Europe suddenly had a severe drop in admission numbers. The act also 
reinforced antiquated regulations from 1790 and 1870 that eliminated people of Asian 
descent from entry. The U.S. reneged on a treaty deal from 1894 that appeared to give 
the Japanese the right to immigrate and receive the same rights as American citizens. 
The 1924 provision tried to revive and preserve American homogeneity through 
assimilation (Chin, 1995-1996; Panunzio, 1927).  
There were several exceptions and contradictions in the 1924 policy that still 
remain in immigration law today. First, the policies and rhetoric of assimilation are 
racist and sexist. Panunzio (1927) pointed out that the author of the legislation, also 
Chairman of  the House Committee on Immigration,  Representative Albert Johnson, 
was explicit in his motivations to protect the American race, and was looking for “the 
best material for citizenship” (p. 149). Johnson was a well-known anti-Semitic racist 
who strongly believed that eugenics was the new science to cleanse the flow of 
undesirable immigrants (Chacon & Davis, 2006; Ordover, 2003). Ordover (2003) 
explained that Johnson was a member of the Eugenics Record Association and the 
Eugenics Committee of the United States, both of which helped him obtain his powerful 
congressional position. From 1924 to 1936, Johnson and a group of prominent leaders 
wrote anti-immigration literature that promoted eugenics policies. Weil (2000-2001) 
asserted that the 1924 law was racist due to the “races and peoples” list that politicians 
had started compiling in 1898 and then used to implement the “national origin” 
requirement into the new law. The fact that entire populations of Asian countries were 
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also excluded speaks volumes in how racist the regulation was, even more so than in 
1921 (Chin, 1995-1996; Panunzio, 1927).  
Silber (1996-1997) described how the 1924 law was also a sexist barrier that 
divided families, in some cases for life. Silber asserted that in addition to limiting 
genetic characteristics of workers, congressional eugenics advocates also limited the 
gender of newcomers as much as possible. First, non-American wives of citizen 
husbands had to petition for non-quota status, and the husband being a citizen was more 
important than whether or not the couple was married. Second, even if a non-American 
wife were to obtain the non-quota distinction and receive the proper visa paperwork 
they still had other hurdles to overcome. When they arrived for physical and mental 
examinations at the ports of entry, if the wife failed the rigorous physical, mental, and 
literacy tests, or had tuberculosis, or the inspectors considered them immoral, they were 
automatically ineligible to stay in the U.S. (Paradise, 1922; Silber 1996-1997). Third, 
Silber illustrated that after passing through all previous requirements, the couple had to 
prove they were married with civil documentation that might be difficult and expensive 
to obtain. The process from beginning to end put many women on a waiting list a 
minimum of thirteen years long before they could join their families. Fourth, American 
citizen women who married non-resident men lost their citizenship leading to an infinite 
number of problems to get back into America legally.  
Beyond the explicit racial and sexual discrimination, the 1924 law had further 
problems as well. There were calls to build an eight-foot high wall with grid fencing at 
the top, across the California border to stop narcotics and liquor trafficking, but 
construction never happened (New York Times, 1924). In addition, many countries in 
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the Western Hemisphere were exempt from the quota laws such as Canada, Mexico, 
Cuba, Haiti, and several “independent” countries in South America. Panunzio (1927) 
pointed out that the immigration work force from China and Mexico was at least as big 
as the new quota population from European immigrants. Many exempted immigrants 
crossing from China and Mexico did not return to their homeland. The law favored 
economic development so people who worked in international and domestic trade 
received a higher priority for entry. This meant that families, ministers, teachers, and 
potential college students faced much greater barriers for admission than they otherwise 
would have. Panunzio (1927) found that in 1924 and 1925 that an alien wanting to bring 
their family into the country already had to be a citizen in order for the family to receive 
non-quota admissions. Upon applying to become a citizen, courts stated that the alien 
could not become a citizen without having his or her family already in the country. This 
paradox gained so much attention that President Coolidge finally asked immigration 
officers to be more lenient on letting families remain together for humane purposes.  
A final problem with the 1924 law and many subsequent immigration laws is the 
bureaucratic backlog. Panunzio (1927) described that if an immigrant had the money, 
they could look forward to the following experience: “there is no escape from an 
endless chain of applications and reapplications, correspondence and painful waiting, 
delays and counter delays and unending anxieties” (p. 141). In 2005, Jernegan, 
Meissner, Grieco, & Coffey (2005) reveal similar problems with the federal agencies, 
with no indication of progress: 
Over the last fifteen years, the number of pending applications for immigration 
benefits has swollen by over 1,000 percent, growing from 540,688 in 1990 to a 
high of 6.08 million in 2003. The body of [six million] applications [in 2003] 
caught in….the backlog….has been a chronic problem….with implications for 
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immigrants, their families, employers who sponsor them, and policymakers.  
….The backlog problem has acquired new importance in recent years…. tied to 
the substantially heightened, resource-intensive, and time-consuming security 
precautions initiated…. [after 9/11]. These measures have increased delays and 
hampered backlog-reduction efforts. (p. 1) 
 
The Department of State (DOS) reports that as of November 2012, there are over four 
million people worldwide on a waiting list to enter the U.S. More than 1.3 million are 
the people of Mexico, many of which fall into one of four family preferential categories 
with legal resident families already across the border. There are no signs of decreasing 
the backlog as America continues to be one of the most preferred immigration locations 
throughout the world.  
 
The Bracero Program (1942-1964) 
 World War II brought a huge labor shortage to the American economy 
especially in the agriculture section. Despite numerous attempts to control and limit 
access, the U.S. government was generous with border laws in order to fill the labor 
shortage. Astor (2009) explained that one practice was allowing farmers to hire illegal 
immigrants already in the U.S. rather than having to recruit them from Mexico. The INS 
could not legalize the workers since it was contrary to their main mission. However, 
Astor (2009) described: 
To maintain the appearance of upholding the law, the INS would “deport” 
undocumented immigrants by taking them to the border. However, upon 
reaching the border, INS agents would give them identification slips that 
enabled them to return and be legally contracted as soon as they stepped across 
the border. Moreover, the only way for many to obtain the slip of paper that 
enabled them to be legally contracted was to be caught working illegally in the 




In 1943, Public Law 45 - Farm Labor Appropriations created and funded the Bracero 
program to further increase migrant labor (Starkweather, 2007). From 1942-1964, it 
allowed over 2 million men to enter the states legally to work on farms. The law 
required that employers provide transportation, basic health service, and a fair wage. In 
theory, the program was positive but in practice, it had multiple problems. First, the way 
the government processed men through the Bracero program actually resembled a wall 
even though men could come to work in the states. Second, Texas was not part of the 
agreement causing unintended rises in illegal labor, discrimination, and corruption. 
Third, the program created a two-tiered subsystem that increased discrimination and the 
physical danger of women and children. 
First, Marentes and Marentes (1999) provided some worker context from Jesus 
Campoya Calderon, one of the first Braceros to start the program. Calderon’s 
descriptions of what happened at the border illustrated the fences were already in 
position long before barricades were called for in the 1990’s. In order to participate in 
the program, Calderon, as all Braceros, went to three windows: first for a work 
interview; second for more extensive interviews, including the humiliation of body and 
hands checks to make sure they were “clean” and “hard-working”; and third, to receive 
a working contract and have a photo taken for their immigration card. After passing the 
interviews and receiving the contract, later in the week on their way to the farms, 
inspectors sprayed all Braceros with white powder in order to rid them of “Mexican 
Fleas”.   
The Smithsonian National Museum of American History (2013) has an online 
exhibition with photos that illustrate well the “bittersweet” nature of participating in the 
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Bracero program. Regarding the border, the Smithsonian exhibition (2013) notes, 
“Braceros were often subjected to humiliating exams and bureaucratic procedures. They 
were told to strip and were sprayed with the pesticide DDT. If they did not pass the 
medical exams, they were sent back to Mexico.” The website goes on to describe how 
participants felt like livestock when inspectors examined them, and like vermin when 
inspectors sprayed them down. Furthermore, the interview process was intimidating. 
The interview process was intimidating. Even with setbacks, over 350,000 Mexican 
men made the trek for 20 consecutive seasons.  
The second major drawback to the Bracero program was that it excluded Texas, 
increasing illegal immigration in that state. According to the Koestler (2013), Mexico 
excluded Texas from the agreement due to lack of civil rights protections, broken 
contracts, and intense discrimination prior to 1942. Notwithstanding these problems, 
Texas farmers and ranchers continued to hire immigrants crossing the border illegally to 
find work. In addition, the U.S. immigration agencies arrested thousands of aliens 
coming into Texas. However, for humanitarian reasons the agencies released the 
immigrants and helped transport them around Texas where they could find jobs. 
Bracero participants in other states felt their wages were too low so they abandoned the 
program in favor of working illegally in Texas. In 1951 due to complaints and 
corruption on both sides of the border, the Mexican government rescinded the original 
Bracero agreement for all U.S. states.  
In retaliation for Mexico’s actions, in 1953 the INS, Border Patrol, the U.S. 
military, state, and local authorities began “Operation Wetback” to repatriate the 
majority of the illegal immigrants back to Mexico, or wherever else they came from 
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(Hernandez, 2010; Koestler, 2013). Astor (2009) argued that this operation was also an 
attempt to turn illegal immigration into a national security issue. Similar to the fears 
after September 2001 that terrorists could cross the border illegally, in the 1950’s 
Senator McCarthy, Senator McCarran, Senator Walter, and many others felt that 
Communist conspirators could get into the country too easily the same way. It was no 
surprise that “Operation Wetback” took place shortly after Congress in a bipartisan vote 
passed the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, despite President Truman’s attempt 
to veto the bill. By 1955 when funding ran out for the “Operation Wetback”, law 
enforcement and military forces of the U.S. government repatriated over one million 
people (Hernandez, 2010). The INS claimed that in some places such as El Paso and 
San Antonio, the government apprehended upwards of 80,000 aliens. However, due to 
the fear of arrest, more than 500,000 people migrated back to their home countries prior 
to the beginning of the operation. Supporters of the operation claimed that removing 
illegal workers benefited the health and economy of the U.S., and it was in the national 
security interest to protect the border. Those that opposed the operation felt there was 
too much xenophobia, and the operation was inhumane. 
The third problem with the Bracero program was that it created a two-tiered, 
class and gender discrimination system (Hernandez, 2007, 2010). Women who wanted 
to join husbands and/or families had to try to cross illegally. The traditionally accepted 
method of stopping migration was to beat up men, who generally gave up or tried to 
find other ways to get over the border. Hernandez (2007) described a different 
experience for women: 
When unsanctioned female and family migration increased during the Bracero 
era, Border Patrol officers struggled to devise methods of migration control to 
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address the new gender dynamics of unsanctioned migration. Officers reported 
feelings of shame and discomfort when attempting to arrest women and children 
and border communities actively opposed the “spectacle” of publicly subjecting 
women and children to police violence. (p. 12) 
 
In order to avoid too much attention, Hernandez (2010) described how the Border Patrol 
built “gendered” fences with the goal of forcing women to more remote and dangerous 
areas to try and cross, thus they would no longer be a political ‘spectacle’ for migration 
control. Anzaldúa (1987), Pettman (1996), and Spencer (2009) noted that gender 
violence was not unique to the Bracero program, but has continued as women find other 
ways to cross the border. Spencer (2009) clarified that the sexual harassment and 
violence of women is so extensive that women cannot travel alone with Coyotes 
(human smugglers). Some coyotes tried to be respectful by hiring women to protect the 
dignity of those traveling across the border. Anzaldúa (1987) concluded: 
The Mexican woman is especially at risk. Often the coyote (smuggler) doesn’t 
feed her for days or let her go to the bathroom. Often he rapes her or sells her 
into prostitution. She cannot call on county or state health or economic resources 
becaus4e she doesn’t know English and she fears deportation.  American 
employers are quick to take advantage of her helplessness. She can’t go home. 
She’s sold her house, her furniture, borrowed from friends in order to pay the 
coyote who charges her four or five thousand dollars to smuggle her to Chicago. 
She may work as a live-in maid for white, Chicano or Latino households for as 
little as $15 a week. (p. 12) 
 
Whether communicating about the consequences of the Bracero program, or the 
communication functions of the security fence, a useful semiotic analysis must 
recognize and create discourse about the historic and current gender oppression security 






Influence of Communism and Civil Rights (1949-1965) 
Shortly after World War II, the two major geopolitical players, the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R. began a Cold War that would last until the late 1980’s. The global political 
backdrop was the fight between the ideologies of Communism and Democracy. 
Countries around the world realigned their political systems between the competing 
geopolitical ideologies. As I noted in the South Africa chapter, the apartheid regime 
passed anti-Communist laws directly affecting Nelson Mandela and the political future 
of that country. In 1949, Mao Zedong was transforming China through the Red 
Knowledge he had gained from his Russian counterparts (Shih, 1972). The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed on August 4, 1949  in response to 
future European aggression, the Soviet uprising, and the Korean War in 1950 (NATO, 
2013). By 1961, the Berlin Wall divided a city, and symbolically divided the world for 
30 years.  
Immigration issues divided the Republican Congress and the Democrat 
President, Mr. Harry S. Truman. Democrats wanted to ban the 1921 quota system to 
gain support from international partners while the Republicans were concerned that 
Communism could spread its way into the states and threaten the American way of life 
(DOS Historians Office, 2013). In the 1950’s, Senator McCarthy gave his famous 
speeches and accusations that there were many Communists in government positions. In 
this political culture, Republican Senator Pat McCarran’s Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee investigated the former President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the sitting 
President Truman to identify any ties to Communism. Democrat Congressman Francis 
Walter was the Chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities. Senators 
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McCarran and Walter created the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA, 1952) 
that received bipartisan support despite a strongly endorsed veto by President Truman 
(Campi, 2004). The INA (1952) codified all previous immigration laws and made some 
significant new amendments. First, the INA lifted the ban on Asian immigrants. The 
second change increased the power of the government to deport individuals or entire 
communities if necessary to protect the country from the rise and spread of 
Communism. Astor (2009) explained that in 1953, “Operation Wetback” took place at 
least in part due to national security concerns about Communists possibly crossing the 
border illegally. The government in that operation repatriated over one million people. 
Although it was highly controversial, the INA (1952) became the new basis for 
immigration laws moving forward (Campi, 2004; Cox & Rodriguez, 2009; Herzog, 
2011; INA, 1952; Truman, 1952).  
President Truman’s veto letter to Congress underscored the essential arguments 
in opposition to the INA. Similar to the 1924 quota system, President Truman (1952) 
claimed, “the greatest vice….is that it discriminates deliberately and intentionally, 
against many peoples of the world” (¶ 18). The INA (1952) was an institutional wall of 
racism and sexism (Chin 1995-1996; Panunzio, 1927; Weil 2000-2001; Silber, 1996-
1997). As I have argued throughout this dissertation, walls come in many forms. Far too 
often, customs officers and physicians who had powerful authority created walls that 
made it difficult for immigrants to overcome. The officers had the sole discretion to 
deny entry to anyone based on factors such as mental or physical deformities or 
perceived immoral behaviors. President Truman (1952) reminded readers that the 
purpose of the 1924 law “was to cut down and virtually eliminate immigration to this 
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country from Southern and Eastern Europe….A theory [of assimilation] was invented to 
rationalize this object” (¶ 18). Truman argued that the heart of the legislation went 
against the ideals of equality found in the Declaration of Independence and that it 
should not receive institutional support.  
Beyond the most glaring trouble, President Truman (1952) identified several 
additional cracks in the INA (1952). Allowing Asians to enter the U.S. again did 
nothing to represent the serious problems many other races faced when trying to come 
to the country. Moreover, there were concerns that the law did not help thousands of 
refugees who were fleeing from Communism. Moreover, supporting the INA (1952) 
was a contradiction. President Truman explained that the U.S. could not support NATO 
while at the same time telling allies their citizens were not welcome in the states. 
Finally, President Truman (1952) argued that the INA (1952) was a Constitutional 
violation of the separation of powers because the bill gave Congress too many 
investigative powers over the Executive Branch and other government agencies. 
Senators McCarran and Walter argued that the investigative powers were necessary to 
fight Communist sympathizers (during the controversial cultural of McCarthyism across 
the country at the time) (Herzog, 2011). 
 
Immigration & Nationality Act of 1965 
President Lyndon B. Johnson (1966) introduced the new legislation standing in 
front of the Statue of Liberty. President Johnson (1966) stated, “This bill….is not a 
revolutionary bill. It does not affect the lives of millions. It will not reshape the 
structure of our daily lives, or really add importantly to either our wealth or our power” 
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(p. 1037). This statement was a terrible misjudgment as noted by most academic and 
public policy literature dealing with the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA, 1965). 
Banning the national quota system was a monumental step in breaking down one of the 
walls to immigration. Beyond the quota ban, the law provided new desperately needed 
emergency visas for refugees and prioritized the visa process. The law had three goals. 
First, bring skilled laborers into the country, second, unite families, and third, provide 
non-emergency refugees an opportunity to come into the states (CIS, 1995; Fortney, 
1970; Friedman, 1973; Kennedy, 1966; Ludden, 2006; Wolgin, 2011). 
Kennedy (1966) described the development of the INA (1965). Within the 
Kennedy family, immigration reform was a strong issue going back to their grandfather 
John Francis Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald had supported a bill to accept refugees from the 
Great Boer War (1898-1901). President John F. Kennedy gained a strong sense of 
appreciation for immigration and pushed for equality under the law. In some ways, the 
law was a reflection to the world that the 1964 Civil Rights Act to ban discrimination 
was not only of domestic importance, but that the U.S. was making a shift in how they 
viewed citizens of the world in the new age of globalization (CIS, 1995; Kennedy, 
1966; Wolgin, 2011) . Kennedy (1966) argued that the momentum to eliminate the 
quota system started when Democrats failed to stop the INA (1952) from passing. 
Kennedy (1966) stated, “the stubborn forces of radicalism and reaction were not easily 
overcome….” (p. 138). It took the Truman Commission and the work of both political 
parties and sides of Congress and the President to push forward a movement for change. 
Kennedy (1966) further complains, “hearings in the house were delayed considerably 
because the subcommittee chairman evidences little public interest in immigration 
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reform, and , in any case, was opposed to the formula recommended by the President” 
(p. 141). Even in the face of many obstacles, the act became law on October 3, 1965 
(Johnson, 1966). Kennedy (1966) concludes that those who supported the new 
legislation to eliminate racial discrimination for immigrants, “did so because they did 
not believe that individual character and capacity are functions of blood and 
ancestry….[and] they recognized the need to facilitate the reunion of families long 
separated by rigidities and strictures of the national-origins system” (p. 145). Kennedy 
and others were also encouraged about the prospects of bringing in new skilled labor, 
but those who opposed change were concerned there would be a huge influx of new 
immigrants, and for better or worse, they turned out to be correct.  
When the U.S. government broke down the quota wall, it communicated an 
economic message to students and skilled workers that America was open for business. 
The impact of this message was immediately apparent, particularly in the hard sciences, 
engineering, medical and dental career fields (Fortney, 1970; Friedman, 1973). Fortney 
(1970) found that in two years, scientists emigrating from Taiwan went from 47 in 1965 
to over 1300 in 1967. Likewise, there was a similar increase from India and the 
Philippines. Rates were about half that size across the countries of Africa, but still a 
significant increase after 1965. Fortney (1970) also found that the majority of students 
from developing countries who obtained degrees in engineering, the hard sciences, and 
in medicine tended to stay in the U.S. rather than return to their home country. In the 
case of Taiwan, Korea, India and Iran, the percentages were even higher. This was 
likely due to jobs not being available in students’ home countries. For example, Ph.D.’s 
in nuclear engineering had the highest chance of finding jobs in the West. Fortney also 
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found that the more education and training a person had, the more likely they were to 
stay here. Finally, Fortney (1970) noted that in 1966, one quarter of all students who 
studied medicine where immigrants from many areas of the world. This was a 40% 
increase from the previous year.  
The INA (1965) provided some positive benefits, but it also had consequences 
for other countries. Friedman (1973) explained that with the new incentives to 
immigrate to America, the law created a brain drain on developing countries desperately 
in need of keeping the few skilled workers they had. Friedman revealed that the 
percentage of highly skilled, specialized professional workers correlated closely with 
the gross national product of a nation. In addition, Friedman explained that the medical 
brain drain was quite drastic. In many countries, there was a ratio of one doctor to 5000 
patients, and that number continued to widen as more doctors immigrated to the US 
where the ratio is much lower, typically one doctor to 600 patients. Friedman (1973) 
concluded that many more foreign students were coming to the U.S., which was a 
benefit to the American economy, especially when they considered staying in the 
country permanently. The vast majority of immigrants that faced the change in policy 
felt it was a positive step to erase certain kinds of discrimination from U.S. laws. 
Removing the quota system was akin to removing a wall of racism that was a critical 
step for immigration reform.  
 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
After 21 years, Congress and President Reagan decided to tackle the issue of 
immigration reform again. They faced similar challenges as previous leaders including 
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how to decrease the backlog, how to help illegal immigrants without providing blanket 
amnesty, how to help the American economy, and how to appease the American people. 
These problems led to the creation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
(IRCA, 1986), also known as the amnesty act. In the political language of 2014, the 
IRCA (1986) would be similar to the Dream Act with fewer partisan political 
challenges. The IRCA (1986) contained 88 pages of legislative jumble that attempted to 
make sense of a complicated and incoherent immigration system. The main intention of 
the IRCA (1986) was to combine enforcement mechanisms with legalization processes 
to move immigration forward in a major way. There were three controversial pieces to 
the new legislation. For the first time, the IRCA (1986) sanctioned employers for hiring 
illegal workers, and provided some worker protection, especially against discrimination 
practices. The idea of the law was to streamline the hiring process as a means to reduce 
the backlog of immigration applications in the system. The second portion of the law 
was a message from Congress that all people were welcome to be in the U.S. whether 
they came here legally or not. The law offered amnesty to those who could prove 
through various requirements that they had been continuous residences since 1982. The 
third portion of the IRCA (1986) was a monumental and unprecedented increase in 
border enforcement that I discuss in a later section (Cooper & O’Neil, 2005; Hagan & 
Baker, 1993; Hernandez, 2010; North, 2010).  
The government advertised the employer sanction and enforcement sections as 
the most important part of the new law. The intent of the IRCA (1986) was to deter 
recent arrivals trying to find work. To the detriment of the law, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Services (INS) only received 10% of the allocated budget to enforce the 
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sanctions. Other funding was supposed to come from fees produced through legalization 
applications. The INS was vastly unprepared to enforce the employer sanctions or deal 
with the huge influx of legalization applications that quickly filled up their offices 
(Cooper & Oneil, 2005; Hagan & Baker, 1993). This was not surprising as backlogs 
plagued the INS since its inception. A backlog with millions of new legalization 
applications only compounded the previous problem. While some politicians blamed 
the INS and Border Patrol for failing to enforce regulations, in actuality the entire 
government was to blame because none of the agencies involved, nor did Congress or 
President Reagan plan for the unintended consequences resulting from the IRCA (1986) 
(Cooper & Oneil, 2005; Hagan & Baker, 1993). Three examples below demonstrate the 
larger problems with the IRCA (1986).  
First, the federal government assumed that local community organizations 
would act as the intermediary between the illegal population and INS officials with 
whom they were afraid to interact (Hagan and Baker, 1993). In participant observations 
and interviews with 79 participants that included federal officials, local religious and 
business leaders, and a Maya community, Hagan and Baker (1993) found that the 
majority of the population went straight to the INS. The perception was that the process 
was easy and the officials were relaxed about the regulations. When a few Maya men 
applied, everyone else wanted to wait and see what happened. When they saw how easy 
the process was, they communicated to their friends and word spread throughout the 
Maya social network quickly. The network included people talking at work, parents 
talking at kid’s soccer practices, and between homes that were mostly apartment 
complex neighbors (Hagan & Baker, 1993). The word spread faster through the social 
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network than any formal advertising that the federal government was conducting at the 
national media level at the time (Cooper & O’Neil, 2005).  
Second, scholars noted several reasons why INS officials were unsuccessful in 
acting on the new IRCA (1986) regulations. North (2010), who was himself a field 
officer in 1986, described that the majority of the frontline field officers had no 
immigration experience. Moreover, when field officers denied an application, regional 
offices in many cases still processed them anyway. In ethnographic research and 
interviews, Heyman (2000) found that federal law enforcement officials felt like their 
agencies wanted them to make impossible moral choices that had profound 
consequences for the people involved in the decision. Heyman described the intense 
struggle INS agents deal with every day when they make judgments on cases. For 
example, one interviewee was a second-generation Mexican American INS officer. The 
official stated that if he were in the same place as a hungry immigrant trying to cross the 
border, agents would have a difficult time catching him. Yet, this same officer continues 
to arrest immigrants in desperate situations. Another officer was fascinated with 
Mexican art and poetry all his life and took a job with INS to be near those things he 
enjoys, not necessarily to deal with the law enforcement implications of the job. In each 
case, Heyman (2000) discovered that officers felt conflicted about their responsibilities 
on the job. 
The third unintended consequence of the IRCA (1986) was when many 
immigrants applied for legalization not because they wanted long term residency or 
citizenship but rather, they perceived legalization as an investment and means of 
survival (Rivera-Batiz, 2000). This continued to perpetuate the larger misconception 
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that all illegal immigrants want to stay in the states. Scholars have continued to prove 
that this idea is demonstrably false. Hagan and Baker (1993) explained that migration 
was not a new phenomenon in the Maya community, nor is it new to many migratory 
cultures.  
 
Immigration Law in the 1990’s  
Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera (2013) indicated that more immigrants 
(legally or illegally) have come to the U.S. between 1990 and 2012 than any other 
period in American history. This increase happened with the IRCA (1986), and three 
new influential laws passed in the 1990’s: The Immigration Act of 1990 (Immigration 
Act, 1990), the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996. 
These policies continued to build on the IRCA (1986) by increasing economic 
cooperation and providing stronger enforcement mechanisms at the border to block 
illegal activities. I discuss the law enforcement mechanisms later in the dissertation.  
The Immigration Act (1990) was the most comprehensive reform in 50 years 
with three main goals: First, family reunification; second, helping refugees; third, more 
employment visas especially for skilled workers (Bush, 1990; Graham, 1991; 
Rosenblum & Brick, 2011). The Immigration Act (1990) was similar to the IRCA 
(1986) since it removed similar barriers to immigrants. The communicative function of 
the Immigration Act (1990) was to tell highly skilled workers, students, and their 
families to come to the states. Employment visas for skilled workers increased from 
56,000 to 140,000 per year, but that number included family members so there were 
187 
 
fewer actual workers than expected (Rebooting, 2011). The preferences included people 
with advanced degrees, exceptional abilities, skilled workers with bachelor’s degrees, 
and investors. The Immigration Act (1990) made the U.S. more competitive by 
receiving more tax from skilled workers (Lawson & Grin, 1992; Rosenblum & Brick, 
2011). The Immigration Act (1990) also removed political restrictions put in place by 
the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (Bush, 1990).  Moreover, the Immigration 
Act (1990) provided new protections and preferential treatment for underrepresented 
immigrant populations. For example, the government reserved 1000 visas for displaced 
Tibetan refugees from India and Nepal due to increasing violations of human rights in 
those countries (Lawson & Grin, 1992).  
 President George H. Bush (1990) argued that the temporary protected status 
section of the law was unconstitutional. Temporary status referred to amnesty for 
refugees fleeing war torn or otherwise violent countries. Anti-immigration advocates 
argued that the law created a new category for temporary residences that would now 
have an excuse to overstay their visas (Graham, 1991). Pro-immigration advocates felt 
that this section of the Immigration Act (1990) did not do enough to protect people. 
Hassan (1992) explained that there were some important benefits to being a temporary 
status refugee. These immigrants had the right to work legally in the states. They could 
travel. Most importantly, they could obtain legal status if they could prove that 
deportation would endanger them by returning to their country of origin. The law 
benefited over half a million displaced refugees from El Salvador, and Honduras due to 
civil war, flooding, and two earthquakes (Rosenblum & Brick, 2011).  
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Regardless of the high level of success, Martin (1991-1992) demonstrated 
several structural problems with the temporary status refugees’ clause. First, the 
provision offered protection on a limited basis meaning the government repatriated 
many refugees because the application process was not complete. Second, border 
officials with no judicial background or oversight made arbitrary decisions about who 
could be deported. Third, the provision defined a refugee very narrowly excluding the 
vast majority of undocumented immigrants. Even if immigrant refugees could make it 
to the states safely, they still faced impossible odds of achieving asylum status. 
According to the Department of Justice (DOJ, 2009), from 2005 to 2008 over 12,000 
Mexican asylum cases were filed but fewer than 120 people, or 1% of the applicants 
won their cases. Since 2008, cases for Mexican narco-refugees (persons fleeing from 
the drug related violence in Ciudad Juarez and elsewhere) have increased even more 
(Kan, 2011). The refugee status procedure is demoralizing to applicants who have no 
other means of escaping the violence in their country of origin (Garcia, 2011; Kan, 
2011). The border drug war has become so devastating that non-profit organizations 
such as the Annunciation House in El Paso started to petition for President Obama, the 
Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice to create a refugee 
status for people stuck in these conditions (Petition for Mexican Nationals, 2014). The 
U.S. government does not apply the refugee status equally, which makes the law even 
more difficult to comprehend. The Petition for Mexican Nationals (2014) described, 
“the United States received 5,879 asylum claims from Colombian nationals during this 
same time period [2006-20130 and granted political asylum to 2,351 individuals - 
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nearly 40% of all Colombian applicants” (¶ 4). Several sections of the Immigration Act 
(1990) clearly have structural deficiencies that Congress and the President could fix.  
Beyond the Immigration Act (1990), two other influential laws passed that did 
not help immigrants. These laws were the 1990’s were the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Welfare Act, 1996), and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (Illegal Immigration 
Reform, 1996). Unlike prior laws that increased privileges, these laws targeted and 
removed benefits. The federal government for the first time also transferred more power 
to states to control various aspects of immigration policies. The Welfare Act (1996) 
created a distinct line between citizens, non-citizens, and qualifying aliens. Moua, et al. 
(2002) explained that qualifying aliens included lawful permanent residents, refugees 
with asylum status, and various other categories. The law did not account for the larger 
population of undocumented immigrants. Under the government definition of non-
qualified persons, the law barred undocumented immigrants and others from receiving 
Medicaid or food stamps (Hagan, Rodriguez, Capps, & Kabiri, 2003). The fact that 
undocumented persons could not receive benefits is not new. Ruben Garcia is the 
Director of Annunciation House (A-House) in El Paso, TX, which is a nonprofit 
Catholic linked organization that has been supporting undocumented immigrants since 
1978. The A-House (2013) website explained:  
In the El Paso community [in 1978], there was an entire group of people who 
were unable to receive any of the social services that are ordinarily available to 
the poor. When referred to an agency, they would return to the house saying, 
They say they cannot help me because no tengo papeles, because I have no 
papers. There was no place where the undocumented could receive such basic 
services as food, shelter, clothing, and medical attention. In the El Paso 





When Hagen, et al. (2003) interviewed more than 500 participants throughout Texas 
including many local leaders, they found that the “Welfare Act” was the newest form of 
bureaucratic wall that negated health care to the poorest families living in the 
borderlands. Moua, et al. (2000) concluded that not helping undocumented immigrants 
with their health problems increased the health risks for everyone regardless of their 
alien or citizenship status.  
Shortly after the devastating effects of the Welfare Act hit, the much larger and 
harder hitting law came into effect known as the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (Illegal Immigration Reform, 1996). The first 
section of the law added more personnel and resources to increase border enforcement. 
More importantly however, the law built back up the walls that Congress had removed 
in 1986 and 1990. Scholars agree that the most distressing part of the law was its impact 
on legal immigration (Immigration Policy Center, 2011; Fragomen, Jr., 1997; Garcia, 
2011; Legomsky, 1997). Annunciation House Director, Ruben Garcia (2011) explained 
the crux of the 1996 law: If an immigrant stays 180 days “plus one” on their visa, they 
cannot reapply or return to the U.S. for three years. If an immigrant stays one day past 
the 365-day visa, the government delays their application for ten or more years. Finally, 
if an illegal immigrant is caught without documentation, is deported, returns to the U.S. 
and is caught a second time, they are permanently debarred from trying to legally come 
into the U.S. for life. Garcia (2011) stated that he had seen more than 10,000 people 
come into the U.S. since 1996 and not one of them was able to receive legal or other 
assistance to be compliant with the law. The Immigration Policy Center (2011) clarified 
that many people are already eligible to obtain residency but backlogs and waiting 
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periods make it extremely difficult to stay in the country without violating the law. 
Moreover, there are waivers available in extreme cases for people who could potentially 
explain why they violated the law by overstaying their visas.  
Time is the biggest challenge to the entire visa system. It can take an average of 
15 months to receive a first hearing with a US Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) official in an office like Ciudad Juarez (Garcia, 2011; Ruben Garcia, personal 
communication, November 9, 2013). Garcia (2011) explains that when USCIS denies 
the waivers and they often do for first time applicants, it can take up to two or more 
years to receive an appeals hearing. Backlogs and denials mean those families must be 
separated by the border fence potentially for years. More importantly, it means that 
many families must return to dangerous areas such as Ciudad Juarez where a drug and 
turf gang war continues to escalate. Stakeholders interested in helping undocumented 
immigrants conclude that the Illegal Immigration Reform Act (1996) formed a new 
structural punishment for immigrants seeking help (Garcia, 2011; Legomsky, 1997). 
This is particularly true for refugees seeking asylum. For many of them, not being 
granted asylum means they return to a situation of fear and a likelihood of torture and/or 
death. In order to break down the walls of immigration policy, the people it affects most 
must be stakeholders at the table.   
 
The Post 9/11 Security Ideology & Immigration Laws 
The 9/11 Commission (2004) described American culture prior to the terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001. The American public was 
decidedly ignorant about world events since the perception was that the U.S. was 
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relatively isolated from the rest of the world since World War II. It was as if we had an 
imaginary wall protecting Americans from dangerous terrorist acts. Two political 
ideologies came to dominate world politics after World War II: Capitalism and 
Communism. After the Cold War ended in 1989, the U.S. government had an identity 
crisis. Congress made unprecedented cuts in defense funding that had not happened 
since the 1950’s. In the 1990’s, American politicians and people disregarded 
globalization, concerning themselves almost entirely with the domestic economy and 
the technology boom. World events mostly ignored by the U.S. included the Bosnian 
and Rwandan Genocides; the Black-Hawk incident in Somalia; the bombing of the U.S. 
Embassy in Kenya; and the terrorist attack in 2000 on the Destroyer, U.S.S. Cole, 
docked in Yemen. Domestically, there were two major terrorist attacks including the 
first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and the terrorist bombing of the Alfred P. 
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995. These incidents 
did little to arouse concerns about any kind of terrorism (9/11 Commission, 2004).    
 On September 11, 2001, the death toll and physical damage to the Twin Towers, 
the Pentagon, and the diverted American Airlines flight in Pennsylvania were 
considerable (9/11 Commission, 2004; Kean & Hamilton, 2014). The U.S. had not lost 
so many people since the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Although there had been some 
physical damage, people could rebuild. The most catastrophic damage came in shaking 
the core of the American psyche. For more than 13 years, U.S. culture and government 
have had an identity crisis of global proportions. The terrorists suddenly forced the U.S. 
military, law enforcement communities, and the American people to face and combat a 
new enemy. The 9/11 Commission in 2004 and in 2014 argue that the terrorists were so 
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creative that they knocked America off its feet. Scholars, the media, and some 
government entities recognize that a new security ideology or culture formed to help 
citizens feel more secure against another imminent terrorism attack (9/11 Commission, 
2004; Ackleson, 2005; Adamson, 2006; Alvarez, 2012; Astor, 2009; Brown, 2010; 
Dunn, 2009; Gulasekaram, 2012; Hayden, 2013; Jones, 2012; Maril, 2004, 2011a, 
2011b; Nevins, 2002, 2006; Nguyen, 2006; Romero, 2008; Rosas, 2006b, 2007). 
Congress and President George W. Bush declared “War on Terror” by passing the 
Patriot Act and creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the third largest 
department created since World War Two (Andreas, 2003). DHS is comprised of 22 
federal agencies whose primary mission is to protect the U.S. against terrorism and 
other many other threats. The INS and Border Patrol were reorganized into three new 
agencies in charge of immigration under the DHS which included Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and U.S. 
Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) (9/11 Commission, 2004).  
The most obvious sign of a new security culture was the deployment of the 
National Guard at airports with automatic machine guns and police dogs. In addition, 
the Transportation Security Administration hired thousands of federal Marshals 
including covert air Marshals to protect planes in the skies. They also hired thousands 
of new airport screening personnel required to be U.S. citizens. Nguyen (2006) 
describes the catastrophic effect new rules had on immigrants:  
Out of twenty-eight thousand screeners nationwide, about ten thousand were 
immigrants….The following month, the government launched Operation 
Tarmac, a multiagency sweep of airports nationwide. The sweep resulted in the 
detention and deportation of more than one thousand undocumented airport 
workers— none of whom were ever shown to have links to terrorist-related 
activities. One of those caught up in Tarmac was Elvira Arrellano, who had 
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cleaned airplanes at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport for three years 
when federal agents raided her home in December 2002 and took her away in 
handcuffs. She now faced deportation and potential separation from her 
children, who are U.S. citizens. (p. XX) 
 
Furthermore, Jones (2012), Maril (2011a, 2011b) and Nevins (2002, 2006, 2012) argue  
that the security culture may be seen and felt along the border and at ports as the 
government continues to hire thousands of additional agents to join the fence line. 
Brown (2010) described the physical environment in Washington D.C. in the years 
immediately following the 9/11 attacks.  For more than three years, “Jersey” barriers 
were deployed around the Capitol building, the White House, and many other federal 
government sites. Many of those barriers still exist in 2014, especially in front of the 
White House and other federal buildings. These barriers are a visual reminder of the 
fear of another attack and that America is still in a state of emergency. In the new 
security culture, the 9/11 Commission (2004) identifies the enemy:  
Our enemy is twofold: al Qaeda, a stateless network of terrorists that struck us 
on 9/11; and a radical ideological movement in the Islamic world….which has 
spawned terrorist groups and violence across the globe. The first enemy is 
weakened, but continues to pose a grave threat. The second enemy is gathering 
and will menace Americans and American interests long after Osama bin Laden 
and his cohorts are killed or captured. (p. 363). 
 
The 9/11 Commission (2004) clarifies that the War on Terror was not against the 
religion of Islam, reminding everyone who lived in America to be respectful of all 
religions. However, the Commission plainly warns that the U.S. will not tolerate radical 
terrorism ideologies. The language the Commission used to justify war rhetoric 
throughout its report was another sign of the new security culture that would continue 
indefinitely. The 9/11 Commission (2004) rationalized, “calling this struggle a war 
accurately describes the use of American and allied armed forces to find and destroy 
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terrorist groups and their allies in the field….the language of war also evokes the 
mobilization for a national effort” (p. 363). These types of open-ended statements 
created the security culture that would be necessary for future government officials to 
continue justifying the need for the War on Terror.  
Vigilante groups have been a popular part of the discussion on border 
militarization. DeChaine (2009), a communication scholar, analyzed the rhetoric of one 
vigilante group that gained a national following after the 2001 attacks. Private citizens 
formed the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps (MCDC) around 2005 because they felt the 
federal government was not doing enough to secure the borders. The MCDC website 
mission is, “To secure United States borders and coastal boundaries against unlawful 
and unauthorized entry of all individuals, contraband, and foreign military” 
(Minutemanhq.com, 2013). The website has a continuing tally of illegal aliens entering 
the nation as well as a large selection of discriminatory rhetoric for public consumption. 
DeChaine (2009) summarizes how the MCDC communicates their message in two 
major ways. First, they are hyper-vigilant in using the media in all forms as well as 
knocking on doors, lobbying congress, and visiting college campuses to increase 
recruits. Second, they spread their message by implying that every “good” ‘patriotic” 
citizen should act to stop aliens from entering the country. This means helping build 
private fence lines and physically guarding the borders just as the federal government 
should be doing. DeChaine (2009) concludes, “[The MCDC] conception of the 
American citizen reveals a profoundly immoral discourse that excludes, racializes, and 
otherizes individuals and groups – a discourse all too readily conscripted for the cause 
of national unity in troubled times” (p. 61). Regrettably, many opinion polls still find 
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that the majority of Americans support some kind of action against illegal immigrants 
so the message of groups like the MCDC is still resonating in many corners of the 
country. 
For some scholars, businesses, and communities, eight years after 9/11, it felt 
like the security culture had gone away. Adkins, Thornton, and Blake (2009) found that 
the private sector was vastly unprepared to deal with a terrorism crisis. Alternatively, 
there was strong evidence in scholarly and industrial literature that the federal 
government was continuing to prepare for new disasters or terrorism attacks. Perhaps in 
some ways, the security culture seems less visible or people just stopped caring about 
terrorism as an issue in their daily lives. The fact is that the security ideology or culture 
has not gone away at all. On September 17, 2014, President Obama informed Congress 
that the U.S. is still under a national emergency caused by terrorist acts that occurred in 
September 2001 (Message to Congress, 2014). Former Republican Senator Thomas 
Kean and former Democrat House member Lee Hamilton chaired the original 9/11 
Commission in 2004. Kean and Hamilton (2014) exclaimed in the Reflections on the 
Tenth Anniversary of the 9/11 Commission Report, that, “the struggle against terrorism 
is far from over – rather has entered a new and dangerous phase” (p. 7). Kean and 
Hamilton pointed out two events in 2014 that illustrate the ongoing security culture and 
crisis in the states. These events included fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS), and the continuing efforts of al Qaeda to try attacking the U.S. homeland. 
FBI Director Comey (2013) stated that terrorism threats remain a top priority especially 
in light of the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings. Both the DHS and the FBI 2014 
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mission statements place border enforcement and the investigation of terrorists as 
primary goals (Core Missions, 2014; ‘What We Investigate, 2014).  
After the Security Fence Act passed in 2006, more and newer border walls 
became one of the most visible symbols of the ongoing security culture in the U.S. One 
of the hotly contested issues in the 2013 immigration reform congressional debates was 
whether to expand border enforcement that originally came from the 2006 law. 
Congressional leader’s votes communicated very clearly to their constituents that 
maintaining their job was more important that listening to the people (Brown, 2010; 
Gulasekaram, 2012; Luke, 2013). In an examination of the votes for and against the 
2006 Security Fence Act, Gulasekaram (2012) found that interior non-border states with 
low immigrant populations voted overwhelmingly in support of the wall. Politicians in 
non-border states were not accountable to constituents who did not live in the 
borderlands. Politicians in these states did not have to account for human rights abuses, 
social and cultural costs, or law enforcement problems that resulted from the fence 
building. In contrast, politicians had mixed votes in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and 
California. The majority of the Californian members in the House of Representatives 
voted against the Federal law in 2006. In the 2013 federal immigration debate, 
McLaughlin and Dinan (2013) found that 64 Senators have never visited the border, or 
refuse to discuss whether they have. 
Beyond the politicians rhetoric, many scholars across the social science 
disciplines remain concerned about the persistent security culture that manifests itself 
across the nation (Alvarez, 2012; Brown, 2010; Brunet-Jailly, 2012; Chavez 2012; 
Dunn, 2009; Garcia, 2011; Gulasekaram, 2012; Jones, 2012; Luke, 2013; Maril, 2011a, 
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2011b; Nevins, 2012). Chavez (2012) argues that the stronger the link between 
undocumented immigrants and terrorism becomes, the more incentive politicians, the 
media, and the public have to support increasing border patrol technologies and other 
forms of protection. Luke (2013) concludes that regardless of how politicians or 
scholars label it, the security culture is still a major part of life in the U.S. for a number 
of reasons. Luke claims, for example, that the defensive wall barriers do not stop 
immigrants from crossing the border. Still, politicians claim the walls are the only way 
to stop invading enemies; therefore, the government should support further wall 
building and border enforcement.  
 
The U.S. Mexico Security Fence 
In the USMX chapter, I reviewed the language of immigration. Then I discussed 
the history of immigration laws that help create a semiotic context for comprehending 
the security fence. In this section, I examine four components that make up the security 
wall with their associated communication functions. The four components are language, 
law enforcement, militarization, and virtual or smart fences.  
Since 1848, there has always been some form of fencing or walls across the 
USMX border. There was a great push in the 1990s to modernize border security by 
building larger fences and adding technology to make enforcement easier. The newest 
and most controversial wall came into existence with the passage of the Security Wall 
Act of 2006. Congress and President Bush made a huge geopolitical decision by signing 
the law that provided all the federal funding and support necessary for the DHS “to 
achieve and maintain control over international land and maritime borders of the United 
199 
 
States…. [preventing] all unlawful entries….by terrorists, other unlawful aliens, 
instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other contraband” (Security Fence Act, 2006, p. 
2). The main purpose of the law was to build a wall to secure the 1951 miles of the 
Mexican border, but it included provisions for more officers and smart border 
provisions. Despite all the rhetoric from politicians, federal contractors, government 
agencies, and the American people who supported the fence, by 2010 the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) using Boeing as the primary subcontractor, had only built 
700 miles of the busiest and most dangerous parts of the border. The first component 
communication component of the wall is language associated with it.  
 
The Language of the Fence  
Previously in two sections I argue that language is central to understanding more 
complex communication structures, and language is arbitrary without context (Berger, 
2011; Brown, 2010; Kramer, 1997; Levi-Strauss, 1958/1963; Noth, 1985/1990). The 
word fence is arbitrary but in the context of American immigration discourse, it 
becomes something entirely different, something worth fighting over. Table 13 reveals 
some of the binary opposition terms that cause conflict when communicating about the 
physical characteristics of the USMX border. 
Table 13 - Binary Opposition Terms on Physical Fence Characteristics  
Fence, wall, barrier Open 
Separate Connected 
Natural Barrier Human made barrier 
 
Kramer (1997) explains that “what Peter says about Paul tells me very much about 
Peter” (p. 185). In relation to the security fence, this means that how organizations or 
200 
 
individuals reference the fence communicates a great deal of information about that 
organization or individual. Two examples demonstrate how dissimilar the 
interpretations are. Ruben Garcia, Director of Annunciation House in El Paso, TX, 
supports Kramer’s argument with his interpretation:  
There is no question that the wall says something in and of itself.  And it 
depends on which side of the issue you are on as to what you think it 
says…..[The wall] is so connected to the poor – that wall is almost like a denial 
of the humanity of the poor. I am not even going to recognize that you are a 
human being. This wall says that. (In Jones, 2012, p. 5)  
 
In stark contrast to Garcia’s view, Maril (2011a) finds that the DHS arbitrarily refers to 
it as a fence. Maril (2011a) explains, “If DHS and CBP….call this construction a border 
fence, then that connotes to those who have not actually seen it a meaning and 
definition that is, for all practical purposes, totally deceptive” (p. 216). The Oxford 
Online Dictionary (2013) defines a fence as “a barrier, railing, or other upright 
structure, typically of wood or wire, enclosing an area of ground to mark a boundary, 
control access, or prevent escape” (p. 1). An Internet search of a typical fence reveals 
images of a wood fence you might build in the yard, or a chain link fence to keep 
children inside the schoolyard and off the street. Sometimes people imagine Robert 
Frost’s version of neighbors and old stone fences. Jones (2012) argues that a fence, 
“sounds more temporary and permeable….[while the] wall, on the other hand, has the 
connotation of being much more permanent and solid with the strong sense that it 
blocks movement as well as vision” (p. 11). Maril (2011a) and Jones (2012) conclude 
that the language regarding the fence or wall or barrier has political and social 
consequences. Maril (2011a) claims, “These new sections of the border fence are not 
fence in any sense of the word as commonly understood or meant. Already before 
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completion, these constructions are nothing more or less than imposing and massive 
border walls” (p. 216).  
Other scholars and media personnel provide many examples in their research 
and on the Internet of more accurate images of the DHS fence (Gulasekaram, 2012; 
Dunn, 2009; Jones, 2012; Maril, 2011). Drehle (2008), for example, reveals that the 
DHS fence “is a hodgepodge of designs. The best--sections of tall, concrete-filled steel 
poles deeply rooted, closely spaced and solidly linked at the top—are bluntly functional. 
The worst--rusting, graffiti-covered, Vietnam-era surplus--are just skivvy walls of 
welded junk” (p. 29). The DHS language about the border fence has faced battles in 
cities and courts throughout the Southwest since the project began. In 2007, DHS 
wanted to build their version of a physical barrier at the University of Texas at 
Brownville and Texas Southmost College (UTB/TSC) that sits along the shores of the 
Rio Grande River. The wall barriers would carve up the campus in the name of national 
security. University President Dr. Juliet Garcia and the Board of Regents fought the 
DHS in court for over a year and finally agreed to build an alternative fence resembling 
something more traditional as opposed to the awkward and ugly DHS barriers 
(UTB/TSC, 2008; Maril, 2011).  
 
Law Enforcement as a Communicative Function of the Wall  
Law enforcement officials (LEO is the abbreviation used in the U.S. Intelligence 
Community) who work locally, statewide, and across the nation are as much a 
characteristic of the border wall as any other artifact associated with it. Indeed, LEO 
participated historically in a number of important roles that helped craft the border wall 
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into what it is today. As of 2014, the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials 
who work along the border are a high profile communicative function of the fence line. 
Starting in 1849, a border commission built 52 tall obelisks to demarcate a physical 
borderline. Due to population growth and expansion, the commission built more 
obelisks that brought the total to 258 by 1894 (Anderson & Gerber, 2007; CPB, 2010b). 
The pictures below are Monument One on the right, the first of the obelisks, and in the 
picture on the left there are several smaller markers next to the Rio Grande River that 
are situated west of El Paso, TX.  
      
The Treasury Department formed the Office of the Superintendent of Immigration in 
1891, and then became the Bureau of Immigration in 1895. This office was responsible 
for all immigration activity across 8000 miles of the Canada and Mexico borders. In 
1903, the duties of the Bureau of Immigration moved under the Department of Labor as 
immigration played a role in economic affairs more so than in tax and treasury concerns 
(CBP, 2013b). Southwest Texas Rangers such as Jeff Milton and others who lived 
around El Paso and other border areas became the first immigration officers throughout 
the 1880’s (CBP, 2013a; Hernandez, 2010). The CBP website shows a photo of Milton 
203 
 
and other officers in 1887with the photo belonging to the University of Oklahoma 
Library Archives (Archives of the Texas Rangers are available at the University of 
Oklahoma Libraries, Western History Collection, Noah H. Rose Collection).  
In 1924, the Border Patrol became an official federal government agency in the 
Department of Labor. At the time there were 255 total employees including 
administrators and staff to support field agents. The government added 400 agents 
although there were debates over whether or not that would be enough to enforce the 
laws (Ettinger, 2009). In 1940, CBP (2013a) transferred from the Department of Labor 
to the Department of Justice (DOJ). CBP remained in the DOJ until 2003 when they 
moved over to the newly created DHS. During World War II, the government added 
800 agents and support staff to CBP. The officers acted in various roles including 
guarding aliens in detention camps, increasing border surveillance for Axis saboteurs, 
protecting diplomats, and significantly increasing aircraft surveillance use (CBP, 
2013b). 
 
Deterrence & Walls Ideology Failures 
Long before the 1920’s, immigration officers knew better than anyone that it 
was impossible to seal off the entire border. Maril (2011a) explains that deterrence 
became, “the fundamental rationalization for the work engaged in by all CBP agents 
patrolling the line” (p. 91). Deterrence became an ideological framework with which to 
view all immigration, drug, and terrorism related activities at the border (Dunn, 2009; 
Maril, 2011a; Nevins, 2002). There are three main ideas that explain deterrence theory. 
First, if criminals perceive a punishment is greater and will happen faster than the 
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benefit they receive, then they are less likely to commit the crime. Second, the speed of 
the punishment is more important than severity. Third, regardless of motive, the theory 
suggests that all potential illegal border crossers will think rationally about their 
decision. A rational person will decide not to make the trip (Maril, 2011). Deterrence 
theory has never proven to be a useful means of explaining criminal behavior. The 
theory tends to be overly simplistic by not accounting for huge diversity of motives for 
individuals and their willingness to obtain their goals. For example, Maril (2011a) 
argues that deterrence may keep some people away from crossing the border to get jobs. 
However, it is unlikely a wall deters a terrorist who is clearly committed to their cause 
to the point they kill and die for them. Deterrence policies lead to unintended 
consequences. I have noted elsewhere that deterrence led to border militarization. 
Deterrence strategies forced Coyotes (human smugglers) to increase prices and change 
their border crossing strategies (Sheridan, 2009; Spencer, 2009). Deterrence strategies 
forced immigrants to make much more dangerous trips over difficult geographic terrain 
usually with a lack of food, water, or shelter (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2004; Maril, 2004, 
2011a, 2011b; Sheridan, 2009; Spencer, 2009). Although deterrence fails, policy 
makers have used it for over 100 years as a justification for many border related issues. 
Panunzio (1921, 1926) commented:  
In each successive annual report the Commissioner General of Immigration 
suggests the need of increased appropriations in order to strengthen the present 
cordon and build new lines of defense.  There are others, however, who consider 
this not a true solution. They believe that it is not a matter of holding a 
Thermopylae pass against a small organized army, but rather the guarding of  
nine-thousand miles of border against individual particles of human dust blown 
toward America by the urge of life itself. The United States Secretary of Labor 
is reported to have said that "If we had the Army on the Canadian border and on 
the Mexican border, we couldn't stop them; if we had the Navy on the water-
front, we couldn't stop them." In fact not even a Chinese wall, nine thousand 
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miles in length and built over rivers and deserts on mountains and along the 
seashores, would seem to promise a permanent solution. (p. 282) 
 
Notwithstanding the obvious dangers and inhumanity in the deterrence policies, fences 
of many lengths, sizes, and materials still rise on the border (Compton, 1948; Martinez, 
2008). In 1925, the government proposed two fences near El Paso, one that would be 
electrified and another that would be 18 feet high, 30 miles long, and cost $33,000 to 
complete ($437,000 in 2013). The communicative function of the barriers was to 
dissuade narcotic smugglers, rumrunners, and aliens from illegal entry. Observation 
towers came up in 1937 (Aguilar, 2010; LA Times, 1925; McGreal, 2011; Washington 
Post, 1925).  
 Rene Mascarenas Miranda was the mayor of Ciudad Juarez, Mexico in the 
1950’s when the towers were very visible and the barriers were a danger to people and 
an eyesore on his city. Martinez (1976) asked Miranda whether he had heard rumors in 
1951 that El Paso planned to build more barriers, and did that bother him. Miranda’s 
response not only communicated his personal feelings about the 1951 rumors, but in a 
broad way, his message communicates the perception millions of immigrants have 
about the USMX border wall. According to Martinez (1976), Miranda said:  
 “En E1 Paso 51.' ha hecho una proposition de que SI.' construya un cerco 
grande del otro lade para tratar de detener a esa gente, para que no cruce . Que  
Ud. de esc?” (p. 287).  
 
English Translation: “I don't like the idea of fences. We don't live between East 
and West Germany. The Communist Wall that is there is a slap in the face to 
any nation that boasts of being democratic. We want greater fluidity and 
communication between us. We don't want barriers; we don't want barbed wire 
fences. We brag that we are two neighborly countries, two friendly nations, and 
that this is the longest border in the world where one does not see a single 
soldier, a single rifle, a single bayonet, or a single affronting or discriminatory 




Miranda also expressed his dislike for the observation towers that were highly visible 
when he visited with U.S. Ambassador Hill in 1958 (See Martinez, 1976, p. 287-292 for 
complete Spanish language transcript). Both the ambassador and Mayor Miranda agreed 
that the towers and fence were an insult to Mexico, and shortly thereafter, President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered that the towers be removed (Anderson & Gerber, 2007; 
Martinez, 1976, 2011).  
 The incident in El Paso did not stop construction or call for more fences and 
barriers. In 1955, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution for 696 miles of fencing to enforce 
the quarantine of animal and plant diseases (Chicago Daily Tribune, 1955). The 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) announced the same year that it would 
replace four miles in San Diego that would be 14 feet tall and cost over $150,000 ($1.2 
million in 2013) (LA Times, 1955). Martinez (2008) laments that journalists did not 
keep records or follow up on the fence building, so it is hard to know whether the 
projects were finished and if they were, whether they worked for the purpose for which 
they were built. Amidst increasing concerns about illegal aliens in the late 1970’s, the 
INS requested funding to build and repair major fence lines in El Paso, TX, and San 
Ysidro, CA. The holes in the old barriers were big enough for cars to drive through, and 
the INS wanted to force immigrants to cross the border outside of urban areas in order 
to increase detection. The new 12 mile project was labeled The Tortilla Curtain in the 
media due to exaggerated claims that spikes could cut off toes and fingers of anyone 
who tried to climb it (Karaim, 2008; Martinez, 2008). By 1980, because President 
Jimmy Carter cut back on the original proposal, the Tortilla Curtain failed. Section 
Chief Cameron of the CBP also noted that there was no funding for maintenance and 
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updating of the fence, and within the first 30 days of building, travelers illegally 
crossing the border already punched new holes through it (Lodi News Sentinel, 1980). 
Many borderlands scholars view the Tortilla Curtain as the catalyst for further funding 
and support from the federal government in the 1970’s through the 2006 Security Fence 
Act (Anderson & Gerber, 2007; Chacon & Davis, 2006; Dunn, 2009; Karaim 2008; 
Martinez, 2008; Martinez & Hardwick, 2009).  
 
Militarization of the Wall 
Legally, according to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (PCA, 1878), the federal 
government may not use military intervention in domestic affairs, but the law has not 
deterred misinterpretations or abuse of the law (Brinkerhoff, 2002; Mason, 2013). 
Brinkerhoff (2002) claims that technically the law only applies to the Army and Air 
Force, although the Department of Defense has consistently held that the Navy and the 
Marine Corp should act in a similar manner. Brinkerhoff further clarifies that the law 
does not apply to the Coast Guard due to their being a civilian agency and a part of the 
Armed Forces. Nor does the law apply to the use of the National Guard, any state 
guards, the Military Police, or civilian employees of the government. Furthermore, the 
law does not exclude the President from quailing riots or civil disorder (Brinkerhoff, 
2002).  
The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 is important to this dissertation since it led the 
government to justify militarizing the border (Mason, 2013). Mason (2013) 
demonstrates that the government used this law to intervene in the drug war in the 
1990s and after the 2001 terrorist attacks, President Bush and President Obama have 
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both used the law to enforce immigration laws at the border. Levario (2012) describes 
that in 1997 during a U.S. Marines anti-drug operation in Texas, the Marines killed an 
innocent, eighteen year old, Esequiel Hernanzdez Jr. who was mistaken for a drug 
smuggler. Mason (2013) states that from 2006 to 2008, President Bush sent 6000 
National Guard troops to the southern border to help CBP with engineering, aviation 
help (unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), helicopters, surveillance planes etc.), entry I.D. 
teams, and other types of technical, logistical, and administrative support. Mason (2013) 
explains that in 2010, President Obama used a similar interpretation of the law to send 
National Guard troops to support law enforcement in securing the border. Mason (2013) 
also claims that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and CBP have made 
other requests where it was determined military force was necessary, such as in 
counterterrorism operations, drug war incidents, or stopping undocumented immigrants 
from crossing the border. Due to the way the government interprets the law, scholars 
across the discipline of Borderland Studies claim that militarization along the border 
was inevitable (Anderson & Gerber, 2007; Andreas, 2003; Brunet-Jailly, 2012; Brunet-
Jailly & Dupeyron, 2007; BAC, 2012; Coleman, 2007; Dunn, 2009; Durazo, 2013; 
Jones, 2012; Luke, 2013;  Maril, 2004, 2011a, 2011b; Nevins, 2002, 2006, 2012; 
Spencer, 2009).  
 The most important bill that communicates the U.S. government was serious 
about building security fences at the border was the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (1986), 
signed by President Reagan to fight the War on Drugs (CBP, 2011). The law primarily 
contributed funding for drug interdiction, but a side effect was an early attempt to 
militarize the border. The INS received 25 million dollars to build three command 
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centers that supported control, communication, and surveillance of the borders (Anti-
Drug, 1986). In addition, several military units from the Coast Guard, Navy, and Air 
Force increased cooperation on drug interdiction campaigns. The Ant-Drug Act (1986) 
supplied the INS with eight Blackhawk helicopters to help monitor the drug flow. The 
combination of the Anti-Drug Act (1986) and the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(1986) communicate a powerful message from the U.S. government: militarization of 
borders is a standard operating procedure (Ackleson, 2005; Anderson & Gerber, 2007; 
Andreas, 2003; BAC, 2012; Chavez, 2012; Coleman, 2007; Dunn, 2009; Durazo, 2013; 
Figueuroa, 2013; Hayden, 2013; Hondagneu-Sotelo, Guadinez, Lara, & Ortiz, 2004; 
Jones, 2012;  Maril, 2011; Nevins, 2002, 2006).  
Dunn (2009) describes another huge step that increased border militarization. 
Dunn (2009) explained that in 1993, Chief of the El Paso Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) sector, Silvestre Reyes, formed a new program called Operation 
Blockade or Operation Hold the Line. The goal of Operation Blockade was to deter 
illegal crossing in urban El Paso by building barriers across the middle of the city. 
According to Ackleson (2005), Dunn (2009), and Maril (2011a), Reyes placed 450 
federal agents in highly visible locations such as on top of the levees and canals, as well 
as other banks on the Rio Grande River. The agents monitored the fence line 24 hours a 
day, seven days a week in lighted trucks and other forms to ensure their presence would 
be widely noticed. Beyond the wall of agents that blocked the border, Reyes received 
permission from the INS to build a fence west of the city including 14 miles of new 
fencing. The fence was steel mesh, 10 feet high, 1.3 miles long, and was thicker and 
larger than the original proposal. Dunn (2009) claims that the government constructed 
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the fence in a way that could make it easier to turn into a larger wall later on. The 
fencing included an extensive network of underground seismic and magnetic sensors 
that rarely were successful in tracking down criminals or immigrants crossing the 
border illegally (Maril, 2011).  
One communicative function of the El Paso wall was that it created public 
discussion Dunn (2009) describes as unusual. Typically, the government does little 
consulting with local groups prior to building what they deem to be essential to border 
security. Dunn found in 1993 that some people in El Paso (businesses, churches, civic 
organizations, the city government, and other stakeholders) did not want a fence that 
they considered a Berlin Wall with their neighbors. The people who opposed the fence 
argued that it would send the wrong, contradictory message to Mexico, especially in 
light of the fact that Congress had just passed the North American Free Trade Act 
(NAFTA). Furthermore, people who opposed the wall argued that it illustrated a lack of 
compassion for human life, and instead of a wall, the CBP should open a new port of 
entry. Ironically, Vila (1999) notes that 90% of the population supported Operation 
Blockade, with almost 70% of that group having origins in Mexico within the last 20 
years. Vila explains that Mexican American residents blame new undocumented 
immigrants for all of El Paso’s problems.  
In order to win the opposition, and increase those in favor of the operation, 
Chief Reyes and the CBP changed their rhetoric about the fence (Dunn, 2009). Instead 
of calling it an immigration prevention program, the CBP began to reframe the debate 
to suggest that the fence was a way to prevent crime. Throughout the debate, the 
opposition agreed with Reyes that crime prevention was a positive goal, especially 
211 
 
where the fence passed by the railroads. Chief Reyes also made a plea that being in 
Border Patrol was a dangerous job and the fence could help the safety of agents. Dunn 
(2009) explained that media help, Reyes and the CBP effectively changed their rhetoric 
to gain public support of the fence. Moreover, Dunn (2009) emphasized that CBP 
increased their credibility by actually consulting with local stakeholders. 
Chavez (2012) argues that the CBP used the El Paso operation to communicate 
that deterrence was effective and should continue. CBP (1994) communicated this 
message in the 1994 Border Patrol National Strategy Guide and Beyond emphasizing, 
“El Paso’s [prevention through deterrence] strategy has been successful….The national 
strategy builds on El Paso’s success through an infusion of permanent resources 
designed….[to] extend it throughout the sector” (p. 7). Congressional leaders and 
President Clinton agreed that the CBP strategy was successful so the CBP received 
more funding and resources. Between 1993 and 2001, 5000 new officers and 1500 new 
support staff were hired. The CBP budget increased by 3.5 billion dollars, and the 
government increased the use of military force to support the deterrence strategy 
(Ackleson, 2005; Fragomen, Jr., 1997; Hondagneu-Sotelo, et al., 2004; Legomsky, 
1997; Rivera-Batiz, 2000).  
Nevins (2002) explains that following the great success in El Paso, the San 
Diego sector commenced Operation Gatekeeper in 1994. The INS built the San Diego 
fence using brown steel landing mats the government used during the Vietnam War, so 
the fence was nicknamed landing mat fence. CBP received the landing mats free and 
used them on 60-80 miles of border wall prior to 2006, mostly to deter vehicle passage 
(Ehrman, 2007; Karaim, 2008, Nunez-Neto & Vina, 2006; Nunez-Neto & Garcia, 
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2009). San Diego also employed the Sandia Secondary Fence that was a much stronger, 
intimidating, and extremely expensive wall. Sandia is actually two fences with an 
access road in the middle for law enforcement surveillance (Nevins, 2002; Nunez-Neto 
& Vina, 2006; Nunez-Neto & Garcia, 2009). The government built overhanging angles 
on the ten-foot tall fences to discourage climbers Nunez-Neto and Vina (2006) 
described that Sandia cost around $900,000 per mile to build and $8000 per month, per 
mile, to maintain. Finally, the government would need to replace the Sandia fence every 
fifth year or sooner due to the fence receiving so much damage. Since 2006, the 
estimates for the Sandia fence increased to over a million dollars or more per mile to 
construct and maintain. 
The San Diego sector also built and maintained a unique barrier. Ehrman (2007) 
illustrates, “At the Pacific Ocean….a steel I-beam barrier divides Imperial Beach, 
California, from Playas de Tijuana, Mexico, the last section of barrier lacks a top 
supporting beam. Some of its stakes….have rotted out completely or been removed” (p. 
55). Pictures in the media show friends passing items between the beams, and families 
hugging. The I-beam fence is another communicative function suggesting that the 
border is not just a line on a map, but a very real tangible line the U.S. government 
believes “the other” should not try to cross illegally. Anderson and Gerber (2007) 
highlight another example of the burden of new walls in the San Diego sector, 
especially after 9/11. Anderson and Gerber (2007) describe how interconnected the 
cities of Jacumba, California and Jacume, Baja California have been historically 
because of cross border family relationships, other social connections and economic 
ties. Even after DHS built barriers in San Diego in the 1990s, people crossed with 
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relative ease, and CBP officers looked the other way as they saw no danger in what 
people were doing. Anderson and Gerber (2007) explain the consequences of post 9/11 
federal policies:  
No one was allowed to cross, even though Border Patrol agents personally knew 
many of the locals. To get to the other side, residents now must drive an hour 
west to the nearest official crossing in Tecate, wait in line, then drive east. Some 
of the residents of Jacume, Mexico, are U.S. citizens with jobs in and around 
Jacumba who choose to live in Jacume for a variety of reasons, including living 
costs and ties to their extended families. The commute to work is no longer a 
few minutes but has become hours in each direction….The store in Jacumba lost 
about 40 percent of its customers, and families and friends are no longer able to 
visit and socialize as they used to do regularly. (p. 58) 
 
The militarization embedded in the U.S. after 9/11 fundamentally altered 
communication in both countries. The physical barriers are simply an outward symbol 
of that communication.  
Regardless of the mounting evidence that wall building does nothing to deter, 
the U.S. government disregards that message. The national strategy guides for the CBP 
in 2004 and 2012 communicates that the 1994 El Paso deterrence strategy was highly 
successful. The government continues to show great interest in the deterrence strategy 
as illustrated by the huge increases in funding for such programs. The CBP and 
Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) operating budgets increased from nine billion 
dollars in 2005 to 17 billion dollars in 2013 (Immigration Policy Center, 2013). From 
2006-2008, President Bush sent 6000 National Guard troops to the southern border to 
help CBP with engineering, aviation help (unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), 
helicopters, surveillance planes etc.), entry I.D. teams, and other types of technical, 
logistical, and administrative support. From 2010-2011, President Obama sent 1200 
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National Guard troops again to the border with the primary mission to deter drugs and 
provide intelligence to CBP (Mason, 2013).  
The largest strategy change for the CBP to combat threats is from a resource-
based approach in 2004 to a more risk based approach in 2012. With more than 700 
miles of physical infrastructure completed, resources shifted to more intelligence driven 
priorities (Jones, 2012). The 2012 guide also suggests that the CBP is increasing 
international cooperation with Canada and Mexico, but at times, it is difficult due to the 
three countries policies on immigration. For example, the Mexican Constitution 
guarantees the right of citizens to migrate freely disregarding the U.S. concept that 
immigrants are illegal entities. Furthermore, the Mexican government repeatedly argues 
that they are concerned for their people, so when Mexican immigrants die in the 
borderlands due to lack of U.S. concern, cooperation becomes more difficult (Escobar, 
Martin, Schatzer, & Martin, 2003; Meyers 2003). Even though some problems exist, the 
Mexican and U.S. governments have seen increased cooperation, especially in the use 
of UAV’s for intelligence gathering purposes. In 2009 when the battles between cartels 
in Ciudad Juarez intensified, President Obama helped President Calderon by increasing 
UAV flights in Mexican air space to collect intelligence on cartel targets (Priest, 2013).  
In November 2013, I visited the border wall to see and understand what it means 
to militarize the border. The message of border walls and border patrols is easy to see 
and hear. Anyone can even touch the fence and talk to people on the other side. In the 
photographs below, this section of fencing was built just west of El Paso, along the New 
Mexico state border by DHS in the to curtail some of the violence from Ciudad Juarez. 
Railroad cars pass this particular stretch about every half hour. This section of the wall 
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has high traffic that is apparent as several CBP trucks make regular stops, and CBP 
helicopters routinely fly over the same areas.. The photographs demonstrate that about 
every 200 yards there are tall posts with cameras that maintain a 360-degree view. 
There is sand on the U.S. side of the fence so that when anyone jumps over, they leave 
footprints. CBP officials can identify and track where they have gone. The photographs 
also visualize mountains that act as natural barriers combined with the fences to deter 








Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System, the First Virtual Fence 
Beyond the wall line itself, in the 1990s CBP began employing advanced 
technology to produce a virtual wall, which many authors also refer to as smart borders. 
Haddal (2010) explains that the CBP uses a network of remote video surveillance 
systems that connect to an integrated computer assisted detection database. When I 
visited the El Paso border sector, on a close inspection at the fence line I observed 
highly technical cameras about 30 feet apart, lining the top of the fences. Haddal (2010) 
describes that there are many underground sensors as well. When working properly, 
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both systems trip an alarm and send a message to a communication center where CBP 
agents decide what to do with the signal (p.8). The complex system was rolled out in 
1997, and was ultimately labeled system the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence 
System (ISIS). In interviews with federal agents who are very familiar with the systems, 
Maril (2004, 2011a) finds that the technology is almost useless in helping officers 
enforce immigration laws. Maril (2004) describes the experience of seven-year veteran 
Border Patrol Agent Fernando Rodriguez. Agent Rodriguez says that anyone with a 
microchip and a little technical knowledge can hack CBP signals allowing for 
eavesdropping in CBP operational communication. Agent Rodriguez further complains 
that the underground sensors are worthless because “The sensors could not distinguish 
between a man carrying….marijuana….or a herd of grazing cattle….or farm workers, 
or whoever else might be there for whatever reason” (Maril, 2004, p. 30). Maril (2004) 
describes another experience from federal agent Noe Escondido. Typically, by the time 
the CBP gets the sensor signals at the command centers, if someone enters the country 
illegally, they are already gone before CBP gets there to do anything about it. Agent 
Escondido clarifies that some sensors are set up at least 10 miles from the 
communication centers so getting anywhere quickly is a problem.  
The ISIS project lasted roughly eight years, covered about four percent of the 
entire border with 13,000 sensors, doing little to deter illegal activities at the border 
(Koslowski, 2011). Koslowski (2011) found that only 11,000 sensors were operative in 
2000 and reported, “Many of the sensors proved difficult to maintain in a variety of 
weather conditions [and]….false alerts triggered by animals resulted in diverted and 
wasted patrol manpower” (p. 9). Maril (2011a) explains that the International 
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Microwave Corporation (IMC) received the federal contract of two million dollars on a 
“non-competitive” bid. Neither the IMC, nor the CBP management reviewed similar 
projects from the past to learn what they could do differently to make the ISIS system 
more effective. Companies do not have any strategic communication with experienced 
Border Patrol agents to understand where the walls could be more effective. Maril 
(2011a) also highlighted that the government faced an ethical dilemma in allowing 
Congressman’s Reyes son and daughter to work on the federal contract considering he 
was the person who lobbied for El Paso border issues in the first place. After firing two 
companies and spending over 200 million dollars, the government declared ISIS a 
failure.  
 
Strategic Border Initiative, the Second Virtual Fence 
In 2005 after DHS determined they would not or could not construct a virtual 
fence, they advertised a contract starting at two million dollars for a company to build 
the Strategic Border Initiative (SBI-Net) (Chavez, 2012). The General Accountability 
Office (GAO) defined SBI-Net as “fencing and vehicle barriers and other forms of 
tactical infrastructure and technology” (Stana & Hite, 2007, p. 1). Chavez (2012) 
suggested that even though political rhetoric linked to national security protection to the 
project, there were other subtle goals as well including stopping undocumented 
immigrants and protecting the environment. The first goal to curtail undocumented 
immigrants failed. Regarding environmental protection, Shellabarger et al. (2012) 
clarified, “increased traffic in remote regions has contributed to ecological degradation 
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of vulnerable ecosystems protected by federal parks, refuges, and forests through 
impacts of migrants and smugglers as well as border enforcement efforts” (p. 384).  
The five largest defense contractors in the national security industry, Lockheed 
Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, Ericsson, and Raytheon, all with numerous 
connections in Washington D.C. became the primary bidders to build the new virtual 
fence. Maril (2011a) explained that throughout the bidding process, the corporate teams 
were mostly concerned with profit margins from federal contracts because they 
typically last for years and produce a great deal of revenue for the managing companies. 
The fence and the virtual fence where never designed from the perspective of the people 
who would actually encounter the product such as CBP officials, or immigrants. Nor 
did the companies consider placing the fences in what CBP officials would consider a 
strategic way that could actually make them more effective in deterring illegal 
activities. In fact, when Maril (2011a) spoke with engineers and business people at 
Honeywell Technology Solutions prior to the fence going up, he found that none of the 
employees working on the fence project had ever been to the southern border. 
Furthermore, Maril noted that none of the new contracts accounted for the failures from 
the ISIS first smart border.  
DHS announced in 2006 that Boeing would be the primary “systems integrator” 
for the SBI virtual fence (Maril, 2011a, 2011b). Stana and Hite (2007) found that 
Boeing received a portion of the five billion dollar contract for sensors, communication 
systems, information technology, and command/control systems to make SBI Net 
operational by 2009. While this was an aggressive goal, Boeing assured DHS that it was 
possible. DHS indicated that a measurable goal was to secure 6000 miles of the U.S. 
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border, but the Government Accountability Office disagreed with the DHS assessment. 
Stana and Hite (2007) stated that the DHS goal was vague. It did not include any 
specific goals on how DHS or Boeing intended to complete the SBI Net project in less 
than two years. Sullivan (2008) noted that through 2008, Boeing had received over one 
billion dollars of government money but had made little progress in their goals. Stana 
(2009) found that Boeing moved the original completion date from 2009 to 2016. 
Boeing only managed to complete portions of the SBI Net in four of the nine Border 
Patrol Sectors including the El Paso, Tucson, and Yuma. DHS and Boeing still had no 
measurable goals to demonstrate the project was functioning correctly or that they could 
meet the purposed time-periods. Finally, Stana (2009) found that CBP agents had to use 
outdated existing technologies such as cameras on towers that had intermittent signal 
problems and minimal maintenance support. Early in 2011, DHS Director Napolitano 
canceled the Boeing contract due to unmet expectations. Instead, DHS and CBP would 
use the contract money on previously developed technologies like Unmanned Ariel 
Vehicles (UAV) to support the mission. Despite their failures, Boeing received contract 
money to maintain and repair antiquated technologies (Biesecker, 2011). Maril (2011b) 
indicated that agencies did not have to account for their expenditures and it was nearly 
impossible to narrow down how much money Boeing and DHS actually spent on 








ST Research Questions 
RQ 1: Which agents created the security social structural that made the fence possible?  
RQ 2: How can the duality of structure be visualized at a micro and macro level 
perspective, and what does the duality of structure reveal about the USMX Security 
Fence?  
RQ 1: Which agents created the security social structural that made the fence 
possible?  
 The answer to RQ 1 can be summed up with one agent and its power, mainly, 
the U.S. Government. Prior to developing this analysis, my list of possible agents with 
intentions included immigrants, drug cartels, the Mexican government, state and local 
governments and organizations, think tanks, activists, businesses, and private entities. 
There are many voices in discussions all of which who wield some form of power or 
another even if they cannot make large overarching changes. For example, the most 
affected agents in the immigration social structure are immigrants. They do not have the 
resources of a federal government, but they do have the power to communicate their 
message with their feet by continuing to cross both sides of the border regardless of 
where the government builds walls. Gulasekaram (2012) states, “Knowledge of 
potential death or even knowing a friend or relative who has died in an unlawful entry 
has not stopped other migrants from undertaking the journey” (p. 156). For some 
immigrants, the peril of violence and death is as high or higher in their home country 
than risking the dangerous journey. In Ciudad Juarez Cartel violence increased 
exponentially since 2008. Many refugee families find that their only safe option is to 
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flee to the border ports of entry or attempt illegal entry (Garcia, 2011; Ruben Garcia, 
personal communication, November 9, 2013, Jones, 2012; Maril, 2011a; Petition for 
Mexican Nationals, 2014).  
Even though there are many agents and diverse horizons, the U.S. government is 
the loudest voice wielding the most power in what happens in on the U.S. side of the 
borderlands. This is due in a large way to the legal framework that made the federal 
government responsible for national issues such as national security, border 
enforcement, the question of sovereignty, and immigration. In many cases, state 
governments or local communities tried to deal with immigration issues on their own 
but at times, DHS or other government entities minimize or overturn the work they 
complete.  
For the U.S., one of the sovereign’s most important functions is to create and/or 
appeal laws that in theory create equality for all people regardless of ethnic origin, or 
immigrant status. The federal government invokes national security concerns to ignore 
some laws so DHS can continue to build walls. Gulasekaram (2012) reveals, “the 
federal government….[is] literally moving mountains…. for a physical border barrier. 
Several state and private lands have been requisitioned….and the multiple….laws that 
would prevent such construction have been abrogated, pre-empted, and disregarded in 
the service of wall construction” (p. 152). This legal power is problematic when DHS 
circumvents all Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulatory standards (Maril, 
2004; Roig-Franzia, 2007). In 2007, the Mexican government filed a 209-page report 
with Congress complaining that the walls devastate Mexican lands and wildlife, but 
U.S. politicians ignore such protests (Roig-Franzia, 2007). In 2009, the Supreme Court 
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upheld the power of the sovereign to make waivers on legislation to protect national 
security interests. This included waiving international statutes with Mexico such as the 
1983 Conservation Agreement signed by President Reagan and Miguel de la Madrid 
that protected unique biodiversity systems (Jones, 2012, Roig-Franzia, 2007). In most 
cases, the DHS authority is unchallenged but at times local agents such as the UT-
Brownsville college lawsuit were successful in altering how the government social 
structure worked on the fence (UTB/TSC, 2008). Of this and similar court battles, Maril 
(2011a) describes, “Steamrolling their way to gain access to private property….DHS 
treated everyone the same, whether poor landowner with a small herd of goats, [a large 
ranch owner], the superintendent of public schools, or a public university” (p. 76). Maril 
further claims that the DHS one size fits all-legal strategy does not expect resistance, 
especially from federal district judges in certain circumstances.  
  Giddens (1984) clarifies that usually agents have some access to resources that 
may include a social network, or physical resources like money and infrastructure, and 
resources are necessary to reproduce social structures. The DHS as the most influential 
agent has unparalleled access to several notable resources such as the resources it’s sub 
agencies receive to do their jobs (CBP, ICE, USCIS). DHS also has access to private 
corporations through federal contract funding.  One of the fatal flaws of DHS is that 
they dismiss some of the most important resources that might help them communicate 
their needs in a way that could produce a reasonable settlement for all parties along the 
border. Maril (2004, 2011a, 2011b) claims that DHS rarely consults their own 
employees in the CBP or ICE offices, who have the most knowledge and experience 
dealing with borderland issues. If consulted, the officers of CBP and ICE are happy to 
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share their perspectives on what would be the most effective strategies to maintain 
border control. CBP officials explain that a fence is only a good idea if people are 
unfamiliar with the daily life and culture of the borderlands. What does it communicate 
about the DHS if they do not consult their own experts on the subject of the fence? It 
communicates, just like in the case of the politicians not visiting the border that the 
fence is much more about politics and symbolism than actually being of use as a 
physical deterrent. 
Jones (2012) is even more critical of how DHS uses resources to construct the 
fence suggesting, “The builders of these barriers also sought to define who belongs 
within the state by creating and reifying boundaries both on the ground and in people’s 
minds” (p. 3). Jones explains that the barriers support institutional discrimination in two 
ways. First, when the sovereign builds a fence, this object is a physical expression of 
power to protect whom they wanted to stay in the country, while at the same time 
having the power to keep out those they deemed unworthy to be here. Second, the idea 
of the fence almost unconsciously increases support for exclusionary practices of ‘the 
other’. In an overly simplistic way, those unfamiliar with the USMX borderlands see 
news pictures of the fence, hear about the drug cartel stories, and continue to perpetuate 
the flawed assumptions that the U.S. is being overrun by illegal immigrants who are a 
detriment to the country (Aguilar, 2011; Coleman, 2008; Flores, 2003; Jones, 2012; 
Laurence, 2010; Rivera-Batiz 2000). Since 9/11, fears are still very real, which provides 
a political justification to support a bigger fence and continue the cycle of exclusion of 
perceived threats deemed ‘the other’ (Brown, 2010; Dunn, 2009; Gulasekaram, 2012; 
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Hayden, 2013; Jones, 2012; Luke, 2013; Maril, 2004, 2011a, 2011b; Nevins, 2002, 
2006; Nguyen, 2006; Rosas 2006b, 2007). 
 There are numerous other agents with power. ST is decidedly more theoretical 
than practical, opening the possibilities to share many perspectives. Future academic 
work could apply ST to other government or external agents and examine how they 
used their power to influence the social structure. I have noted throughout the 
dissertation where borderlands scholars are already conducting this research. 
Communication scholars have an opportunity to contribute their knowledge and theories 
to borderlands research.  
 
RQ 2: How can the duality of structure be visualized at a micro and macro level and 
what does it reveal about the USMX Security Fence?  
 Researchers use the duality of structure in ST to identify agents, power, and 
choices in the micro and macro parts of the social structure. How do these different 
players in the social structure influence each other? What are the consequences of their 
interactions, or by not interacting together? Part of this project is finding ways to make 
ST practical or visually useful. Olufowote (2003) argues that Giddens provides 
theoretical concepts that are particularly useful in explaining communication concepts. 
However, Giddens and communication scholars have grappled with capturing all the 
complexities that ST has to offer. Following Olufowote’s (2003) suggestions for future 
research, during the analytical phase of the project, I created some visual charts to 
represent ST principles found in the social structures I studied. This project offers two 
ways to visualize the duality of structure where micro and macro level actions help 
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build and maintain the USMX border walls. Table 14 is one way to visualize the 
“dimensions of the duality of structure" (Giddens, 1984, p. 29) in the latest security 
minded social structure. Each dimension with its accompanying term represents some 
aspect of the security social structure. The arrows reveal agents communicating through 
many channels at the micro level. At the macro level, all of the dimensions together 
represent the larger security social structure that makes up a part of American culture. 
Too often, many agents in the social structure do not seem to see the social structure in 
which they take part. 
Table 14 – A Macro View of the Security Social Structure after 9/11 in America. 
 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a second way to represent the duality of 
structure. SNA provides a picture of many interpersonal and systemic lines of 
communication that create the security social structure in which we live. Figure 1 
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confirms that there are many stakeholders with varying motives. Future communication 
research could analyze the communicative functions of other stakeholders and their 
relationship with the USMX Security Fence. I created the visual network using 
UCINET SNA software (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002), and Netdraw (Borgatti, 
2002). Both programs are available at https://sites.google.com/site/ucinetsoftware/home 
(current as of January 12, 2014). The circle nodes denote agents, the square nodes 
signify affiliates with the agents, and the links between the nodes represent 
communication and some association with other agents in the network. The entire 
picture represents the security social structure we live in. Giddens (1984) argues that too 
often, we don’t not recognize the routine of the structure that may be right in front of us.  




There is an interesting juxtaposition happening between the Annunciation House 
(A-House) node and the Federal Law Enforcement (LEO) node in El Paso, Texas. 
Undocumented immigrants make up a large portion of the poorest people in the El Paso 
area. Since they do not have documents, civil agencies can and do deny them with the 
most basic services such as food, shelter, clothes, medical attention, and legal help (A-
House, 2013; Garcia 2011). A-House (2013) provides basic services to undocumented 
immigrants with a particular emphasis on refugees mostly fleeing from the violence in 
Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, or other countries including Guatemala, Honduras, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, and elsewhere. Dunn (2009) explained that between 1993 and 2002, there was 
a greatly strained relationship between Federal LEO and social services groups. The 
official government policy was to take great care when dealing with sensitive 
institutions such as church’s, social services, schools, and the like. Unfortunately, Dunn 
(2009) stated that some officers overlooked this policy in order to conduct raids and 
surveillance on some undocumented immigrants and the social services they used. This 
conflicting relationship came to a peak in 2003 when “A Border Patrol agent shot and 
killed an undocumented immigrant whom he and other agents had pursued from a local 
immigrant shelter and cornered in a confrontation that went horribly wrong” (Dunn, 
2009, p. 173). Dunn (2009) described:  
Nineteen-year-old Juan Patricio Peraza, an undocumented immigrant from 
Tijuana, took out the trash to a dumpster behind the building and was confronted 
by Border Patrol agents, from whom he fled. Very quickly additional agents 
arrived on the scene to assist….One agent shot Peraza, who agents claimed had 
first swung his pipe at them. A group of horrified shelter residents who 
witnessed the event from the roof of the shelter….claim Juan Patricio did no 




Following the death of Juan Patricio, thousands of protestors from organizations across 
El Paso worked with the local and federal LEO to make sure such an accident would not 
happen again (Dunn, 2009). Federal agents killed Juan just outside the A-House 
compound, only a few blocks from the El Paso border. Garcia, Director of A-House 
(2009) writes a commentary regarding the killing that sums up the wall of immigration 
policies that remain ineffective. Garcia (2009) states:  
In El Paso, Juan Patricio [Peraza Quijada] has become the symbol of everything 
that is wrong with present immigration policy, the great need for just and 
humane comprehensive immigration reform, and the terrible consequences of 
the current enforcement-only immigration policy used by the US Government. 
Over the past decade, it is a policy that has resulted in the deaths of thousands of 
immigrants who have died in deserts, drowned in rivers or automobile accidents, 
or, like Juan Patricio, been killed by Border Patrol Agents. It is a policy that has 
resulted in the division of families when the undocumented members of a family 
are detected, detained and deported, forcing one part of the family to live in the 
US and the other part in another country….It is a policy that now regularly uses 
criminal prosecution with its corresponding prison sentences to punish 
undocumented individuals caught living and working in the US….By 
commemorating Juan Patricio’s life and death, it is a way for a community to 
again state that this is not what immigrants deserve, that this is not acceptable 
immigration policy, and that deaths such as that of Juan Patricio contradict the 
core principles of justice and human rights to which the US aspires. (¶ 1-4) 
 
From 2003 to 2014, the A-House staff and other social service groups have reshaped 
their relationship with CBP and Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials. In 
fact, it is notable that CBP and ICE officials have referred undocumented immigrants to 
A-House to help them with basic needs rather than detain and deport them. Through 
open and cooperative communication channels, the relationship has become one of trust 
and help as opposed to past problems and violence (Aguilar, 2014; A-House, 2012, 
2014; Davydenko, 2013; Ruben Garcia, personal communication, November 9, 2013). 
This relationship has become essential in 2014 in order for federal agencies and local 
volunteer operations to find living space for more than 52,000 young immigrants who 
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started crossing the border in October 2013 to flee from the violence mostly in 
Honduras (A-House, 2014; Church Strives, 2014; Valdez, 2014). This is only one of 
many examples where local nodes are communicating with national nodes to resolve 
issues created by restrictive immigration laws and the USMX wall that exists to enforce 
them. 
Another node of interest is one discussed previously in this project. In 2007, 
DHS and the University of Texas at Brownville and Texas Southmost College 
(UTB/TSC) conflicted in court over how the USMX Security Fence would work on a 
college campus. President Garcia and the Board of Regents communicated in court the 
huge detrimental consequences the fence would cause on their campus. Even with a 
strained relationship, the two nodes found ways to cooperate on how the fence would be 
built (UTB/TSC, 2008; Maril, 2011). The network of the security social structure is 
very large. There are many ways to examine the duality of structure within the network.  
 
DAD Research Question 
RQ 1: What are the magic, mythic, and perspectival dimensions of the USMX 
Security Fence and how does that affect the communication about the security fence?  
As early as the 1500’s, Cortez introduced the xenophobic, white European 
hegemony that would come to dominate and subjugate the Aztec empire, and the people 
of Mesoamerica (Gebser, 1949/1985). Within 100 years, the colonists of New Spain 
annihilated the Aztec population of 1.5 million, and then proceeded to destroy over 95% 
of the indigenous Mexican people (Hamnett, 1999). Gebser (1949/1985) points to this 
massive extinction as an example of what has happened when magic and mental 
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consciousness structures collide. The USMX Security Fence represents magical, 
mythic, and perspectival consciousness structures that are comparable to South African 
apartheid history described in Chapter 5. American colonists long perceived that they 
had individual rights, the most important of which was property rights. The U.S. land 
expansion during the 1800’s was part of the “Manifest Destiny” ideology, so annexing 
Texas from Mexico appeared to be a natural way of things (Hernandez, 2010). In the 
perspectival consciousness where personal freedom and individualism play the 
paramount role, the practice of claiming land as a personal possession that could be 
owned and protected would be seem normal since it is a “natural” right of U.S. citizen 
in the Declaration of Independence.  
 
Magic Dimension and the Fence 
Part of the definition of magic is that the world is full, whole, alive, where 
everything connects to everything else, including animals, the earth, and humans who 
are all equal in the ever-present universe (Kramer, 1997 & 2013). A magical culture that 
is a collective, whole, complete, living universe would not build a fence causing a 
separation or imbalance of that universe. Magic people would not build a physical wall 
to block them from movement, especially on lands they deem to be holy and where they 
bury their ancestors, who become part of the land. Building a wall would offend nature 
that has a spirit also. Building a wall could up upset the balance of the universe.  
The O’odham Native American tribe is the most well-known example of a 
magic culture that the U.S. government severely interrupts with wall building across 
O’odham lands. Schlyer (2012) describes that the tribe resides between Arizona and the 
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Mexican state of Sonora. The O’odham oral histories suggest that this geographical area 
has been a sacred place for more than 6000 years. It was unthinkable that the two 
countries could separate the land, just as humans are not separate from their animal 
relatives. Schlyer (2012) explains that the O’odham people have a great respect for the 
circle of life; the Sonoran Desert has an influential role in their spiritual belief system. 
When the U.S. government annexed parts of Mexico in 1853, the new borders cut the 
O’odham Native American tribe in half on paper, but members of the tribe where still 
able to traverse each side of the border with minimal interruption. In the 1990’s, the 
U.S. government separated tribal members from their people and sacred lands 
(Hendricks, 2010; Morse, 2012; Weber, 2011). There were several consequences for the 
magical culture of the O’odham tribe. Hendricks (2010) records that traditional tribal 
members are concerned that the metal barriers, comparable to metal knives, are stabbing 
Mother Earth and won’t be removed. The metal fence permanently alters the balance of 
the universe causing chaos. Moreover, there are 11 burial sites dating back to the 12
th
 
century that the O’odham people had to remove and rebury. While the government was 
considerate in how they allowed the O’odham tribe to work with the burial sites, to 
traditional tribal members this is another offensive desecration of sacred ancient lands. 
In addition to religious desecration, walls physically block O’odham members 
from movements between the U.S. and Mexico. Morse (2012) describes that every 
October, tribal members conduct a pilgrimage from Arizona to Sonora for the festival of 
St. Francis, but each year the passage is more difficult with increasing border 
militarization and enforcement. Weber (2011) suggests that one reason for the 
difficulties is that the O’odham people do not identify themselves as U.S. or Mexican 
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citizens, or if they do, it is secondary to their O’odham American identity. O’odham 
activist Ofelia Rivas is the founder of the O’odham Voice against the Wall, an 
organization she started on behalf of the tribal elders. Rivas travels on both sides of the 
fence to conduct religious ceremonies and work with other tribal members. Rivas 
explains that the Nations elders “are concerned about how the vehicle barrier being 
constructed at the U.S.-Mexico border is cutting off traditional routes across the Nation 
and disrupting the traditional O’odham way of life” (Weber, 2011, p. 182). The clash 
between the O’odham people and government is an example of what Gebser 
(1949/1985) calls a deficient system. Kramer (1997, 2013) explains that one of the 
consequences of the modern culture is that deficient systems cannot sustain themselves. 
Within an efficient social system, there is cooperation and shared communication about 
what both sides in the argument want. The magical culture has an equal voice at the 
table. The fence, if built at all, would be vastly different from what we have now in the 
current deficient system. 
The O’odham are not the only people fighting for their lands and the magical 
culture they have lived in for thousands of years. Schlyer (2012) also relates the story of 
Eloisa Tamez who received her lands from the Lipan Apache and Basque settlers prior 
to 1767. When Tamez tried to fight the DHS for her land, she lost in court when the 
government sited they could use eminent domain, meaning they could annex the land 
for purposes that were in the public interest. The resulting wall cut Tamez off from her 
ancestral lands that included sacred riverfront areas (Schlyer, 2012, p. 172).  
 
Mythic and Perspectival Dimensional Accrual and the Fence  
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From its inception, the USMX Security Fence maintains a combination of 
mythic and perspectival communication functions. Kramer (1997, 2013) identifies 
several characteristics that emerge in mythic cultures with an important distinction that 
entities separate into polar, cyclical relationships. In their polar relationships, humans 
are somewhat detached from nature or an overall god or life force that connects 
everything. This detachment causes some level of individualism allowing people to 
justify selfish needs. The separation also means that mythical communication allows 
symbolic or connotative meanings. In the perspectival dimension, that separation 
becomes arbitrary where there may or may not be any relationship to anything. 
Individualism is a paramount feature of the modern perspectival dimension.  
From a mythical view, ancient empires used walls as political symbols that 
projected authority, power, and territory. They also served a defensive purpose for 
thousands of years. City walls divided “civilized” or cultured society from the 
“barbarians” who lived in the vast expanse of “un-governed”, “wild”, or other chaotic 
space. Kramer (1992) claims that from the earliest existence of the term culture, it is 
synonymous with civilization. In modernity, some scholars (Brown, 2010; Cisneros, 
2014; Gulasekaram, 2012; Luke, 2013; Pusterla & Piccin, 2012) argue that the concept 
of the sovereign state is falling apart so nations build walls in a desperate attempt to 
save the nation-state philosophy. The USMX Security Fence is much more of a symbol 
of sovereignty than any kind of defense or barrier from anyone (Dunn, 2009; Jones, 
2012; Nevins, 2002). A review of Internet videos demonstrates that young and old 
people alike can climb many parts of the border fence within minutes. Moreover, if 
people have intentions to cross the fence for nefarious purposes, they find many ways to 
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do so including tunneling underneath the fence, or placing vehicle tracks on top of the 
fences to drive over them. Gulasekaram (2012) suggests that the U.S. government is 
using the fence as a mythic political symbol to cover up its perspectival intentions:  
By juxtaposing current border fortification with a time immemorial, a wall 
transcends our current political and historical moment….the border wall 
naturalizes the idea and existence of a national boundary, moving it beyond its 
politically contingent reality as the negotiated boundary between two nation-
states, into primordial primacy. Insulating the border fence within a narrative of 
ancient cultures marginalizes the effect of contemporary policy debate regarding 
the efficacy or normative desirability of muscular border policy. (p. 178-179) 
 
 Beyond its mythic symbolism, the border wall has several perspectival 
characteristics that influence the message it sends to audiences in the U.S. and abroad. 
Kramer (1997, 2013) claims that in the perspectival culture, the meaning of land is 
arbitrary so people can divide and own it. Fragmentation is a trait of the perspectival 
world. The wall communicates that fragmentation is a reality, the government and 
individuals can own space, and people can control what happens in that space (Brown, 
2010; Gulasekaram, 2012; Luke, 2013; Pusterla & Piccin, 2012). Jones (2012) argues 
that there is no place in the modern world for territories or space to remain “un-
governed”, “wild”, or “barbaric”. Within the context of counterterrorism in a post 9/11 
world, ungoverned space is where terrorists have free reign to prepare themselves to 
fight so ungoverned spaces are undesirable (9/11 Commission, 2004; Kean & Hamilton, 
2014). 
 Kramer (1997, 2013) claims that the modern dimension is not emotional. Rather, 
it is full of carelessness making actions arbitrary. A significant example of carelessness 
in the perspectival dimension is technology. In a technocratic world, Mumford (1934) 
reminds us that we often do not think about the negative consequences of new 
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technologies. The border wall is a devastating example of perspectival technology that 
the government uses without regard to human consequences. Schlyer (2012) relates the 
story of border ranchers that deal with the consequences of perspectival arbitrariness:  
This family plot has weathered political storms that have blown in and out of the 
region, upending the concept of nationality on more than one occasion. From the 
Texas Rebellion, to the Mexican-American War, to the US Civil War and the 
Mexican Revolution, political disputes have long embattled this location. And 
today is no exception. Noel points north to the levy almost two miles away, 
where the US government plans to build a border wall, essentially taking all of 
the land between the levy and the spot on which he stands, by eminent domain. 
Construction of the wall— eighteen feet of concrete meant to stop immigrants 
from entering the country without permission— will turn Noel’s family land 
into a no-man’s-land between the actual US-Mexico border at the Rio Grande 
and the effective border two miles north at the wall. All access to the river will 
be cut off. For the US government this spot holds little meaning other than as an 
enduring reminder of its failure to craft a workable relationship with Mexico. 
For Noel, it is a family treasure. Though he has fought a long battle against the 
seizure, before long he will lose, and the government will take his land (italics 
added). (p. 171-172)  
 
The wall technology is not only failing to stop criminals, terrorists, or immigrants, but it 
actually hurts people instead. In other sections of the dissertation, I argue that 
immigrants die due to poor geographic conditions or exploitation from human 
smugglers. Scholars claim that the number increased exponentially since Operation 
Hold the Line and Operation Gatekeeper in the 1990’s (Dunn, 2009; Nevins, 2002, 
2006). Despite the arbitrary nature of the fence and government immigration policies, 
people demonstrate an extreme determination to make it into the states.  
Beyond the physical structures that are in place, I also discuss the inadequacy of 
smart technologies along the border. In a perspectival world, the smart technologies that 
federal officers use at least in part remove some human emotion from patrolling the 
borderlands. On one hand an argument can be made that the use of smart technology 
(surveillance UAV’s, fence cameras, and sensors) keeps officers safe and increases their 
237 
 
effective range of operations. For example, it is a good idea to put metal cages on patrol 
trucks to protect officers from people throwing rocks from the Mexican side of the wall. 
On the other hand, scholars and practitioners reveal many times that smart technologies 
are inadequate, broken, and/or create more problems than they solve. The government 
does not consult operations officers who could help make the smart technology 
strategically useful and more humane. In addition, Maril (2004, 2011a, 2011b) found 
that private corporations are filled with engineers who never see the border, but think 
they have great smart technology plans to solve the problem of border security. Certain 
corporations receive a great deal of profit for creating defective products while ignoring 
the consequences of wall building that threatens the lives of people at the border.  
 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
Walls that divide nations are a reflection of how we communicate, how we see 
our fears, our ambitions, and ourselves. The purpose of this project was to utilize 
semiotics and hermeneutics to analyze, compare, and contrast the communicative 
functions of historic apartheid and the modern USMX Security Fence. Both artifacts 
have influential roles in social, political, cultural, economic, and globalization issues for 
their own countries, and for the world. I studied these artifacts for two reasons. First, 
fences are symbols of deeply engrained social structures or cultures that give the fences 
meaning. In order to comprehend the communicative functions of the two fences, it is 
necessary to understand the context of the history and cultures supporting them. The 
second reason to study fences is to add knowledge in the field of communication 
studies. Communication scholars rarely contribute to borderlands research, despite 
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several calls to do so. In this conclusion, I discuss two important similarities between 
apartheid and the USMX Security Fence. Then I discuss significant limitations in 
conducting this research effectively. Finally, I recommend future research to help 
advance borderlands scholarship for communication scholars and the Intelligence 
Community.  
Discussion 
 I conducted the historical analysis and theoretical applications in chapters five 
and six. At this point, I highlight two of the most relevant similarities in the 
communicative functions of both artifacts. When this project started, I had pre-
conceived notions that comparing these two artifacts would be like comparing apples 
and oranges because they were so different. Part of the hermeneutic challenge was to 
recognize I had a biased perspective to start from, and then the challenge was to find 
more information to see if apartheid and the USMX Security Fence had any related 
characteristics. A review of the chapters illustrates that in my hermeneutic and 
semiotics research, I found plenty of evidence that the two artifacts are indeed 
comparable for many reasons.  
 
Language is a Critical Component in Building Fences 
 The first shared characteristic of both artifacts is that they had similar 
connotative and denotative underpinnings. In the methodology, I list at least 22 
denotative meanings of walls. Six of those meanings apply directly to apartheid and the 
USMX fence. Apartheid and the USMX wall are intangible barriers. Both artifacts are a 
mental, ideological enclosure that leads to physical enclosures. Both artifacts are 
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comparable to other famous barriers in history. Both walls manifest institutional 
discrimination or racism. Both fences divide cultures. Finally, both fences force people 
to become desperate often resorting to violence to overcome the consequences made by 
the barriers. Politically, the USMX fence also served as a symbol of physical defense 
against intruders like terrorists or illegal aliens or drug smugglers. In addition to these 
meanings, apartheid and the USMX Security Fence also have comparable binary 
oppositions in their languages, and the use of language shapes the realities of both 
social structures. In both cases, people are separate or apart. There is a dichotomy 
between being civilized verses being native. The civilized or cultured verses native or 
natural dichotomy leads to other oppositions such as how to define whom land owners 
are or whether we should own it at all. There are similarities in the language of being 
individualistic or a collective.  
Government leaders or colonist leaders wrote specific language into policies, 
regulations, and laws that created the social structures possible to build walls. For 
example, powerful foreign ‘aliens’, ‘stranger’, or ‘uitlanders, invaded what they 
perceived as ungoverned space and then claimed to be the native or divine owners over 
the land. Laws like the Hottentot code of 1809, Law 3 in 1885, and the exclusion of the 
Chinese people in America in 1891 are all examples of where political leaders use 
language to push foreigners out of their lands. Later, laws include attempts to stop the 
spread of Communism in the U.S. and South Africa. Under the discursive ideology in 
each country, powerful governments created the social, political, and legal structures 
that would ultimately lead to the building and maintaining of walls. Indigenous peoples 
in South Africa and the U.S. suddenly became strangers, aliens, and foreigners, in their 
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own lands because they were not from ‘civilized society’. Governments or political 
leaders used labels as justification to forcefully remove and kill millions of indigenous 
peoples. Indeed, Saussure’s argument that language is the most important social system 
and the basis for all other systems is true. Language is the foundation system for the 
social structure necessary to build apartheid and the USMX Security Fence. 
 
Powerful State Actors Shape Social Structures 
It is not new or surprising information that powerful colonial agents with 
abundant resources and new military technologies forced cultural change on native 
societies. The Dutch and later the British foreigners colonized and dominated the tribal 
societies and the Boer, and then the Boer continued to enforce racist policies against 
tribal peoples until apartheid ended. In the U.S., American colonies became a sovereign 
nation. Under the ideology of the Manifest Destiny, Anglo-American settlers took over 
the rest of the U.S. at times with backdoor deals, or by raw brute force. Indigenous 
peoples in neither country had the capabilities to overcome the almost entire destruction 
of their people, language, and cultures by their foreign enemies. In each chapter, the 
historic semiotic analysis outlined specific types of oppression and the response from 
indigenous peoples (Khoi Khoi, Zulu, San Bushmen, Xhosa, the Native American 
O’odham tribe, and the native Mexican people under the rule of Spain). What continues 
to be problematic even in a current context is that too often, nation states continue to 
ignore the rights of indigenous peoples. The dominant agents must learn to give all 
stakeholders a place at the table when determining where or if they should draw 
borderlines and how it influences all affected all parties. 
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Another similarity about powerful actors was that they use symbols very 
effectively to shape the social structure into what they think society should be. Dissent 
was discouraged or outright punished. The Afrikaan Purified National Party and some 
people within the U.S. government use their respective walls as a symbol of political 
power. This is almost more important than implementing laws or protecting the 
southwest border physical wall. Both governments use mass media to manipulate the 
social structure, to send out their message, mainly that fences and separation are 
beneficial for protecting the people’s way of life. The political strategy of D.F. Malan 
was the symbol of apartheid. When Malan won, he institutionalized apartheid under the 
new Purified National Party. Apartheid was the symbol of oppression in South Africa 
for 50 years. Likewise, protecting the southern border was mostly symbolic from the 
time immigration regulations became popular. The fences on the border are a symbolic 
extension of what has already been taking place with immigration policies for over 100 
years. 
Limitations & Future Research 
I found some difficult obstacles in trying to conduct this project. First, one of the 
largest differences is the fact that the security fence is a border problem that involves 
two sovereign nations whereas Apartheid was an internal affair. Even though the 
oppression happened for half a century, internal political parties were able to overcome 
the minority party and take over the government. In the case of the U.S. Mexico border, 
there are two sovereign nations competing for resources that include everything from 
labor to environmental needs. There are international consequences on a much broader 
scale for two nations that share the largest land border in the world. While they share 
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some common ground, they come from very different horizons and have opposing 
versions of what to do about their borders.  
A second limitation is that there are too many institutional constraints from 
academia and the government. There are controversial views between universities and 
their graduate students. There are even more conflicting relationships between 
universities and the U.S. Government where national security concerns exist. The 
government is in a tough position having to balance the needs of national security and 
privacy interests with what should be available to the public, the media, and university 
researchers. This problem will likely continue given the increasing number of terrorist 
threats and the inherent relationship between immigration and travel security concerns. 
Until some of these issues are resolved through more mutual trust and respect between 
university officials and government agencies, this research will always be difficult. 
A third limitation is access to participants’ stories. Practitioners and researchers 
must be able to access human subjects in alternative ways that protects the interests of 
both the subjects and the research. Until researchers are able to talk with and document 
the stories of undocumented immigrants, without the fear that federal officials will 
detain and deport them, it makes gathering their ideas through communication at best a 
difficult process. As the literature review claims, medical researchers are reviewing 
alternative consent methods in order to increase access to patients in the borderlands. If 
it is successful, communication scholars could utilize the same method to interview 
undocumented immigrants and other controversial subjects. Without ways of accessing 
human stories, the research on undocumented immigration and the consequences of the 
security fence will remain limited.  
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This project serves as the basis for many areas of potential borderlands research. 
The literature review briefly discusses communication functions in the areas language 
and metaphor, geopolitics, policy analysis, history, and other social sciences. Many 
countries are building security walls that have influential communication functions that 
society needs to grapple with. One specific area of interest that would greatly enhance 
borderlands research is tracing social networks of immigrants, their communication, and 
their needs. They are critical stakeholders in the debate about walls and government 
leaders, local leaders, and communities must hear them speak. Several interesting 
programs exist to conduct social network analysis. Researchers could continue 
combining ST with communication concepts to explain the activities of undocumented 
immigrants. We must be able to gather information from undocumented immigrants 
without them fearing legal consequences if they share. Until we can collect this kind of 
communication research, we are limited in the opportunities to participate in 
immigration studies in the U.S. and Mexico.  
In conclusion, fences, walls, and barriers are social structures with 
communicative functions that reflect who we are. The analysis of apartheid and the 
USMX Security Fence using hermeneutics and semiotics illustrated how walls obtain 
their meaning through social structures. Now is the time for communication scholars 
and practitioners to contribute to borderlands research. In a globalizing world that is 
becoming smaller, and as more barriers continue to be built, there will be a greater 
necessity to understand what they communicate, and how to cooperate despite 
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